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RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY 
AND SIREN FROM THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY WORLD 
 
GARY NEUSTADTER* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Between February 24, 2010 and April 23, 2012, Heritage Pacific Financial, 
L.L.C. ("Heritage"), a debt buyer, mass produced and filed 218 essentially identical 
adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts against makers of 
promissory notes who had filed chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.  Each 
complaint alleged Heritage's acquisition of the notes in the secondary market and 
alleged the outstanding obligations on the notes to be nondischargeable under the 
Bankruptcy Code's fraud exception to the bankruptcy discharge.  The notes 
evidenced loans to California residents, made in 2005 and 2006, which helped 
finance the purchase, refinancing, or improvement of California residential real 
property.  When issued, the notes were secured by junior consensual liens on the 
real property, but subsequent foreclosure of senior consensual liens, precipitated by 
the mid-decade burst of the housing bubble, left the notes unsecured. 
This Article reports an empirical study of these bankruptcy adversary 
proceedings.  Because the proceedings were essentially identical, they offer a rare 
laboratory for testing the extent to which our entry-level justice system measures up 
to our aspirations for "Equal Justice Under Law." We are unlikely to find many 
conditions better suited to empirical exploration of that question: (1) civil litigation 
filed during a relatively brief time span by one plaintiff against 266 defendants 
(including co-defendant spouses); (2) some defendants defaulting, some defendants 
appearing pro se, and some represented by an attorney; (3) dispersal of the 
litigation among forty-seven different bankruptcy court judges, all sitting in one 
state (and thus, where applicable, required to apply the relevant substantive law of 
a single state); and (4) legal claims and factual allegations by the plaintiff so nearly 
identical that each dispute is resolvable on the basis of one obvious and 
straightforward factual question (reliance by an originating lender on a borrower's 
misrepresentations) or on the basis of three less obvious and more complex legal 
rules (a California statutory limitation on fraud claims and two alternative varieties 
of a standing defense). 
                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. I am grateful to law student Megan Gritsch and 
graduate fellow Steve Horner for their assistance in gathering and recording some of the data used in this 
study, to colleagues Patricia Rauch, Kandis Scott, and William Woodward for their continuing interest in 
and intellectual contributions to this study, to Professor Eleanor Willemsen for her assistance with statistical 
analysis, and to colleagues Kerry Macintosh, Kenneth Manaster, and David Yosifon for helpful comments 
on portions of a draft of this Article. 
The author supervised law students representing defendants in three of the 218 adversary proceedings that 
are the subject of this Article, serving as attorney of record in each. 
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The results in the Heritage adversary proceedings evidence a stunning and 
unacceptable level of randomly distributed justice at the trial court level, generated 
as much by the idiosyncratic behaviors of judges, lawyers, and parties as by even 
handed application of law.  We anticipate some randomly distributed justice as the 
inevitable byproduct of disparities in economic and other resources of the parties 
and disparities in the knowledge, capabilities, and attitudes of even well-meaning 
attorneys and judges acting reasonably in an imperfect system.  We aspire, 
nonetheless, to equal justice under law.  The findings of this study reflect a 
departure from that ideal on a scale both larger than we may have expected and 
larger than we should tolerate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C. ("Heritage"), formed in 2009 as a Texas 
limited liability company,1 was a debt buyer.2 Preceding its January 2014 financial 
demise, 3  it actively invoked California and federal judicial systems, seeking to 
collect on unpaid promissory notes with face amounts aggregating in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars that it had purchased for at most pennies on the dollar.4 The 
notes, issued by California residents to institutional lenders in 2005–06, promised 
                                                                                                                         
1 Heritage filed a certificate of formation as a limited liability company with the Texas Secretary of State 
on March 26, 2009. For formation information, see TEX. SEC'Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/corp/sosda/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
2 I use the term "debt buyer" advisedly, because Heritage asserted in one court submission that it stopped 
purchasing loans in mid-2009, choosing instead to take a temporary assignment of a one percent ownership 
in the loans from a third party on whose behalf it would service the loans or litigate to collect on them. See 
Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Contempt 
and Sanctions at 6, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013), ECF No. 265. Yet, in 
each of the adversary proceedings that are the subject of this study, all initiated after 2009, Heritage alleged 
in each of its complaints that originating lenders or their assignees had duly assigned loan obligations to 
Heritage and that Heritage was the "current owner and/or holder" of those loan obligations. E.g., Plaintiff's 
Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 4, In re Adams, No. 11-02127 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 
24, 2011), ECF No. 1. In one, Ben Ganter, self-described director of client relations, custodian of records, 
and director of the legal department for Heritage, testified at trial that Heritage generally bought loans in 
default and then made efforts to collect on them and that Heritage generally had approximately 50,000 loans 
in its portfolio at any one time. See Transcript of Trial at 6, 44–45, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 18, 2013), ECF No. 59. In any event, the findings and conclusions of this study do not depend on 
whether one characterizes Heritage as debt buyer, servicer, or debt collector. 
For a detailed description and empirical assessment of the debt buying industry, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, 
THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY (2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buying-
industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf. The Federal Trade Commission derived its empirical data from information 
furnished to it by six of the nation's largest debt buyers. Id. at 8–9. In the study, credit card receivables 
constituted sixty-two percent of the portfolios purchased by debt buyers. Id. at 14. Those debt buyers were 
thus institutional debt buyers attempting in the main to collect a recurring type of debt. Heritage, in contrast, 
was a situational debt buyer, formed at least in part with a view to acquiring and profiting from debt 
generated by specific historical circumstances. 
3 Heritage filed a voluntary chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas. See Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., In re Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C., No. 14-
40107 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
4 It purchased the notes from multiple entities. For example, in January 2009, Heritage appears to have 
purchased notes with a face amount of $69,327,453 from Promor Investments, L.L.C., for one-half cent on 
the dollar. In summer 2009, Heritage appears to have purchased notes with a face amount of approximately 
$116,961,649 from Anson Street L.L.C. for .97 of one cent on the dollar. In February 2010, Heritage appears 
to have purchased notes with a face amount of $104,561,120 from Dreambuilder Investments, L.L.C. for 
approximately 1/5th of a cent on the dollar. For these three purchases, then, Heritage appears to have 
purchased notes with a face amount of approximately $290,850,222 for approximately $1,690,287.  
In each of these three agreements, Heritage acknowledged that the debt purchased was delinquent, that the 
purchase price had been adjusted accordingly, and that it was purchasing the debt "as is." Copies of each of 
the three agreements pursuant to which it made these purchases are on file with the author. 
Copies of notes and allonges gathered for this study reflect indorsement of notes to Heritage from many 
additional entities. I did not have access to the agreements pursuant to which these other entities sold notes 
to Heritage and thus can only infer that those agreements provided pricing and other provisions roughly 
comparable to those in the three foregoing examples.  
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repayment of loans that helped finance the purchase, refinancing, or improvement 
of California residential real property.5  At issuance, the notes were secured by 
junior consensual liens on the real property, but subsequent foreclosure of senior 
consensual liens, in many cases probably precipitated by the mid-decade burst of 
the housing bubble, left the notes unsecured.6 
In late 2009 and early 2010, Heritage sued makers of 157 of these notes for the 
outstanding balances, joining seemingly random groups of them in three separate 
actions filed in the Federal District Court for the Central District of California.7 
During the balance of 2010, in a veritable avalanche of litigation, Heritage filed at 
least 534 additional lawsuits in California Superior Court against makers of some of 
the notes it had purchased.8 And, between February 24, 2010 and April 23, 2012, 
Heritage filed 218 adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts against 
makers of these notes who had filed chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions, 
alleging the outstanding obligations on the notes to be nondischargeable under the 
Bankruptcy Code's fraud exception to the bankruptcy discharge. 9  This Article, 
drawing mostly from PACER-accessible records, 10  reports on a study of these 
bankruptcy adversary proceedings, all but one of which has been closed.11 
                                                                                                                         
5 For convenience, "notes" includes a very small number of home equity line of credit agreements and 
other non-negotiable instruments. A few of the notes subject to this study were secured by liens on real 
property located outside California. 
6 Deposition testimony and declarations of Ben Ganter, a Heritage principal, and declarations of Mark 
Schuerman, an expert witness retained by Heritage, make clear that Heritage sought to collect on notes 
originally secured by junior liens on real property. See, e.g., Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter at 13–
15, 17–18, 21–22, 30, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-cv-173203 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2011) (on file with 
author); Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schuerman in Support at 12, 18–19, In 
re Mabson, No. 10-02445 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 19, 2011), ECF No. 20. Foreclosure of a senior consensual 
lien on real property extinguishes junior liens on the property, leaving a "sold-out junior." Bank of Am. v. 
Graves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
7 For a discussion of these three federal district court actions, see infra Part II.A.1. 
8 For a discussion of some of the state actions, see infra Part II.A.2.  
9 An adversary proceeding is a lawsuit filed in bankruptcy court that is largely governed by Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001–87, 9017. Because of 
bankruptcy's automatic stay, Heritage could not initiate suit against makers of notes in either federal district 
court or state court after a maker had filed a bankruptcy petition, and it could not continue a federal district 
court or state court action initiated against such a maker prior to the bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a)(1) (2012). Broadly speaking, an individual's discharge of debt in bankruptcy does not discharge a 
debt incurred by fraud if the creditor timely files an adversary proceeding and thereafter obtains a 
bankruptcy court judgment that the debt is nondischargeable. See id. § 523(a)(2), (c)(1) (2012); FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 4007(c). For a discussion of the adversary proceedings, see infra Part III.A. 
10  Electronic versions of the dockets and all relevant documents filed in each of the 218 adversary 
proceedings, written summaries of each proceeding, Excel spreadsheets recording fifty-seven discrete data 
points as to each proceeding, and tables generated from the spreadsheets are on file with the author. The 
author expresses his appreciation to Bankruptcy Judges Carroll, Jaroslovsky, Klein, and Taylor, Chief 
Judges of the Bankruptcy Courts for the Central, Northern, Eastern, and Southern Districts of California, 
respectively, for PACER fee exemption orders that enabled free access to these records. The relevant 
documents consist of pleadings, entries of default, most motions, memoranda of points and authorities and 
declarations in support of and in opposition to motions, transcripts of hearings, some status reports, referrals 
to mediation and mediators' reports, settlement stipulations, orders, judgments, and, for the very few cases in 
which there was a trial or appeal, exhibit and witness lists, trial briefs and transcripts, and appellate briefs. 
Except where helpful to an understanding of the proceeding, I have not saved any summonses, certificates of 
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Heritage mass produced most of the significant records that it filed in the 
adversary proceedings and its attempted prima facie showing in each was identical 
in every material respect—identical in legal theory, identical in critical factual 
allegations, and identical in the kind of evidence offered to support those 
allegations: 
 
1. Using a uniform residential loan application (Fannie Mae Form 1033),12 
individuals applied for residential real property secured loans, mostly 
through mortgage loan brokers dealing with wholesale lenders, but 
occasionally directly with an originating lender.13 
2. The loan applications, signed by prospective borrowers beneath warnings 
of civil and criminal liability for knowingly false statements, 
misrepresented the prospective borrower's income, employment, or 
intended use of the real property, or, in a few cases, the nature or extent of 
the borrower's liabilities. 
3. Originating lenders relied on the misrepresentations in making what 
Heritage's expert identified as "stated income" loans and what others have 
less charitably identified as "liar loans."14 
4. Originating lenders sold the notes, secured by junior liens on real 
property, in the secondary mortgage market.15 
                                                                                                                         
service, or notices of mailing, and have not saved most status reports, scheduling and other miscellaneous 
orders, or civil minutes. For adversary proceedings commenced in the Northern District of California, 
records also include audio files of hearings, made available because of the Northern District's participation in 
PACER's Digital Audio Recording Project. See Digital Audio Recording Project, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT 
ELECTRONIC RECORDS (PACER), https://www.pacer.gov/announcements/general/audio_pilot.html (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015). The Central, Eastern, and Southern Districts of California did not participate in the 
audio recording project at the time of the adversary proceedings.  
11 One proceeding remained open as of April 5, 2016. In that proceeding, the bankruptcy court entered a 
judgment in favor of the defendant on his motion for summary judgment. Entry of Final Judgment, In re 
Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012), ECF No. 166. The court thereafter awarded 
attorney's fees to the defendant, Order on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, In re Montano, 
No. 11-04008 (Jan. 25, 2013), ECF No. 198, an award that Heritage appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, see infra text accompanying notes 345–46. The Panel affirmed the attorney's 
fee award in In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 112–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013), but the proceeding remains open 
because of the defendant's extended and extraordinary efforts to enforce the attorney's fees judgment. Some 
of those efforts are briefly described infra note 353.  
12 Uniform    Residential    Loan    Application,    FANNIE       MAE    (revised      June     2009), 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide_form/1003rev.pdf.  
13 Unlike a direct lender, a wholesale lender does not conduct the loan origination process directly with the 
borrower; instead, it solicits and acts upon loan applications submitted by mortgage brokers or other 
intermediaries. Loan applications and promissory notes available from PACER typically show that the loan 
application was taken by an "interviewer" working for an entity other than the entity identified on the 
promissory note as the lender. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 11, 
14, In re Cervantes, No. 11-01733 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011), ECF No. 1. A few loan applications 
were taken directly by the entity identified in the promissory note as the lender. See, e.g., Exhibits A and B 
to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Alejandre, No. 11-02349 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. June 19, 2011), ECF No. 1. Shortly after funding a loan, a wholesale lender typically sells the loan in 
the secondary mortgage market.  
14 E.g., In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 730 n.4, 731 n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
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5. Borrowers defaulted in payments on the notes, typically leaving a 
balance equal or nearly equal to the face amount of the note.  Foreclosure of 
a senior lien extinguished the junior lien, leaving the notes unsecured. 
6. Heritage acquired the notes, in some cases directly from the originating 
lenders and in other cases from the last in a chain of intermediate 
transferees.  None of its complaints alleged that Heritage relied on the 
misrepresentations,16  but, under Ninth Circuit authority, Heritage's claim 
under the fraud exception to the bankruptcy discharge could rest on the 
reliance of the originating lender.17 
 
 Despite the undifferentiated nature of Heritage's legal theory, allegations, and 
supporting evidence, this study reveals significant and unjustified disparity in 
adjudicated outcomes among the many bankruptcy judges who heard the adversary 
proceedings.  It also reveals that most attorneys representing defendants did not 
plead defenses that might have defeated liability, that defendants represented by 
attorneys did not necessarily fare better than pro se defendants or defendants who 
defaulted, and that represented defendants in the Northern District of California 
generally fared better in settlement of the Heritage claims than represented 
defendants in the other three California federal districts.  The study also suggests 
that the Bankruptcy Code's attorney fee shifting provision, 18  intended to deter 
adversary proceedings alleging fraud that are not substantially justified, does not 
function effectively. 
Taken together, these findings advance our understanding of debt buyer 
initiated litigation, studied by others primarily in the context of much smaller 
contract claims filed by institutional debt buyers in state court.19 More importantly, 
                                                                                                                         
15 See, e.g., Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 3–
4, In re Frutos de Espinoza, No. 10-09078 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011), ECF No. 31.  
16  Heritage nonetheless frequently submitted a standardized declaration of Ben Ganter in which he 
identified himself as Director of Client Relations of Heritage and asserted that Heritage relied only on 
information provided in a loan application when purchasing loans on the secondary market. E.g., Declaration 
of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 1–2, In re Calderon, No. 10-09077 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2011), ECF No. 57.  
17 See Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that in an 
action under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) the assignee need not demonstrate its own reliance on a 
misrepresentation if it can demonstrate reliance by the original lender).  
18 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).  
19 The most recent published study, of lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland, identifies, summarizes, 
and contrasts the results of prior studies. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 
Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 198–202, 225–29 (2014). Holland's study 
randomly selected 4400 lawsuits filed in Maryland collection courts by eleven debt buyers with the highest 
volume of filings, over one thousand each, in 2009–2010. Id. at 185–86, 203. The lawsuits primarily 
involved attempts to collect relatively small amounts of credit card debt, typically less than five thousand 
dollars and averaging less than three thousand dollars. Id. at 193, 205. Holland's study and previous studies 
all revealed high rates of default, high rates of judgments against defendants (either by default or otherwise), 
and very low rates of attorney representation. Id. at 225–28. Each of these findings contrast sharply with the 
findings reported in this Article, likely because of the significantly greater amounts sought by Heritage in its 
adversary proceedings. In Holland's study, defaulting defendants fared worst, pro se defendants fared better 
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these findings reflect what may collectively and colloquially be described as 
randomly distributed justice at the trial court level—outcomes driven at least as 
much by luck as by the inherent merits of the case.  We anticipate some randomly 
distributed justice as the byproduct of disparities in economic and other resources of 
the parties and disparities in the knowledge, capabilities, and attitudes of even well-
meaning attorneys and judges acting reasonably in an imperfect system.  We aspire 
nonetheless to equal justice under law.  The findings of this study reflect a departure 
from that ideal on a scale both larger than we may have expected and larger than we 
should tolerate. 
To develop this thesis and to foreshadow the description of disparate outcomes 
in the adversary proceedings, Part II describes salient features of Heritage's (non-
bankruptcy) lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California and in the California Superior Court.  Part III describes the Heritage 
adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts, focusing on one factual and 
two legal issues whose disparate resolution generated disturbingly different 
adjudicated outcomes.  Part IV explains how Heritage played with a deck stacked in 
its favor—the beneficiary of information asymmetry, mass production of 
documents, the complexity of the legal issues, and the impotence of the Bankruptcy 
Code's attorney fee shifting provision.  Part IV also describes wild cards randomly 
undermining Heritage's advantages.  Part V offers suggestions for reform and Part 
VI concludes. 
 
I.     HERITAGE LAWSUITS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AND CALIFORNIA 
SUPERIOR COURT 
 
A.    The District Court Actions 
 
Heritage's initial litigation foray in California appears to have been in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California, where it filed 
three actions. The remarkably inconsistent outcomes in these three essentially 
identical actions foreshadow the randomly distributed justice in its subsequently 
filed adversary proceedings. 
Each of the complaints alleged diversity jurisdiction,20 and each joined multiple 
individuals as defendants, presumably to save filing fees.  Heritage filed the first of 
these actions ("Chao") on December 11, 2009, joining fifty individuals as 
                                                                                                                         
but still poorly, and defendants represented by attorneys fared best. Id. at 210–13, 223–24. Those findings 
too contrast sharply with the findings reported in this Article. 
20 Heritage, a limited liability company, alleged that it organized under Texas law and had its principal 
place of business in Texas, that each of the defendants resided in California, and that the amount in 
controversy for each defendant exceeded $75,000. E.g., Complaint for Damages, Specific Performance, & 
Other Equitable Relief at 2–3, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Chao, No. 09-01466 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), 
ECF No. 1. Heritage failed to allege the citizenship of each of its owners or members, and its later failure to 
offer evidence of that citizenship proved fatal in one of the three actions. See infra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text.  
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defendants, the second ("Cole") on January 20, 2010, joining fifty-five individuals 
as defendants, and the third ("David") on February 4, 2010, joining fifty-two 
individuals as defendants.21 It filed Chao and David in the Santa Ana Division of 
the Central District, where each was assigned to a different judge, and it filed Cole 
in the Los Angeles Division of the Central District, where it was assigned to a third 
judge. 
The complaints in the three actions were virtually identical.  All three alleged 
that each defendant had misstated income on a residential loan application, had 
caused the misleading loan application to be transmitted to prospective lenders, had 
thereby obtained a loan, had signed a note promising repayment, and had defaulted 
on the note.  Heritage alleged that it was the holder of each note through assignment 
from an originating lender or intervening assignee.  Each complaint also alleged the 
possibility that one or more of the defendants may have also misrepresented an 
intention to use the real property as a primary residence.  One of the three 
complaints also alleged that each defendant had misrepresented the nature and 
history of his or her employment.  One of the complaints alleged that each 
defendant had sought the loan for purchase of real property; the other two 
complaints alleged that some defendants had sought the loan to purchase and others 
to refinance real property. 
Each complaint pleaded causes of action for intentional and negligent 
misrepresentation and breach of contract, and two of the three added a cause of 
action for fraudulent concealment.  In each, Heritage sought actual damages from 
each defendant equal to the face amount of the relevant note plus twice that amount 
in punitive damages.22  
Following sua sponte orders to show cause why multiple defendants had not 
been improperly joined, the court in both David and Cole dismissed all but one 
defendant because of improper joinder.23 But because dismissal of the entire action 
is not the proper remedy for improper joinder,24 the court in David left the case 
pending against defendant Susana David, apparently only because her name, 
although not alphabetically first, appeared first among fifty-two defendants in the 
caption of the complaint.  The court in Cole left the case pending against defendant 
Hector Hernandez, the one defendant unlucky enough to have filed an answer to the 
complaint prior to the court's order dismissing the remaining defendants.25  But 
                                                                                                                         
21 See Complaint for Damages, Specific Performance, & Other Equitable Relief, supra note 20; Complaint 
for Damages, Specific Performance, & Other Equitable Relief, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Cole, No. 10-
00394 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010), ECF No. 1; Complaint for Damages, Specific Performance, & Other 
Equitable Relief, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. David, No. 10-00133 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1. 
22 None of the complaints sought interest that had accrued on the obligations following the borrowers' 
defaults. 
23 See Civil Minutes – General, Cole, No. 10-00394 (May 3, 2010), ECF No. 54; Civil Minutes – General, 
David, No. 10-00133 (May 14, 2010), ECF No. 67.  
24 A federal court may not dismiss an action for improper joinder but may drop parties to cure the 
improper joinder. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
25 See Civil Minutes – General at 4, Cole, No. 10-00394 (May 3, 2010), ECF No. 54; Defendant Hector 
Hernandez’ Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages, Cole, No. 10-00394 (Mar. 4, 2010), ECF No. 41.  
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serendipity saved Mr. Hernandez from this misfortune.  The court's sua sponte order 
in Cole had also required Heritage to show cause why the case should not be 
dismissed for lack of subject matter (diversity) jurisdiction.26 Heritage probably 
could have responded successfully by offering evidence that the sole member of 
Heritage (an L.L.C.) was a citizen of Texas, thus establishing diversity of 
citizenship, but it misread the law and failed to do so. 27  The court therefore 
dismissed the action against Mr. Hernandez.28  
Susana David was not so fortunate; the court's sua sponte order in her case had 
not raised the jurisdictional issue.29 Ms. David had not appeared in the action, and 
Heritage moved for a default judgment against her on both its contract and fraud 
claims after procuring entry of default. 30  The court denied the motion, having 
properly concluded that California legislation, section 726(g) of the California Code 
of Civil Procedure,31 barred an action for fraud by a holder of a note if the note 
evidenced a loan that was secured, as it was in Ms. David's case, by single-family, 
owner-occupied residential real property actually occupied by the borrower and if 
the loan was for less than $150,000 (adjusted for inflation).32 But the court left 
Heritage the option of reinstating a breach of contract claim that the court believed 
Heritage had abandoned.33  
The court should have dismissed with prejudice instead, because relevant law 
also barred the breach of contract claim asserting default on the note.  California 
anti-deficiency legislation, section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
precludes recovery "[u]nder a deed of trust or mortgage on a dwelling of not more 
than four families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan that was used to 
pay all or part of the purchase price of that dwelling, occupied entirely or in part by 
the purchaser."34 The legislation applies to an action on a note held by a sold out 
                                                                                                                         
26 Civil Minutes – General at 1–2, Cole, No. 10-00394 (Mar. 8, 2010), ECF No. 44. 
27 In the Ninth Circuit, an L.L.C. is a citizen of every state in which its owner/members are citizens. 
Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (joining five other circuits 
that had addressed the issue). Heritage's later filed voluntary bankruptcy petition identified Christopher D. 
Ganter as its sole member and its attached Schedule H stated his address to be in Frisco, Texas. Petition of 
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, at 3, 44. Heritage's response to the order to show cause 
asserted that "each of Plaintiff's members is a citizen of the State of Texas," but Heritage failed to include 
with its response any evidence to that effect (e.g. a declaration of Christopher Ganter stating his residence). 
Instead, its response argued, incorrectly, that its Texas organization and Texas principal place of business 
determined its citizenship. Response to Order to Show Cause and Request to Discharge the Court's Order to 
Show Cause at 3–4, Cole, No. 10-00394 (Mar. 23, 2010), ECF No. 46.  
28 Civil Minutes – General, Cole, No. 10-00394 (June 7, 2010), ECF No. 57. 
29 Civil Minutes – General, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. David, No. 10-00133 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2010), 
ECF No. 61. 
30 Notice of Application and Application for Final Default Judgment Against Defendant Susana David, 
David, No. 10-00133 (Aug. 18, 2010), ECF No. 74; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Plaintiff's Application for Final Default Judgment Against Defendant Susana David, David, No. 
10-00133 (Aug. 18, 2010), ECF No. 74-1. 
31 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(g) (2012). 
32 Civil Minutes – General at 2–5, David, No. 10-00133 (Oct. 17, 2011), ECF No. 108. 
33 Id. at 6. 
34 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (2012). 
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junior lienholder35 and therefore should have barred Heritage, a subsequent holder 
of Ms. David's note, from recovery.  In focusing on section 726(g) of the California 
Code of Civil Procedure, the court overlooked the underlying prohibition on the 
collection of a deficiency. 36  As we shall see, in one adversary proceeding, a 
bankruptcy court did the opposite (properly acknowledging the anti-deficiency rule 
but overlooking section 726(g)).37  
 Heritage didn't look a gift horse in the mouth.  It amended its complaint against 
Ms. David, reinstating its breach of contract claim, and renewed its motion for a 
default judgment. 38  The court granted the motion, saddling Ms. David with a 
$144,434 default judgment on a deficiency claim barred by California law.39 Even 
more troubling, the court's correct ruling on the fraud claims did not deter Heritage 
from filing three subsequent adversary proceedings invoking the fraud exception to 
the bankruptcy discharge,40 and no document that Heritage filed in its still pending 
adversary proceedings acknowledged the ruling of the court in David that section 
726(g) of the California Code of Civil Procedure barred certain fraud claims.  To 
the contrary, many of the complaints that Heritage filed in its adversary proceedings 
(i.e. in other courts) alleged: "Plaintiff is not barred from pursuing this action by 
any anti-deficiency statute or rule.  Plaintiff does not seek a deficiency judgment for 
the balance of a promissory note following foreclosure, but rather seeks a judgment 
for Defendant's fraud in connection with their loan application, as alleged herein."41  
                                                                                                                         
35 See Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Cal. 1972); see also Kurtz v. Calvo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 
100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).  
36  In reaching its conclusion, the court relied exclusively on three cases identified by Heritage that 
addressed the effect of California's one form of action rule on a sold out junior lienholder but none of which 
involved the type of purchase money loan addressed by California's anti-deficiency rule. See Civil Minutes – 
General, supra note 32, at 4–5 (discussing Nat'l Enters., Inc. v. Woods, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001), Bank of Amer. v. Graves, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), and Roseleaf Corp. v. 
Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1963)).  
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit provided the correct analysis in 
affirming a judgment against Heritage in one of the subsequently filed Heritage adversary proceedings. See 
In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 105–12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). For further discussion of that proceeding, see 
infra text accompanying notes 241–44.  
37 See infra text accompanying notes 249–53.  
38 Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint for Breach of Contract Against Defendant Susana David, David, 
No. 10-00133 (Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 110; Motion for Final Default Judgment Against Defendant Susana 
David, David, No. 10-00133 (May 10, 2012), ECF No. 123.  
39 Order of Judgment Against Defendant Susana David After Default, David, No. 10-00133 (July 23, 
2012), ECF No. 130. Because judgment on the fraud claim was denied and entered instead on the contract 
claim, Ms. David could discharge the claim in bankruptcy because exceptions to the bankruptcy discharge 
do not include claims for breach of contract. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012). A PACER search on Ms. David's 
name revealed no bankruptcy filing in California.  
40 Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Dekoekkoek, No. 11-90491 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re 
Nsahlai, No. 11-02983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2012), ECF No 1. In each, 
Heritage alleged that it was not seeking a deficiency judgment but was instead seeking a judgment for fraud 
in connection with the defendant's loan application.  
41 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 4, In re Alabsi, No. 11-03019 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
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 In Chao, the third of the three federal district court actions, the court did not 
question either joinder or subject matter jurisdiction.  Instead, in advance of ruling 
on Heritage's motions for default judgments against multiple defendants, it 
expressed concern about two issues: (1) whether Heritage, as successor-in-interest 
on a note, could invoke the originating lender's reliance on alleged borrower 
misrepresentations in support of its fraud claims; (2) whether the defendants might 
be protected by anti-deficiency legislation. 42  In supplemental briefing, Heritage 
addressed the first issue but not the second.43 The court nonetheless must have 
resolved its misgivings about potential application of anti-deficiency legislation and 
may have been unaware of section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure, because it entered default judgments in favor of Heritage totaling 
$1,841,363 against twenty-three individuals (ranging from $43,380 to $145,273, 
with a median judgment of $87,833). 44  Although the judgments mention that 
Heritage waived its right to punitive damages,45 they do not state whether they were 
based on Heritage's contract or fraud claims, or both.  Thus, unlike Susana David, 
none of the Chao defendants against whom default judgments were entered could 
know whether the judgments against them were, like the default judgment against 
Susana David, based only on a contract claim dischargeable in bankruptcy. 46 
                                                                                                                         
42 Civil Minutes – General at 1–2, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Chao, No. 09-01466 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 
2010), ECF No. 123. 
43 Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application For Entry of Final 
Default Judgments, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Chao, No. 09-01466 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2010), ECF No. 
133.  
44 Judgments Against Defendants, Chao, No. 09-01466 (Dec. 7, 2010, June 13, 2011, and June 14, 2011), 
ECF Nos. 177, 205, 206, 208, 209. No PACER-accessible document explains the court's thinking on the 
anti-deficiency issues. We have only a transcript of a hearing on the motions for default judgments in which 
the judge comments: "And I've thrown a lot of things at you, including antideficiency issues and other 
issues." Reporter's Daily Transcript of Pretrial Proceedings at 6, Chao, No. 09-01466 (Dec. 6, 2010) (on file 
with author).  
45 Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application For Entry of Final 
Default Judgments, supra note 43.  
46 The fate of the Chao defendants, Susana David, and other defendants against whom Heritage obtained 
judgments in subsequent state actions or bankruptcy adversary proceedings is fertile soil for study. Here is 
one example. At least one of the twenty-three Chao defendants against whom Heritage obtained a default 
judgment, Jennie Arizmendez, filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on January 4, 2012, just over a year 
after the entry of the default judgment against her. See Petition of Jennie Arizmendez at 3, In re Arizmendez, 
No. 12-10200 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012), ECF No. 1. She listed Heritage's claim as $97,959.60, 
Schedule F – Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims at 13, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 
18, 2012), ECF No. 11, the exact amount of the default judgment against her, and noted wage garnishment 
by Heritage in July 2011, Statement of Financial Affairs at 21, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 
2012), ECF No. 11. Her other debt schedules reveal this claim to have constituted ninety percent of her total 
priority and non-priority unsecured debt. Schedule F, supra, at 13; Schedule E – Creditors Holding 
Unsecured Priority Claims at 12, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. The Heritage 
wage garnishment therefore played heavily in her decision to file. At the time of her petition, she stated that 
she was married, had one dependent daughter, was employed as a cashier at Target (for thirteen years) with a 
net monthly take home pay of $1,153.73, received an additional $800 per month from a combination of 
rental income and "family contribution," and that her husband received $1,367.16 per month from social 
security and pension or retirement income. Schedule I – Current Income of Individual Debtor(s) at 16, In re 
Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. She listed average monthly expenses of $2,856.29, 
including $1,726.57 as rent or a home mortgage payment. Schedule J – Current Expenditures of Individual 
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Sections 580b47 and 726(g) of the California Code of Civil Procedure48 may well 
have barred both the contract and fraud claims upon which many of these 
judgments were based.  The court dismissed all but three of the remaining twenty-
seven defendants upon Heritage's request.49  
To recapitulate this remarkable set of disparate outcomes among three identical 
lawsuits: (1) Susana David, fortuitously the first of fifty-two co-defendants named 
in a Heritage lawsuit filed in the Santa Ana Division of the Federal District Court 
for the Central District of California, suffered a $144,434 deficiency judgment 
based on a misreading of California law after the judge sua sponte had dismissed 
her fifty-one co-defendants for improper joinder; (2) Hector Hernandez, fortuitously 
the only defendant among fifty-five co-defendants to have filed an answer, escaped 
a similar fate in a Heritage lawsuit filed in the Los Angeles Division of the Federal 
District Court for the Central District of California, if only because the judge sua 
sponte dismissed the lawsuit against him for lack of diversity jurisdiction after 
having sua sponte dismissed his co-defendants for improper joinder; (3) twenty-
three other defendants, among fifty sued by Heritage in a second lawsuit filed in the 
Santa Ana Division of the Federal District Court for the Central District of 
California, suffered default judgments totaling nearly two million dollars 
                                                                                                                         
Debtor(s) at 18, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. She indicated her sole 
ownership of a single-family residence in Chino, California, subject to a secured claim of $399,451.66 and 
estimated to be underwater by $119,451.66. Schedule A – Real Property at 5, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-
10200 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 11. The judge confirmed a five-year chapter 13 plan calling for payments of 
$465 per month based on disposable income of $27,900 over the period of the plan. Order Confirming 
Chapter 13 Plan, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Mar. 21, 2012), ECF No. 28. Heritage filed a claim for 
$97,959.60. Proof of Claim at 1, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Mar. 9, 2012), Claim 3-1. An entity 
known as VAK M12 FUND, L.L.C. later filed notice that Heritage had assigned the claim to VAK, Transfer 
of Claim Other Than For Security, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Mar. 7, 2013), ECF No. 36, suggesting 
that Heritage may have sold to others at least some of the judgments it had obtained. Ms. Arizmendez 
converted the case to chapter 7 on December 31, 2013. Notice That The Case Has Been Converted to 
Chapter 7 from Chapter 13, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 2, 2014), ECF No. 50. The court thereafter 
granted her a chapter 7 discharge. Discharge of Debtor, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Apr. 15, 2014), 
ECF No. 69. VAK M12 FUND, L.L.C. did not file an adversary proceeding to determine the 
dischargeability of the debt assigned to it by Heritage. Docket, In re Arizmendez, No. 12-10200 (Jan. 4, 
2012). 
PACER searches on the other Chao defendants against whom default judgments were entered revealed 
either no bankruptcy filing or a bankruptcy filing by more than one person with the same name. 
47 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (2012). 
48 See id. § 726g.  
49 Analysis of the docket indicates that Heritage requested dismissal of many defendants for whom it had 
not filed a proof of service of summons and complaint and against whom it therefore had not requested or 
obtained a default; as to these defendants it was presumably unable to effectuate service. Heritage requested 
dismissal of a few other defendants after obtaining their default and naming them in its initial but not in its 
second motion for default judgment. Heritage requested dismissal of a few other defendants who had filed 
answers (one of whom had filed a motion for summary judgment, one of whom had filed a third party 
complaint, and one of whom had filed a counterclaim) and one who had filed bankruptcy. The court ordered 
dismissal in response to all of these requests except as to the defendant who had filed bankruptcy, a second 
defendant jointly sued with her spouse, and a third defendant as to whom Heritage had filed a stipulation to 
dismiss. The case was closed with no further docket entries as to the three remaining defendants. See 
Docket, Chao, No. 09-01466 (Dec. 11, 2009). 
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notwithstanding the same infirmities that led two other judges to dismiss 107 
defendants in the other two Heritage lawsuits. 
 
B.    The California Superior Court Actions 
 
Notwithstanding its success against twenty-three defendants sued in Chao, 
Heritage filed no further actions in any California federal district court.  Instead, 
Heritage began filing actions in California Superior Court as early as March 2010.50 
A detailed analysis of those lawsuits is beyond the scope of this Article, in part 
because there are so many of them and in part because obtaining the relevant 
records would be extraordinarily time-consuming and expensive. 51  But a brief 
survey of some of the easily accessible data about some of those lawsuits provides 
additional important context for analysis of the adversary proceedings. 
Heritage filed at least 534 civil actions in California's ten most populous 
counties.52 There is ample reason to believe that the core allegations of most if not 
                                                                                                                         
50 Heritage may have filed some of these actions against defendants dismissed from the federal district 
court actions because of improper joinder, but discovering the extent to which it did so is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
51 The California Superior Court operates at the county level. California has fifty-eight counties, many of 
which do not provide for online retrieval of either basic case information or records filed in a case. Some 
larger California counties provide for online name searches and some provide for online retrieval of basic 
case information (party names, case numbers, nature of the case, names of documents filed, and 
identification of rulings, judgments, and other events), either for a nominal fee or for free. A few also 
provide for online retrieval of images of some records filed in some cases, typically only for a fee.  
52  Heritage filed 195 actions in Los Angeles County (civil party name search function available at 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF L.A., Party Name Search, 
https://www.lacourt.org/paonlineservices/civilindex/cipulbicmain.aspx? (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 81 
actions in Orange County (case index search function available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF 
ORANGE, Case Index, https://ocapps.occourts.org/CourtIndex/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 74 actions in 
Riverside County (civil case name search function available at RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT, PUB. ACCESS, 
Civil Main Menu, http://public-access.riverside.courts.ca.gov/OpenAccess/CivilMainMenu.asp (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015)), 51 actions in Sacramento County (civil party name search available at SACRAMENTO 
SUPERIOR COURT, PUB. CASE ACCESS, Search by Name - Civil, 
https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Civil/SearchByName (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 47 
actions in San Bernardino County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF 
SAN BERNARDINO, Court Case Information and Document Sales, http://www.sb-
court.org/Divisions/Civil/CaseInformationOnline.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 39 actions in San Diego 
County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF SAN DIEGO, Party Name 
Search, http://courtindex.sdcourt.ca.gov/CISPublic/namesearch (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 24 actions in 
Contra Costa County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF CONTRA 
COSTA, Online Case and Calendar Information, http://www.cc-
courts.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=6736 (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 11 actions in 
Santa Clara County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF SANTA 
CLARA, Public Access Civil Case Information Website, 
http://www.sccaseinfo.org/pa6.asp?display_name=index_party (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)), 9 actions in 
Fresno County, (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF FRESNO, Smart 
Search, https://publicportal.fresno.courts.ca.gov/FRESNOPORTAL/ (last visited July 13, 2015)), and 3 
actions in Alameda County (civil party name search available at SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF 
ALAMEDA, DomainWeb, https://publicrecords.alameda.courts.ca.gov/PRS/Home/Disclaimer (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2015)).  
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all of those actions mimicked those in the district court actions.  First, several online 
indices identify these actions as seeking relief for fraud, a description consistent 
with the nature of the claims asserted in the district court actions, and some of the 
online indices identify the actions as being unlimited civil cases (cases in which the 
claim exceeds $25,000),53  an amount consistent with the amount of the claims 
asserted in the district court actions.  Second, online indices indicate that Heritage 
filed all of these actions between March 9, 2010 and October 22, 2010, suggesting 
the likelihood of boilerplate allegations in identical lawsuits.  Reinforcing this 
inference, online records for which the information is available identify the law firm 
that represented Heritage in the state court proceedings as either of the two law 
firms that represented Heritage in the district court proceedings.  Third, the time 
period during which Heritage filed these actions in part slightly overlaps but in 
larger part slightly precedes the time period during which Heritage filed the 
adversary proceedings.54 That timing suggests that Heritage sued individuals in state 
court and thereafter filed adversary proceedings against state court defendants who 
filed bankruptcy (hence invoking the automatic stay) during the pendency of the 
state court action.55 Finally, the complaints filed in a small sample of these actions 
mimic one another and largely mimic the complaints in the district court actions, 
and some of them, like the district court actions, join multiple defendants and 
include the same boilerplate allegations against each defendant.56 
                                                                                                                         
53 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 85–88 (2012).  
54 Heritage filed 42 of the 218 adversary proceedings within the same time period. With the exception of 
one adversary proceeding filed in April 2012, Heritage filed all of the remaining adversary proceedings 
between October 22, 2010 and November 11, 2011.  
55 Cases involving defendants Javier Tovar and Jesus Montano exemplify this pattern. Heritage sued Javier 
Tovar on February 4, 2010, in one of its three district court actions. See Complaint for Damages, Specific 
Performance, & Other Equitable Relief at 2, 7, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. David, No. 10-00133 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 4, 2010), ECF No. 1. The district court dismissed him and others for improper joinder on May 14, 2010. 
See Civil Minutes – General, David, No. 10-00133 (May 14, 2010), ECF No. 67. Heritage then sued him in 
Los Angeles County Superior Court on June 11, 2010. Civil party name search function available at 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CNTY. OF L.A., Party Name Search, 
https://www.lacourt.org/paonlineservices/civilindex/cipublicmain.aspx? (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). He filed 
a bankruptcy petition on July 30, 2010. See Petition of Javier Tovar, In re Tovar, No. 10-41664 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. July 30, 2010), ECF No. 1. Heritage filed an adversary proceeding against him on November 5, 2010. 
See Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Nov. 5, 2010), ECF No. 
1. 
Heritage joined Jesus Montano as one of several defendants in an action filed in Alameda County Superior 
Court on May 6, 2010. See Complaint for Damages at 1–2, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Cloird, No. 
10514182 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2010) (on file with author). He filed a bankruptcy petition on October 13, 
2010. See Petition of Jesus Montano, In re Montano, No. 10-71788 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010), ECF 
No. 1. Heritage filed an adversary proceeding against him on January 9, 2011. See Plaintiff's Complaint to 
Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Jan. 9, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
56 The sample, on file with the author, consists of complaints in: Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Cloird, No. 
10514182 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 6, 2010); Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Duran, No. 30-2010-00372102 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. May 13, 2010); Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Aquino, No. CIV 495303 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 
2010); Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Bulan, No. CIV 495304 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010); and Heritage 
Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Salvi, No. CIV 497206 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2010). The sample also consists of 
"previews" of portions of five complaints filed in the County of Sacramento, in which the names of the 
defendants, the case numbers, and the filing dates are obscured unless downloaded for a fee, and the first 
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Judges in at least two of these actions, both presiding in the Santa Clara County 
Superior Court, entered summary judgment against Heritage on the basis of the 
limitation on fraud claims in section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure. 57  That conclusion replicated the conclusion reached by the federal 
district court judge in David, previously discussed,58 but, as we shall see, rescued a 
defendant in only one of the 218 adversary proceedings.59 And in the only one of 
the Heritage state court actions that reached the appellate level, a California court of 
appeal affirmed a trial court judgment against Heritage on the basis of what 
amounted to a lack of standing defense that had not surfaced in any of the district 
court actions and surfaced only rarely in the adversary proceedings.60 
The court of appeal's description of the alleged facts typifies the facts alleged in 
both the district court actions and in the adversary proceedings.  In 2006, Maribel 
Monroy purchased her son's residence in Richmond, California for $425,000.61 
WMC Mortgage Corp. ("WMC") financed 100 percent of the purchase price with 
two loans, one for $340,000 secured by a senior deed of trust and a second for 
$85,000 secured by a junior deed of trust.62 After her default in mortgage payments, 
the holder of the senior mortgage foreclosed.63 Heritage thereafter acquired the sold 
out junior note as part of its acquisition of a larger pool of notes.64 
Heritage filed its superior court action against Ms. Monroy on June 1, 2010, 
alleging her misrepresentation of income on her loan application and pleading 
causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
concealment, and promissory fraud.65 It did so after its apparently common, but in 
her case unsuccessful, pre-litigation collection activities.66 It had sent Ms. Monroy 
an initial notice that it had purchased her unpaid junior note, attempted to speak 
with her, sent her a second notice of its ownership of the note, and sent her a third 
notice asserting her obligation to pay Heritage on the note.67 Shortly after filing the 
                                                                                                                         
page of five complaints filed in the County of Riverside. The complaints in the state law sample differ from 
the complaints in the three district court proceedings in two principal respects: they substitute for breach of 
contract a cause of action for promise without intent to perform and they seek prejudgment interest and an 
unspecified amount of punitive damages.  
57 See Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. 
Pena, No. 1-10-CV-173402 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2012) (on file with author); Order Re: Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Jiminez, No. 1-10-CV-171231 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2012) (on file with author).  
58 See supra text accompanying notes 30–32.  
59 See infra text accompanying notes 241–44.  
60 Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), petition for review 
denied, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6631 (Cal. July 31, 2013).  
61 Id. at 33.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 See Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 33. 
67 Id. Deposition testimony in another case, by Ben Ganter, self-described managing partner and head of 
the legal department of Heritage, suggests that Heritage typically pursued this type of pre-litigation activity. 
It would "[s]end them letters, try and dig any more information out of them, you know, find out their ability 
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action, Heritage sent her a copy of the complaint and summons together with a 
letter advising her, among other things, that it had filed the action and encouraging 
her to contact Heritage to try to resolve the matter short of litigation.68  
The court of appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion that Heritage had 
failed, in three attempts, to adequately allege the originating lender's assignment of 
a fraud claim to Heritage.69 Indorsement of the note to Heritage from the originating 
lender assigned only a contract claim (barred by anti-deficiency legislation). 70 
Neither an allegation of an industry custom and practice to assign a fraud claim with 
assignment of a note, nor a declaration from a representative of the originating 
lender two years after the sale of the notes, was sufficient to show an intention to 
assign a fraud claim.71 The trial court had invited Heritage to attach to an amended 
complaint a copy of any written assignment by the originating lender.72 Instead of 
doing so, Heritage's second amended complaint alleged that the "loan sell 
agreement" implied assignment of the fraud claim by using the following language: 
"Seller does hereby sell, assign and convey to Buyer, its successors and assigns, all 
right, title and interest in the loan."73 That allegation was insufficient to plead the 
originating lender's intent to assign a fraud claim.74  
 In other words, Heritage lacked standing to assert the fraud claim because it did 
not own it.  This defense, standing alone (no pun intended), likely would have 
defeated many if not all of Heritage's actions, in district court, in state court, and in 
the adversary proceedings, but the March 29, 2013 decision in Monroy came too 
late for perhaps hundreds of other defendants sued by Heritage and an unknown 
number of others who may have settled with Heritage in response to its pre-
litigation collection activities.75  
                                                                                                                         
to pay and come up with settlement agreements." Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter, supra note 6, at 
19 (on file with author).  
68 Id. at 34. A copy of what appears to be an identical (and therefore form) letter sent by Heritage to 
another individual on July 26, 2010 is on file with the author.  
69 Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42.  
70 Id. at 42.  
71 Id. at 41, 43.  
72 Id. at 34.  
73 Id. at 35. Copies of each of the three loan sale agreements on file with the author contain comparable 
language.  
74 Id. at 36.  
75 The Monroy decision did not come too late to rescue defendant Mary Aquino, sued by Heritage in 
another state court action. Complaint for Damages, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Aquino, No. CIV 495303 
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2010) (on file with author). Following the court's denial of Ms. Aquino's earlier, 
pre-Monroy, motion for summary judgment on the ground that "the lender's mortgage fraud claims passed, 
as a matter of course, with the transfer of the note to Plaintiff," Order Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment by Defendant Mary Aquino at 3, Aquino, No. CIV 495303 (July 30, 2012) (on file with author), 
Ms. Aquino's counsel renewed the motion after the Monroy decision. In response, the court, citing Monroy, 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, stating: "Neither the November 2, 2007, Sale and Assignment 
Agreement between WMC Mortgage Corporation [the originating lender] and Mountain View Capital 
Mortgage Trust [the initial assignee], nor the January 20, 2009, Mortgage Loan Sale Agreement between 
Promore Investments, L.L.C. and HERITAGE PAC. FIN., L.L.C., manifest an intent to transfer tort claims." 
Judgment of Dismissal With Prejudice at 2, Aquino, No. CIV 495303 (Dec. 19, 2013) (on file with author).  
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Moreover, the Monroy decision does not offer enduring protection against fraud 
claims asserted by debt buyers.  It teaches future debt buyers to insist on express 
assignment of fraud claims in future debt purchase agreements.  When debt buyers 
purchase note pools from intermediate assignees, the assignment of fraud claims 
would also have to be expressed in each previous assignment up the line to the 
originating lender.  It would not be surprising if this lesson were to penetrate the 
market sufficiently to prompt originating lenders and intermediate assignees to 
include the necessary boilerplate language in all future debt purchase agreements, 
thus obviating this standing defense. 
 
II.     HERITAGE ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS IN CALIFORNIA BANKRUPTCY COURTS 
 
A.    An Overview 
 
Between February 24, 2010 and April 23, 2012, Heritage filed 218 adversary 
proceedings in California bankruptcy courts against individuals who had filed 
chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.76 It filed 40 in the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Northern District of California, 37 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 
District of California, 125 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of 
California, and 16 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California.77 
Forty-seven different bankruptcy judges presided in these proceedings, ten in the 
Northern District, seven in the Eastern District, twenty-five in the Central District, 
                                                                                                                         
76  Debtors named in eighteen of the adversary proceedings had filed chapter 13 petitions, either 
individually or jointly with a spouse; the debtor in one of them converted to a chapter 7 proceeding. The 
balance of the debtors had filed chapter 7 petitions, either individually or jointly with a spouse. Bankruptcy 
courts dismissed three adversary proceedings following dismissal of the underlying chapter 13 proceeding 
and three other adversary proceedings following dismissal of the underlying chapter 7 proceeding.  
77 PACER's Bankruptcy Party Search in each of these districts under the name "Heritage Pacific Financial" 
revealed more than 218 entries for adversary proceedings, but many of the entries were duplicates.  
Jurisdiction of the Northern District, allocated among four divisions, covers Northern California coastal 
counties from Monterey County in the South to Del Norte County at the Oregon border. See U.S. DIST. 
COURT, N. DIST. OF CAL., Jurisdiction Map, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/jurisdictionmap (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2015). Jurisdiction of the Eastern District, allocated among three divisions, covers counties, largely 
in California's Central Valley, from Kern County in the South to Siskiyou and Modoc Counties at the 
Oregon border. See U.S. BANKR. COURT, E. DIST. OF CAL., District Map, 
http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/Locations/DistrictMap.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). Jurisdiction of the 
Central District, allocated among five divisions, covers Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, 
San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties. See U.S. DIST. COURT, C. DIST. OF CAL., 
Jurisdiction Map for the Central District of California, http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/jurisdiction (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2015). Jurisdiction of the Southern District, allocated to one division, covers San Diego and 
Imperial counties in the southern end of the state. See U.S. MARSHALS SERV., Southern District of 
California, Area of Service, http://www.usmarshals.gov/district/ca-s/general/area.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 
2015). For division locations in each district, see U.S. BANKR. COURT, E. DIST. OF CAL., United States 
Bankruptcy Courts Within California, http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/documents/Forms/EDC/EDC.002-
070.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).  
368 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 351 
 
 
and five in the Southern District.78 Twenty-three of the judges presided in at least 
five separate proceedings. 
As in its federal district court and state court actions, Heritage alleged in each 
adversary proceeding that a lender had loaned the defendant79 money relying on a 
defendant's intentional misrepresentations in a loan application and that Heritage 
owned the relevant promissory note. 80  Virtually every complaint alleged on 
information and belief that the defendant's loan application had misrepresented the 
defendant's employment, income, or intended use of the property as a primary 
residence; a few alleged the loan application's misrepresentation of the defendant's 
liabilities. 81  Each complaint sought a judgment that the unpaid debt was 
nondischargeable in the debtor's bankruptcy because the debt was for money 
obtained on the basis of one or both of the species of fraud described in section 
523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or 
actual fraud other than a statement respecting the debtor's financial condition;82 (B) 
a materially false statement in writing respecting the debtor's financial condition, 
made with the intent to deceive, upon which the creditor to whom the debtor is 
liable reasonably relied.83  
In the 218 proceedings, Heritage sued 266 individuals84  for claims totaling 
$21,267,016.  The claims in each of the adversary proceedings were substantial, 
ranging from $11,773 to $458,596,85 with a median claim of $89,363.  Figure 1 
depicts the number of claims by amount (grouping the amounts in $15,000 
increments starting with the lowest claim of $11,773).  Claim distributions in each 
of the four federal districts roughly mirror this distribution among all districts 
combined.86  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
78 Because of judicial reassignments, two judges presided successively in seventeen of the proceedings and 
three judges presided successively in three of the proceedings.  
79 For convenience, this Article uses the singular "defendant" or its singular possessive even though 
Heritage joined co-defendants in forty-eight of the proceedings.  
80 See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 2–4, In re Countouriotis, No. 10-02774 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010), ECF No. 1.  
81 For a discussion of five iterations of the complaint, see infra note 112.  
82 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).  
83 See id. § 523(a)(2)(B).  
84 In forty-eight of the proceedings, Heritage joined co-borrowers, typically spouses at the time of the loan 
application.  
85 The largest note was for $200,000. The $458,596 claim appeared in a complaint asserting liability on 
three separate notes.  
86 Figures depicting the claim distribution for each of the four federal districts are available from the 
author.  
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FIGURE 1: Claim Distribution 
 
 
 
In almost every proceeding, Heritage's claim equaled or was only slightly lower 
than the face amount of the note, both because defendants had purportedly failed to 
make any payments, or only nominal payments, on the notes, and because Heritage 
did not pursue any claim to accumulated and unpaid interest on the notes.  Heritage 
also did not pursue any claim to its attorney's fees although its complaints in the 
adversary proceedings included both a prayer requesting attorney's fees and an 
allegation that its damages included attorney's fees.87  
                                                                                                                         
87 Heritage may not have been entitled to a judgment that included attorney's fees even though all but a 
handful of the 175 notes available through PACER included boilerplate language entitling the lender to 
attorney's fees. At least in the Ninth Circuit, a creditor obtaining a judgment of nondischargeability under 
section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code would be entitled to attorney's fees for the adversary proceeding 
only if it would have been entitled to such fees in a non-bankruptcy court. See In re Pham, 250 B.R. 93, 97–
99 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000), relying on Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 224 (1998). In California, a party 
may recover its attorney's fees in litigating a tort claim if the parties had so agreed in a contract between 
them. See In re Chen, 345 B.R. 197, 200 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (2012)). 
The wording of an attorney's fee provision in a contract determines whether there is a contractual right to 
recover attorney's fees in litigating a tort claim. See Santisas v. Goodin, 951 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1998). The 
author did not examine the attorney's fees provisions in the notes on which Heritage sued to assess whether 
they were worded broadly enough to encompass recovery of attorney's fees in an action for fraud, but a 
bankruptcy court did so in one of the adversary proceedings. Relying on Chen, it denied a motion for 
attorney's fees in part because of its conclusion that the language of the note was not broad enough to 
encompass a fraud claim. See Docket Text Order, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 
2013). Paragraph 4(D) of the relevant promissory note (incorrectly referred to in the Docket Text Order as 
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An attorney represented the defendant throughout a proceeding in 51.4 percent 
of the proceedings and for only portions of a proceeding in another 11.5 percent of 
the proceedings. 88  Defendants represented themselves in 21.1 percent of the 
proceedings and failed to appear in 16 percent of the proceedings. 
Information about the amount of Heritage's recovery from a defendant is 
available for 210 of the 218 proceedings.  It recovered nothing in ninety-four of 
those 210 proceedings (45 percent). 89  It suffered seven judgments of 
dischargeability, four on summary judgment and three following trial. 90  It 
acquiesced to dismissal with no payment to Heritage, based on mutual releases, in 
forty-nine filed written settlement agreements.  Bankruptcy courts dismissed 
twenty-six other proceedings on Heritage's unilateral requests for dismissal,91 and 
dismissed, or entered a judgment against Heritage, in twelve proceedings for other 
reasons.92 
In the remaining 116 adversary proceedings for which the information is 
available (55 percent), Heritage recovered at least $2,142,561 in aggregate 
(approximately 10 percent of its total claims), consisting of $1,138,564 owing by 
                                                                                                                         
"para. 5D") provided simply for the note holder's recovery of attorney's fees for the borrower's failure to pay 
the note holder as required. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 13, In re 
Palines, No. 12-03063 (Apr. 23, 2012), ECF No. 1.  
88  An attorney substituted in for a pro se defendant at various stages in eighteen proceedings and 
substituted out in favor of a pro se defendant in four proceedings. In two proceedings, an attorney substituted 
out in favor of a pro se defendant who later retained a second attorney, and in one proceeding an attorney 
substituted in for a pro se defendant but later substituted out in favor of the pro se defendant.  
89 This includes one proceeding in which the parties settled for payment of one dollar to Heritage.  
90 Heritage appealed one of the four summary judgments of nondischargeability, probably because it was 
based on an issue of law—the applicability of section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil Procedure—the 
resolution of which was critical to its chances in many other cases. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel affirmed the summary judgment and Heritage did not appeal further. See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). For a discussion of this proceeding, see infra text accompanying notes 241–44.  
Heritage appealed one of the three trial judgments of nondischargeability, rendered in a proceeding in 
which the defendant had, through trial, represented himself pro se. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel affirmed the judgment and Heritage did not appeal further. See In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-
HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).  
91 A court order of dismissal followed each request except in one case in which the court simply closed the 
proceeding without an order of dismissal. Although the available records do not reveal reasons for these 
Heritage requests, some of the requests likely reflected its assessment of ultimate success or failure before 
the judge involved. For example, one request followed a court's denial of a Heritage motion for a default 
judgment in the proceeding. See, e.g., Request for Dismissal of Adversary Proceeding Against Defendant, In 
re Cox, No. 11-90357 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. May 18, 2012), ECF No. 24, following two weeks after the court 
denied a motion for default judgment for insufficient evidence of a false representation or materiality of the 
representation, Memo re Order: Request for further documentation or further action, In re Cox, No. 11-
90357 (May 4, 2012), ECF No. 20.  
92 A court dismissed four proceedings for failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Adversary 
Proceeding for Failure to Prosecute, In re Diaz, No. 10-01335 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2011), ECF No. 19. 
It dismissed one for failure to timely schedule a default prove-up hearing. See infra notes 369–74 and 
accompanying text. It dismissed six because of dismissal of the underlying chapter 7 or chapter 13 
proceeding. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, In re Dominguez, No. 11-01646 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. July 11, 2011), ECF No. 5. It entered a judgment against Heritage in one proceeding for 
unspecified "good cause" on the day of trial. See Civil Minute Order, In re Mindt, No. 11-02217 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. Oct 5, 2011), ECF No. 12.  
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virtue of ten default judgments, one summary judgment, two judgments following 
trial,93 and $1,003,997 pursuant to 103 filed written settlement agreements.94 The 
default judgments, summary judgment, and judgments following trial ranged in 
amounts from $49,721 to $147,710.95 Table 1 summarizes this data. 
 
TABLE 1: Recovery by Heritage 
(210 of 218 adversary proceedings) 
 
 
Filed 
Settlement 
Agreements 
Heritage 
Requests 
Dismissal 
Dismissal 
for Other 
Reasons 
Default 
Judgments 
Summary 
Judgments Trials 
$0 recovery 
by Heritage 49 26 12 
Eight 
motions 
denied* 
4 3 
>$0 
recovery by 
Heritage 
103 
($1,003,997) N/A N/A 
10** 
($867,996) 
1 
($61,417) 
2 
($209,151) 
* Excludes one proceeding in which evidence in support of motion for default judgment not available from 
PACER. 
** Excludes default judgment in one proceeding in which default (and hence default judgment) was later set 
aside. 
 
Each of the written settlement agreements calling for payment to Heritage 
provided for payment of significantly less than the amount of Heritage's claim 
against the settling defendant, typically through installment payments.  Figures 2 
and 3 depict the range of amounts defendants agreed to pay by way of settlement, 
expressed first in absolute numbers (ranging from $500 to $32,000) and second as a 
percentage of Heritage's claim against each defendant (ranging from .9 percent to 
48.3 percent).96  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
93 A defendant in one of the two proceedings in which the court entered a judgment of nondischargeability 
following trial appealed the judgment. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the judgment 
and the defendant did not appeal further. See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3633 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). For a discussion of this proceeding, see infra text accompanying 
notes 199–213.  
94  Ninety-four of the settlement agreements called for and resulted in entry of money judgments of 
nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(A) or 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, or both (or in one 
case entry of a monetary judgment without a judgment of nondischargeability). Ten of the settlement 
agreements resulted in the court's dismissal of the adversary proceeding without entry of judgment (or in one 
case closing of the proceeding without entry of an order of dismissal), based on money paid or promised to 
Heritage.  
95 Courts awarded Heritage 100% of its claim in twelve of these thirteen proceedings and, for unexplained 
reasons, only 95% of its claim in the other.  
96 Eleven settlement agreements provided a relatively small discount for early payment that is not reflected 
in the ensuing figures.  
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FIGURE 2: Settlement Amounts Owing in Installments 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Percentage of Claim Owing in Installments 
 
 
 
In seventy-eight of these settlement agreements, however, the defendant 
became liable for a larger sum, often a significantly larger sum, upon default in 
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installment payments.97 The risk of default was not insignificant, given both the 
necessitous financial circumstances in which many debtors continue to find 
themselves after bankruptcy98  and the often lengthy duration of the installment 
payments.99 Figures 4 and 5 depict the range of amounts defendants agreed to pay 
upon default in installment payments, expressed first in absolute numbers (ranging 
from $1000 to $149,855) and second as a percentage of Heritage's claim against 
each defendant (ranging from 2.9 percent to 170 percent).  Were every defendant to 
default in installment payments, Heritage (or its successor-in-interest) would 
become entitled to collect $2,853,883 on the basis of settlement agreements. 
 
FIGURE 4: Settlement Amounts Owing If Default in Installment Payments 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
97 These settlement agreements typically provided for entry of a judgment of nondischargeability for the 
larger amount that would not be enforced if the defendant timely made the agreed installment payments. See, 
e.g., Stipulation for Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff, In re Antunez, No. 11-01569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 
2011), ECF No. 18. Bankruptcy courts would then enter a judgment of nondischargeability in accordance 
with the stipulation. See, e.g., Judgment at 1–2, In re Antunez, No. 11-01569 (Oct. 19, 2011), ECF No. 19. A 
term in a settlement agreement stipulating to a later entry of a judgment in a larger amount if a party defaults 
in making installment payments totaling a smaller amount constitutes an unlawful and hence unenforceable 
liquidated damages term under California law. See Greentree Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc., 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (decided before the Heritage adversary proceedings); see also Purcell v. 
Schweitzer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (decided after the Heritage adversary proceedings). 
The same might be true when the settlement agreement provides for immediate entry of judgment for the 
larger amount not to be enforced absent default in installment payments. See Chambreau v. Coughlan, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).  
 98 See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy's Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
67, 88–93 (2006) (discussing financial plight of substantial minority of families after filing bankruptcy).  
99 Repayment periods ranged from a low of one month (seven defendants) to a high of fifteen years (one 
defendant), with a mean repayment period of 50.9 months and a median repayment period of sixty months.  
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FIGURE 5: Percentage of claim owing if default in installment payments 
 
 
 
Heritage did not collect all of the money owing prior to its January 2014 
bankruptcy filing, in part because some of the promised installment payments had 
not yet become due and in part because it claimed to own only a percentage interest 
in some of the judgments.100 But defendants who have not yet paid Heritage could 
be pursued for payment by a debt collector employed by Heritage's bankruptcy 
trustee on a fifty percent commission basis.101 
                                                                                                                         
100 In its bankruptcy schedules, Heritage lists as assets hundreds of unpaid judgments, discounts the face 
amount of each judgment 98% to reach an estimated fair market value of the judgments, and then claims 
only a 30% ownership in that market value. See Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, 
at 9 (Schedule B), 17–21 (Attachment B-18). Reversing that mathematical process, one derives $27,451,435 
as the total face amount of unpaid judgments, much no doubt attributable to its state court actions. Heritage's 
Schedule B includes at least three judgments, one for $120,000 against Javier Tovar, and two totaling 
$144,037.51 against Maria Taraz, Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, at 18, 20 
(Attachment B-18), equal to the amount of the judgments rendered against them in an adversary proceeding. 
See Judgment, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 44; Judgment by 
Default, In re Taraz, No. 10-90456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011), ECF No. 25 (judgment on two separate 
notes). Heritage's claim to 30% ownership seems consistent with its position, asserted elsewhere, that as to 
notes on which it filed suit, it owned only a temporary 1% ownership that reverted to a third party after 
judgment but as to which Heritage was entitled to a thirty percent fee on amounts collected. See Plaintiff 
Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Contempt and 
Sanctions, supra note 2, at 6.  
101 See Order Approving the Employment of Debt Collector, In re Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C., No. 14-
40107 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2014), ECF No. 63. Amounts to be collected may include unlawful 
liquidated damages. See supra note 97. Such collection efforts might be minimal, however. Heritage's 
bankruptcy trustee recently wrote: "I hired Commercial Recovery Systems and they have collected $0. 
Before I hired them I was assured how good at collecting they were. Once hired, they claim that the debts 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
N
um
be
r o
f D
eb
to
rs
2016] RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE 375 
 
 
 
B.    Deconstructing the Outcomes 
 
To deconstruct these starkly different outcomes in proceedings that were at core 
legally and factually identical, this section of the Article first briefly reviews two 
key elements of the prima facie case under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code: misrepresentations made with intent to deceive a creditor and a creditor's 
actual and either reasonable or justifiable reliance on the misrepresentations.  It then 
discusses three findings in depth: (1) the dramatic differences in judicial response to 
Heritage's claim of reliance on misrepresentations by the originating lender; (2) the 
extent to which defendants failed to invoke the benefit of California's prohibition of 
the fraud claim Heritage was asserting; (3) the extent to which defendants 
overlooked two distinct arguments that Heritage lacked standing to assert its fraud 
claim. 
Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code divides in two the universe of 
nondischargeable fraud claims: (1) false written statements about a debtor's or 
insider's financial condition,102  and (2) all other types of fraud, excluding both 
written and oral statements about a debtor's or insider's financial condition. 103 
Although the two are mutually exclusive,104 most elements of each claim are the 
same,105 and all must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.106 In either 
case, the defendant must communicate a misrepresentation to a creditor intending to 
deceive the creditor and the creditor must rely on the misrepresentation.107 The 
nature of the misrepresentation and the nature of the creditor's reliance distinguish 
the two.  For a false written statement of financial condition, reliance must be 
reasonable; for all other kinds of fraud, reliance need only be justifiable.108  
                                                                                                                         
are too old and too difficult to collect." E-mail from bankruptcy trustee Christopher Moser to author (Feb. 4, 
2016) (on file with author).  
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012).  
103 See id. § 523(a)(2)(A).  
104 See Eugene Parks Law Corp. Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 1454, 1457 
(9th Cir. 1992).  
105  Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires proof of the traditional elements of common law fraud: a debtor's 
misrepresentation, fraudulent omission, or fraudulent conduct, knowledge of the falsity or deceptiveness, 
intent to deceive, justifiable reliance by the creditor, and damage to the creditor proximately resulting from 
such reliance. See Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Ass'n v. Slyman (In re Slyman), 234 F.3d 1081, 1085 
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted) (indicating that creditor must establish these five elements to 
prevail). Except for the nature of the misrepresentation and the nature of reliance, section 523(a)(2)(B) 
requires proof of the same elements. See Siriani v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., of Milwaukee, Wis. (In re Siriani), 
967 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (June 29, 1992) (concluding that since sections 523(a)(2)(A) 
and 523(a)(2)(B) are "substantially similar," adoption of the same test is appropriate for both).  
106 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 760 F.3d 1038, 1050 (9th Cir. 
2014).  
107 See supra note 105.  
108 Section 523(a)(2)(B) explicitly refers to reasonable reliance. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2012). Section 
523(a)(2)(A) is silent on the nature of the reliance required, id. § 523(a)(2)(A), but the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that the creditor's reliance under that section need only be justifiable. See Field v. Mans, 
516 U.S. 59, 69–75 (1995). The Court's opinion explains the likely justification for requiring reasonable 
instead of justifiable reliance in the context of section 523(a)(2)(B): 
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To determine if a creditor's reliance was reasonable, a court must determine if 
the "creditor exercised the same degree of care expected from a reasonably prudent 
person entering into the same type of business transaction under similar 
circumstances."109 Courts can make that determination, the Ninth Circuit has said, 
"without additional help."110 To determine if a creditor's reliance was justifiable, a 
court must consider the qualities and characteristics of the particular creditor and 
the circumstances of the particular case rather than a community standard of 
conduct.111  
Because the nature of the required reliance differs, it would have seemed 
significant for Heritage to have assessed whether alleged debtor misrepresentations 
about the defendant's income, employment, liabilities, or intended use of property 
qualified as false written statements of financial condition or rather as other types of 
fraud. Heritage seemed to struggle with that question, because its complaints 
evolved through several iterations reflecting seemingly different positions.112 In the 
                                                                                                                         
 
The House Report on the Act suggests that Congress wanted to moderate the burden on 
individuals who submitted false financial statements, not because lies about financial 
condition are less blameworthy than others, but because the relative equities might be 
affected by practices of consumer finance companies, which sometimes have 
encouraged such falsity by their borrowers for the very purpose of insulating their own 
claims from discharge. 
 
Id. at 76–77.  
109 In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 736 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012).  
110 Candland v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Candland), 90 F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996).  
111 See Field, 516 U.S. at 71 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1976)). 
112 Heritage's first complaint, used in only the first two adversary proceedings, filed in February and March 
2010, pleaded one claim for relief, alleging misrepresentations of income, employment, and intended use of 
the property, that relied exclusively on section 523(a)(2)(A). See, e.g., Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt, In re Vega, No. 10-01101 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010), ECF No. 1. Heritage 
may have abandoned this format so quickly upon realizing that misrepresentations about income might be 
governed instead by section 523(a)(2)(B). The second and third iterations of the complaint, used in 
adversaries filed from May through early December 2010 (thirty-one percent of the proceedings), pleaded 
one claim for relief, alleging the same misrepresentations, based on both section 523(a)(2)(A) and section 
523(a)(2)(B), without distinguishing between the types of misrepresentations actionable under section 
523(a)(2)(A) from those actionable under section 523(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt, In re Orozco, No. 10-01599 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2010), ECF No. 1. The 
third iteration added to the second only an allegation that Heritage had attempted to resolve the matter before 
filing suit by contacting the defendant's attorney. See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt 
at 2, In re Birch, No. 10-01480 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2010), ECF No. 1. The fourth iteration of the 
complaint, used in proceedings filed from December 2010 through August 2011 (sixty-four percent of the 
proceedings), pleaded two claims for relief, one under section 523(a)(2)(A) for misrepresentations of 
intended use of the property, and the other under section 523(a)(2)(B) for misrepresentations of employment 
and income. It also added an allegation that Heritage's claims were not barred by anti-deficiency legislation. 
Unlike earlier iterations, it also attached a copy of the loan application and note as exhibits. See, e.g., 
Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Vicente, No. 11-02016 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
Jan. 9, 2011), ECF No. 1. It also added an allegation that Heritage's claims were not barred by anti-
deficiency legislation. Id. at 4.  
Heritage used another variation of its complaint in six of the last seven adversary proceedings that it filed, 
alleging in each only a misrepresentation of a defendant's liabilities. Five of them pleaded a claim for relief 
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proceedings in which the parties agreed to a dismissal with no payment to Heritage, 
the distinction obviously was moot.  Even in the proceedings in which a defendant 
agreed to pay Heritage something, the defendant, Heritage, and the bankruptcy 
judges would have been indifferent to the distinction.  In fact, most of the stipulated 
judgments of nondischargeability, drafted by Heritage and signed by a bankruptcy 
judge, stated that the debt was excepted from discharge "pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(2)(A)-(B)."113 Preceding such a settlement, however, the distinction might 
have been relevant if the parties perceived the distinction to be pertinent to the 
settlement value of the proceeding. 
In all but a few cases, the defendants sued by Heritage had applied for loans via 
a Fannie Mae Uniform Residential Loan Application, a form that calls for 
information about a debtor's intended use of the real property subject to a 
contemplated mortgage and about a debtor's employment, monthly income, monthly 
housing expenses, assets, and liabilities. 114  Clearly, a misrepresentation about a 
debtor's intended use of the property would not be a false written statement about 
the debtor's financial condition, so that claim should have proceeded exclusively on 
the basis of section 523(a)(2)(A), requiring only justifiable reliance by the lender.  
But misrepresentations in a loan application about income and liabilities constitute 
misrepresentations about a debtor's financial condition, so those claims should have 
proceeded exclusively on the basis of section 523(a)(2)(B), requiring reasonable 
reliance by the lender.115  
                                                                                                                         
under section 523(a)(2)(B). See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re 
Nsahlai at 4–5, No. 11-02983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1. One pleaded a claim for relief 
under both section 523(a)(2)(A) and section 523(a)(2)(B). See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt at 4, 5–6, In re Bettencourt, No. 11-01224 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2011), ECF 
No. 1. 
113 E.g., Order (Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment) at 2, In re Agsalud, No. 10-
90597 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 18. At least one bankruptcy judge was more attentive to 
the distinction. In his order approving a settlement agreement, he struck the reference to section 523(a)(2)(A) 
but not the reference to 523(a)(2)(B). See Order (Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Settlement) at 2, In 
re Torell, No 11-01080 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011), ECF No. 47.  
114 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 10–13, In re Castaneda, No. 
10-01749 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010), ECF No. 1.  
115 Courts differ on the meaning of a "statement . . . respecting the debtor's . . . financial condition." Some 
take the broad view that it encompasses any written statement that reflects the financial condition of the 
debtor, while others take the narrow view that it encompasses only written statements that provide 
information about the debtor's overall financial health. See Schneiderman v. Bogdanovich (In re 
Bogdanovich), 292 F.3d 104, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing cases). The Ninth Circuit adopted the narrower 
view. See In re Belice, 461 B.R. 564, 573–78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). Although Heritage filed all but one of 
its adversary proceedings before the December 2011 decision in that case, misrepresentations in a loan 
application of income and liabilities would seem to present a picture of the debtor's overall financial health. 
In two appeals to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel involving a Heritage adversary proceeding, 
both decided after the court's decision in Barnes, the Panel did not consider the question. See In re Tovar, 
Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (assuming 
written statement regarding debtor's financial condition because not contested by appellant); In re Trejo, Ch. 
7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *11–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (affirming 
trial court conclusion that reliance was neither justifiable nor reasonable). Misrepresentations about the 
nature of one's employment may not qualify under the narrow view. See, e.g., In re Carlson, Ch. 7 No. WW-
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Whatever the misrepresentations alleged, every defendant answering a 
complaint denied having made misrepresentations, or at least denied having made 
them with intent to deceive a creditor.  Most did so in their answers with a simple 
denial;116 some added a boilerplate affirmative defense alleging fault of unnamed 
"others."117 Answers from other defendants more explicitly blamed a broker or real 
estate agent, as in the following three unedited excerpts from the answers of pro se 
debtors:  
 
When I applied for a loan for the purchase of my house, all 
documentation was made by the sales agent, he only said to me: 
SIGN HERE, I wanted to have a home to live in with my family 
and fulfill my American dream, in no time I had the intension [sic] 
of doing some fraud on my behalf. 
 
But the bad economic situation around world, affected my 
economy, I lost my job, I could not make monthly loan payments 
and lost my house. 
 
I have never altered documents to make fraud; I don't speak or 
write English, everything was made by the sales agent.118 
 
–––– 
 
Because I am not well versed in purchasing property, I trusted my 
broker to provide me with accurate information. I signed the loan 
papers as instructed and the broker had completed the rest of it. 
Since that time, I have learned that the broker I used was indited 
[sic] and convicted in federal court for fraud. I am a victim of his 
illegal activities and was none the wiser.119  
 
–––– 
 
I Oscar Villatoro pleading that all of this is not a fraud. Yes I did 
sign the paper but I did not know the real estate agent had put my 
income really high. I didn't realize what I was signing I gave all my 
                                                                                                                         
11-1486-KiJuH, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2304, at *22 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 22, 2012) ("[R]epresentations about 
sources of income that could be looked to for repayment are not statements of financial condition.").  
116 See, e.g., Answer to Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Gomez, No. 10-03197 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011), ECF No. 6.  
117 See, e.g., Answer to Complaint at 3–4, In re Taber, No. 10-05395 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2012), 
ECF No. 24.  
118 Answer, In re Barahona, No. 11-02210 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011), ECF No. 8.  
119 Notice of Motion and Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) at 11, In 
re Fontenot-Kenney, No. 11-01953 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2011), ECF No. 8.  
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information and paystubs to the agent so I trusted him. Should I 
have check [sic] what I was saying "yes", was I stupid for not 
checking "yes". Honestly I don't know what else to say, if Heritage 
Pacific Financial want [sic] to sue me, well I don't know how much 
they will get because I have nothing I don't make much. So this is 
my plea.120  
 
Bankruptcy courts found intentional misrepresentation in five of the seven 
proceedings in which they adjudicated that issue. 121  The remaining adversary 
proceedings settled, were resolved by a bankruptcy court on other grounds, or were 
dismissed at Heritage's request. For most of the proceedings, therefore, we cannot 
assess the accuracy of Heritage's claims of intentional misrepresentations.  But even 
assuming intentional misrepresentations of income or employment in every 
proceeding, it is nonetheless possible to compare results across a significant number 
of the proceedings, because intentional misrepresentation alone, without the 
appropriate degree of reliance, is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case.  It is 
therefore to the question of reliance by the originating lender that this Article now 
turns. 
 
1.    Reliance, Like Beauty, is in the Eye of the Beholder  
 
Heritage submitted evidence purporting to demonstrate reliance by the 
originating lender in twenty-nine proceedings: in a motion for default judgment in 
at least eighteen of nineteen proceedings,122 in support of or in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment in six proceedings, and in five trials.  In each of 
those contexts, some bankruptcy judges found the evidence sufficient and others 
found it insufficient to demonstrate the requisite reliance of the originating lender, 
even though, as detailed below, the evidence in most was either identical or 
functionally equivalent. 
 
                                                                                                                         
120 Answer, In re Villatoro, No. 11-01315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 31, 2011), ECF No. 5.  
121 See Order Following Trial at 2, 4–5, In re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011), ECF 
No. 33 (misrepresentations of income and employment deemed admitted from unanswered Request for 
Admissions); Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011), ECF No. 19 (defendant encouraged by another to misrepresent income); Transcript of 
Trial, supra note 2, at 119–20 (misrepresentations of income, employment, and intended use of property); 
Transcript of Trial at 16–17, In re Mabson, No. 10-02445 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), ECF No. 21 
(misrepresentations of income and intended use of property); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2, 
In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 43 (unspecified false representations); 
Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 7, 9, In re Martinez, No. 11-
01131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2012), ECF No. 35 (misrepresentation of income, no misrepresentation of 
intended use of property or ownership of restaurant, and unresolved issue of material fact concerning intent 
to misrepresent income); Memorandum at 8–10, 12–13, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 13, 2012), ECF No. 47 (insufficient evidence of false representations and insufficient evidence of intent 
to deceive).  
122 Documents are not available from PACER for one of the nineteen motions for default judgment.  
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a.    In Motions for Default Judgment 
 
The troubling differences in outcome are most evident in the resolution of 
Heritage's motions for default judgment, each filed following a defendant's default.  
In support of each of its motions for default judgment, Heritage offered the 
declaration of Ben Ganter.  Describing himself as Heritage's Director of Client 
Relations, Mr. Ganter declared his familiarity with Heritage's regular course of 
business and with its operations in the secondary mortgage market, which included 
the purchase of notes.123 His declarations typically attached the defendant's loan 
application and promissory note as exhibits,124 and routinely asserted that Heritage 
relied on the truthfulness of loan applications when it purchased loans.125  This 
implausible assertion was in any event irrelevant because Heritage neither pleaded 
nor argued its own reliance as a predicate for its fraud claims.126 His declarations 
did not claim his employment by or other association with any originating lender or 
any other basis to establish his personal knowledge of an originating lender's 
underwriting practices or its reliance on a specific loan application.127  For that 
reason, some bankruptcy judges found his declaration insufficient to establish the 
originating lender's reliance.  One bankruptcy judge put this bluntly in granting a 
judgment for the defendant after trial:  
                                                                                                                         
123 See, e.g., Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Motion for Default Judgment at 1, In re Wilson, No. 
10-01291 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011), ECF No. 17. In another proceeding, Mr. Ganter testified that he 
was a managing partner and custodian of records of Heritage. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 9. In 
testimony in a state law proceeding, Mr. Ganter described himself as managing partner and head of the legal 
department of Heritage, but not a lawyer. See Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter, supra note 6, at 8–9.  
124 See, e.g., Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 4, In re 
Arana, No. 10-01575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011), ECF No. 8-2.  
125 See, e.g., Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, supra note 
124, at 3.  
126 Proof of Heritage's own reliance (in lieu of proof of reliance by the originating lender) would have 
sufficed to satisfy the reliance requirement of section 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Machuca, 
483 B.R. 726, 731 n.6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), but Mr. Ganter's assertion that Heritage relied on 
representations in loan applications was implausible for several reasons. As previously indicated, supra note 
4, Heritage purchased blocks of notes for at most pennies on the dollar several years after defendants 
represented income and employment in loan applications. Both the purchase price and timing of these 
purchases reflect the implicit understanding of seller and buyer that many of the notes will be uncollectible, 
either because of inaccuracy in income or employment information stated in the loan application or because 
of a subsequent change in the borrower's financial circumstances. Moreover, Mr. Ganter testified that when a 
portfolio of loans became available for purchase, and before bidding on the portfolio, a Heritage 
representative would visit the facility at which the loan files were stored, verify the existence of loan files, 
but not look at the loan application or other documents in the loan files. See Deposition of Benjamin Alan 
Ganter at 18–23, Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Aquino, No. CIV- 495303 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2011) (on 
file with author). One bankruptcy court commented on both the irrelevance and implausibility of Mr. 
Ganter's assertion of reliance by Heritage, noting that Heritage had not alleged that it had been defrauded 
but, had it done so, the court would not have been persuaded by Heritage's "blind reliance on the loan 
application . . . ." Civil Minutes at unnumbered fourth page, In re Calderon, No. 10-09077 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 28, 2011), ECF No. 68.  
127  See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 2, In 
re Medrano, No. 10-03142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF No. 30-3 (failing to establish any 
personal knowledge of originating lender's underwriting practices). 
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However, the Ganter Declaration provides no evidence of the 
original lender's reliance on the statements within the Loan 
Application. Mr. Ganter provides no personal knowledge as to the 
reliance undertaken by the original lender. The Ganter Declaration 
claims that the original lender approved the Loan based on the 
Defendant's misrepresentations. This is a bald, unsupported 
statement, without personal knowledge of the original lender's 
reliance or state of mind.128 
 
Yet in three proceedings in which Heritage offered Ben Ganter's declaration as the 
only evidence of the originating lender's reliance, two bankruptcy judges granted 
Heritage's motion for default judgment, commenting in one, without elaboration, 
that "[t]he motion is supported by competent evidence."129  
Heritage also offered the declaration of Mark Schuerman, an expert witness, in 
support of sixteen of the nineteen motions for default judgment.130 Each of his 
declarations recited his credentials and extensive experience in the real estate and 
mortgage industries.131 The most common form of his declaration, used in support 
of ten motions for default judgment, stated that originators of stated income loans 
expected to hold notes for thirty to ninety days before selling them to an investor 
and that "[t]he buyers of these notes rely on the stated income and representations 
made in the 1003 Applications when purchasing these notes from the original 
lenders." 132  It then quoted a paragraph of those applications in which the loan 
applicant represents the truthfulness of information in the application to lenders and 
their successors in interest and described that paragraph as crucial to the viability of 
the lending industry.133 It concluded that holders of notes secured by a second deed 
of trust heavily rely on income, employment, assets, and debts stated in the loan 
application because they are at the mercy of foreclosure by the holder of a first deed 
of trust on the same property.134  
The second most common form of his declaration, used in support of six 
motions for default judgment, described the defendant's loan as a stated income loan 
                                                                                                                         
128 Memorandum, supra note 121, at 11.  
129 Civil Minutes, In re Wilson, No. 10-01291 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 18, 2011), ECF No. 22. Two months 
later, the same court granted Heritage's motion for default judgment in another proceeding, without 
comment. See Civil Minutes, In re Phillips, No. 10-01308 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 29. In 
the third of the three proceedings, discussed more fully infra note 153, another bankruptcy court granted 
Heritage's motion for default judgment without comment on the evidence. Order and Judgment of 
Nondischargeability in Favor Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C. and Against Daniel Hawker Taber, In re 
Taber, No. 10-05395 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 5, 2011), ECF No. 16.  
130 For simplicity, this presumes that Heritage submitted this declaration in support of a motion for default 
judgment in one proceeding for which relevant documents are not available from PACER.  
131 See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 1–2, 
In re Calderon, No. 10-09077 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011), ECF No. 30.  
132 Id. at 3.  
133 See id.  
134 See id. at 3–4.  
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and offered greater detail about the standards of practice and customs in the lending 
industry for stated income loans from 2005 to 2007, the period of the loans in 
question.135 The practice, he said, was to obtain a borrower's loan application and 
rely on the borrower's FICO score and debt-to-income ratio in approving loans.136 
At the time, he stated, "[t]he stated income loan was favored . . . as it sped up the 
underwriting and closing processes."137 
Notably absent from both forms of Mr. Schuerman's declaration was any 
statement that a specific originating lender actually relied, justifiably relied, or 
reasonably relied on income, employment, or other information in a specific 
defendant's loan application.  Presumably he could not have made any such 
statement, because none of his declarations claimed his employment by or other 
association with an originating lender or claimed any other basis to establish his 
personal knowledge of an originating lender's underwriting practices or reliance on 
a specific loan application.  Neither of these two forms of his declaration mentioned 
the defendant's name, enabling Heritage to duplicate it, attach a cover page with a 
caption that included the defendant's name, and file it in more than one proceeding, 
sometimes months after Mr. Schuerman's signed it.138 
Some bankruptcy judges found the Schuerman declaration insufficient to 
establish reliance by an originating lender.  In one proceeding, against defendant 
Maria Becerra, Heritage offered both the Ganter declaration and the more 
frequently used form of the Schuerman declaration.139 The judge declined to enter a 
default judgment but gave Heritage the opportunity to submit additional evidence 
after making the following comments:  
 
This . . . loan was made in 2006, when home lending practices in 
California and the nation as a whole were sloppy at best. The court 
has a substantial question whether any underwriting due diligence 
was performed by lenders . . . . Given the industry practices at the 
time, the court is unwilling to presume that anyone even looked at 
the financial statements and other documents submitted in support 
of loan applications. In other words, this court will not presume 
justifiable reliance by the originating creditor, even if the 
                                                                                                                         
135 See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment at 4–5, 
In re Medrano, No. 10-03142 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF No. 30-2.  
136 See id. at 4–5.  
137 Id. at 4.  
138 See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re 
Calderon, supra note 131, which Mr. Schuerman had signed on October 1, 2010, and which was duplicated 
off-center and at an angle distinct from a covering caption page.  
139 See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Becerra, No. 
10-01517 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12-1; Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12-5.  
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representations in the financial statement were materially false. 
Evidence of reliance by the original lender is required.140  
 
The judge's reference to sloppy home lending practices in 2006 is arresting.  
Ms. Becerra had defaulted and therefore offered no such evidence; Heritage had not 
submitted any such evidence and would have been foolish to do so.  Perhaps the 
bankruptcy judge took judicial notice of sloppy home lending practices sub silentio.  
A court may sua sponte take judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable 
dispute if it is generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction.141 The 
bankruptcy judge would be in good company were that her justification.  The 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit effectively did likewise one year 
later in affirming a defendant's attorney fee award in another Heritage proceeding: 
  
By identifying his Loan as a stated income loan . . . [the defendant] 
implicated the now-discredited practice of indiscriminately making 
mortgage loans without verifying the income stated on the loan 
application. Lenders who made these so-called "liar's loans" often 
did not care what income the borrowers listed and sometimes 
actively encouraged misstatements of income. Indeed, the 
economic incentives associated with originating such high-risk, 
high-interest rate loans led some brokers to falsify loan applications 
without the borrower's knowledge or active participation.142  
 
Offered the opportunity to submit additional evidence against Ms. Becerra after 
the court denied its motion, Heritage submitted the declaration of a vice-president 
of a successor-in-interest to the originating lender stating that the originating lender, 
consistent with industry practices, had relied on information provided by "an 
applicant/borrower in his/her loan application through all stages of the underwriting 
process."143 The judge again denied the motion for default judgment, finding the 
supplemental declaration insufficient to establish the declarant's familiarly with the 
                                                                                                                         
140 Court's Request for Supplemental Brief on Justifiable Reliance in Motion for Default Judgment at 3, In 
re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Aug. 18, 2011), ECF No. 19. To demonstrate misrepresentation, Heritage had 
submitted a tax transcript showing that Ms. Becerra's earnings for 2006 were lower than earnings for that 
year stated in her loan application. See Exhibit C to Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Default Judgment, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12-4. The tax 
transcript had been requested in January 2011, probably by Heritage. See id. at 2. Submission of a tax 
transcript requested in 2011 suggests that the loan file did not contain a tax transcript ordered by the 
originating lender prior to making the loan in 2006; that, in turn, implies that the originating lender, WMC 
Mortgage Corp. ("WMC"), may not have taken any steps to verify Ms. Becerra's stated income. The 
implication is fortified by the contents of WMC loan files that Heritage offered into evidence in two other 
proceedings discussed infra notes 183–92 and accompanying text. 
141 See FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1), (c)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 9017.  
142 In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 730 n.4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). The court cited three law review articles 
following its description of lending practices. Id.  
143 Declaration of Robert Rothleder at 2, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Sept. 19, 2011), ECF No. 20-1.  
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loan in question because the declarant had not been employed by or been an officer 
of the originating lender at the time the loan was made.144 Undeterred, Heritage then 
submitted additional briefing and the less frequently used form of the Schuerman 
declaration.145 The judge again denied the motion, with the following comments: 
 
Plaintiff's attempt to prove reliance by expert testimony is 
insufficient to prove that the actual lender on the loan in question 
followed any industry standard or relied on anything when the loan 
was made. The only competent admissible evidence sufficient to 
establish reasonable reliance in this case would be testimony from 
an employee or underwriter of this loan by . . . [the originating 
lender] in the relevant time frame. Plaintiff presents no such 
evidence.146  
 
The same bankruptcy judge denied a Heritage motion for default judgment in 
another proceeding for the same reason.147 Two other bankruptcy judges shared the 
same view.  One denied a Heritage motion for default judgment in part because he 
concluded that the Ganter and Schuerman declarations failed to demonstrate 
reliance of the originating lender.148 Another continued a hearing on a Heritage 
motion for default judgment with the comment that Heritage's evidence, which had 
included the Ganter and Schuerman declarations, had not demonstrated reliance.149 
Heritage requested dismissal of each of these proceedings thereafter, presumably 
because it didn't wish to speculate on and invest in the possibility of identifying, 
locating, and procuring favorable testimony from someone personally 
                                                                                                                         
144 Denial of Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra at 2, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Dec. 20, 
2011), ECF No. 21.  
145 See Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application for Default Judgment Against 
Defendant Maria R. Becerra, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 3, 2012), ECF No. 22; Supplemental Brief 
of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Brief in Support of its Application for 
Default Judgment Against Defendant Maria R. Becerra, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Apr. 3, 2012), ECF 
No. 22-1.  
146 Order Denying Entry of Default Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra at 2, In re Becerra, No. 
10-01517 (Sept. 7, 2012), ECF No. 25.  
147 See Order for Judgment Against Defendant Domingo Castaneda – Denied, In re Castaneda, No. 10-
01749 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012), ECF No. 26. In a third proceeding pending before the same judge, 
Heritage moved for a default judgment without a hearing. Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Default Judgment 
by the Court, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 24, 2011), ECF No. 13. The docket in the 
proceeding reflects no ruling on the motion. See Docket, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Aug. 31, 2010). 
Twenty-two months later, the court issued an order to show cause why the matter should not be dismissed 
for failure to prosecute. See Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute, In re Villegas, No. 
10-01526 (Mar. 20, 2013), ECF No. 18. In response, Heritage moved to dismiss the case, presumably 
because of the judge's earlier rulings denying a motion for default judgment in both the Becerra and 
Castaneda adversary proceedings. See Request for Dismissal of Defendant Jose Asuncion Villegas, In re 
Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Mar. 25, 2013), ECF No. 21.  
148 See Civil Minutes, supra note 126, at unnumbered pages 4–5.  
149 See Calendar Notes, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012), ECF No. 22.  
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knowledgeable about underwriting procedures of the originating lender many years 
earlier, at the time the loan was made.150  
In striking contrast, eight bankruptcy judges granted a Heritage motion for 
default judgment in eleven proceedings.  As a result, Heritage obtained default 
judgments, ranging from $49,722 to $147,710, totaling $867,996, approximately 
forty-one percent of its recovery in the 117 proceedings in which it became entitled 
to recover something.151 Heritage submitted the Ganter declaration alone in support 
of three of the motions (as noted earlier) and also submitted the Schuerman 
declaration, but no other evidence, in support of eight of the motions.152 Two of 
these eight judges later seem to have changed their evaluation of the evidence, 
concluding in Heritage proceedings against other defendants that the Ganter and 
Schuerman declarations did not demonstrate the requisite reliance.153  
                                                                                                                         
150 Heritage requested dismissal of four other proceedings in which it had filed a motion for default 
judgment, one before a hearing on the motion, one in which a bankruptcy judge denied the motion for 
undisclosed reasons, one in which the bankruptcy judge denied the motion on grounds other than lack of 
proof of reliance, and one in which the bankruptcy judge required additional briefing on issues not described 
in the PACER-accessible documents.  
151  The total excludes a default judgment for $147,500 later set aside after the defendant appeared, 
discussed infra note 153.  
152 See, e.g., Declaration of Mark Schuerman, In re Arana, No. 10-01575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011), 
ECF No 8-1. 
153 In one proceeding, Heritage submitted the Ganter declaration (attaching the loan application, note, and 
tax transcripts, requested in 2011, reflecting the defendant's income for 2005–2007) and the Schuerman 
declaration. See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, supra note 
124; Exhibits A–C to Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re 
Arana, No. 10-01575 (Feb. 1, 2011), ECF Nos. 8-3, 8-4, 8-5; Declaration of Mark Schuerman, supra note 
152. The court entered a default judgment for Heritage. Order of Judgment Against Josefina Arana, In re 
Arana, No. 10-01575 (Apr. 18, 2011), ECF No. 12. 
One month after that order, in another proceeding before the same judge, Heritage submitted identical 
evidence (except that the tax transcripts, requested in 2011, covered only 2005–2006). See Declaration of 
Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (May 10, 
2011), ECF No. 13-1; Exhibits A–D to Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Default Judgment, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (May 10, 2011), ECF Nos. 13-2, 13-3, 13-4, 13-5; 
Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, In re Moreno, No. 
10-01685 (May 10, 2011), ECF No. 13-6. The docket reflects denial of the motion. Docket, In re Moreno, 
No. 10-01685 (Nov. 19, 2010). Heritage renewed the motion eight months later, Plaintiff's Motion for 
Default Judgment by Court, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Jan. 9, 2012), ECF No. 17. Just before the hearing 
on the motion Heritage filed the alternative form of the Schuerman declaration in support of the motion. See 
Supplemental Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment 
Against Defendant Joel R. Moreno, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Apr. 4, 2012), ECF No. 21-3. The judge 
continued a hearing on the motion with notes indicating that the supplemental papers did not demonstrate 
actual reliance. Calendar Notes, supra note 149, at 2. In July 2012, Heritage again renewed its motion, 
adding the declaration of an account executive working for the originating lender at the time of the loan to 
Mr. Moreno who stated that the originating lender relied on the information provided by the "applicant-
borrower" in the loan application. See Declaration of Richard Turner in Support of Plaintiff's Amended 
Default Judgment Against Defendant Joel R. Moreno at 2, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (July 9, 2012), ECF 
No. 27-3. For unknown reasons, Heritage requested dismissal of the action before a hearing on the renewed 
motion. See Request for Dismissal of Defendant Joel R. Moreno, In re Moreno, No. 10-01685 (Oct. 3, 
2012), ECF No. 35. 
In another proceeding, before a different bankruptcy judge, Heritage submitted only the Ganter declaration 
(attaching the loan application and note). See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Motion for Default 
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Records from the eleven proceedings in which the court granted a Heritage 
motion for default judgment reveal nothing about the judges' view of the 
declarations or thinking on the issue of reliance.154 Perhaps some of these judges 
thought a default judgment justified on the basis of Heritage's complaint, because 
federal law permits default judgments on the basis of well pleaded complaints 
alone. 155  If so, that would have been inconsistent with the decision of another 
bankruptcy judge who dismissed a like Heritage complaint in another proceeding 
for failure to plead fraud with the requisite particularity: 
 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrepresented her income and/or 
employment status and that the loan application submitted by 
Defendant was "false." Again, however, the complaint is 
completely devoid of any factual support for these conclusions. In 
fact, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff has utilized a "canned" 
complaint, which simply recites the elements of the causes of 
action, and then concludes, without an iota of factual support, that 
Defendant's conduct is wrongful and that the debt owed to Plaintiff 
should be determined nondischargeable. While this method of 
practice may save time and allow Plaintiff to file multiple 
complaints against various defendants with little work, it is 
ineffective in the face of a motion to dismiss. Thus, because the 
complaint only offers "threadbare recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," it is 
                                                                                                                         
Judgment, In re Taber, No. 10-05395 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011), ECF No. 10-2. At the hearing on the 
motion, with respect to the issue of reliance, the judge stated only: "The creditor maintains that they 
reasonably relied on it and there is a declaration to support that." Oral Argument at 1:35–1:41, In re Taber, 
No. 10-05395 (June 30, 2011), ECF No. 15. The court then entered a $147,500 default judgment for 
Heritage. Order and Judgment of Nondischargeability in Favor of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C. and 
Against Daniel Hawker Taber, supra note 129. The defendant thereafter moved to vacate the default and 
default judgment on the grounds that he mistakenly believed that his bankruptcy counsel would be 
responsible for responding to the complaint in the adversary proceeding. See Notice of Motion; Motion to 
Vacate Default and Default Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 4, In re Taber, No. 10-
05395 (Nov. 18, 2011), ECF No. 19. The court granted the motion, vacated the judgment, and permitted the 
defendant to answer the complaint. See Order Vacating Default Judgment, In re Taber, No. 10-05395 (Jan. 
11, 2012), ECF No. 22. 
Two months after having granted a default judgment in the proceeding against Mr. Taber, the same 
bankruptcy judge denied a Heritage motion for summary judgment against defendant Oscar Trejo. See Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 
2011), ECF No. 20. In his order, the judge found the Ganter declaration (the only declaration offered in 
support of the motion for default judgment against Mr. Taber) showed reliance only by Heritage and not by 
the originating lender. See id. at 6. In the order, the judge also commented on the insufficiency of the 
Schuerman declaration to demonstrate reliance by the originating lender, and also noted that the defendant 
had signed the loan application one day after having signed the note, thus suggesting the possibility that the 
originating lender had not relied on the loan application. See id. at 5–6.  
154 See, e.g., Order of Judgment Against Josefina Arana, supra note 153; Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 121.  
155 See In re McGee, 359 B.R. 764, 772 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006).  
2016] RANDOMLY DISTRIBUTED TRIAL COURT JUSTICE 387 
 
 
insufficient and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.156 
 
Ipso facto judges granting a motion to dismiss for this reason would not have 
entered a default judgment on the basis of the complaint alone, because the 
complaint was not well pleaded.  And those judges who denied a Heritage motion 
for default judgment necessarily must have found allegations of like complaints 
insufficient in themselves to establish liability because a claim for relief based on a 
complaint that does not allege fraud with sufficient particularity may not support a 
default judgment.157  
 
b.    In Motions for Summary Judgment 
 
Resolution of six motions for summary judgment reflect differences on the 
issue of reliance comparable to those we have seen in resolution of Heritage's 
motions for default judgment.  Each of four bankruptcy judges considering a 
defendant's motion for summary judgment found insufficient evidence of reliance.  
Three of them granted the motion on that ground;158 a fourth granted the motion on 
another ground159  but later awarded attorney's fees to the defendant because of 
insufficient evidence of reliance.160 One of two bankruptcy judges considering a 
Heritage motion for summary judgment likewise found insufficient evidence of 
reliance and denied the motion, but a sixth bankruptcy judge granted the same 
Heritage motion in another proceeding.161  
Consider first the irreconcilable outcomes in the two proceedings in which 
Heritage moved for summary judgment, one involving defendant Oscar Trejo and 
the other involving defendant Yazmin Gonzalez. Heritage submitted the identical 
Ganter and Schuerman declarations in each.162 In each, Heritage also submitted 
virtually identical unanswered requests for admissions.163 Factual statements made 
                                                                                                                         
156 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss With Leave to Amend and Without Oral Argument at 3, In re 
Ferreira, No. 11-04053 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011), ECF No. 25 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009)).  
157 See In re Kubick, 171 B.R. 658, 661 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).  
158 See Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121, at 9–
10; Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–8, In re Machuca, No. 
10-05301 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 51. The third of these three proceedings, involving 
defendant Garrett Palines, is discussed infra note 192.  
159 See infra text accompanying notes 241–44.  
160 See infra text accompanying notes 170–75. 
161 See infra text accompanying notes 162–69.  
162 Compare Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the 
Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 27, 2011), ECF 
No. 9-3, with Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the 
Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011), 
ECF No. 14 and Declaration of Mark Schuerman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or 
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Aug. 22, 2011), ECF No. 14.  
163 Compare Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Oscar Trejo, In 
re Trejo, No. 10-05392 (July 25, 2011), ECF No. 15, with Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests 
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in an unanswered request for admissions are deemed admitted absent an answer or 
objection to the request.164 The pro se defendants in each may have failed to answer 
or object to the requests for admissions because of their ignorance of the manner or 
importance of responding.  Neither of the requests asked the defendant to admit 
reliance by the originating lender.  Instead, both requests, tracking the language of 
section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, asked the defendant to admit obtaining 
the relevant loan by false pretenses, through false representations, and through 
fraud.165 But, as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held in an appeal of a 
subsequent trial judgment in one of the two proceedings, those requests improperly 
called for a legal conclusion and, in any event, failure to respond to them did not 
establish reliance of the originating lender.166  
Heritage submitted no other evidence in either proceeding.  Neither pro se 
defendant responded to the Heritage motion for summary judgment.  One 
bankruptcy judge denied the motion, finding neither the Ganter nor the Schuerman 
declaration probative on the question of the originating lender's reliance.167 Heritage 
fared no better at trial later in the same proceeding.168 The other bankruptcy judge 
granted the motion without discussion of reliance, commenting instead that the 
defendant had conceded all the essential elements for a claim under section 
523(a)(2) (presumably because of a failure to respond to the request for admissions) 
and that it was unfortunate, but no defense, that the defendant had been encouraged 
by someone else to make false statements regarding her income.169  
Consider next the conclusion of another bankruptcy judge in granting a 
defendant's motion for attorney's fees after having granted the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on another ground.  Attorney's fees are available to a 
defendant in a section 523(a)(2) adversary proceeding if, among other things, the 
position of the creditor (in this case Heritage as successor-in-interest to the 
originating lender) was not substantially justified.170  Discussion of the issue of 
reliance first arose at a hearing on a much earlier defense motion to dismiss the 
complaint conducted by another bankruptcy judge to whom the proceeding 
originally had been assigned.  Although denying the motion to dismiss, that 
bankruptcy judge cautioned Heritage that it would have to provide evidence of the 
originating lender's actual reliance on misrepresentations in the loan application and 
                                                                                                                         
for Admission to Defendant Yazmin Gonzalez, Exhibit A to Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re Gonzalez, 
No. 11-02088 (Aug. 22, 2011), ECF No. 14.  
164 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 36(a)(3), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. 
BANKR. PROC. 7036.  
165 See, e.g., Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests for Admission to Defendant Oscar Trejo, 
supra note 163, at 7. 
166 See In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *9–10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Dec. 20, 2012). 
167 See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 153, at 6.  
168 See Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 6–9.  
169 See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121.  
170 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).  
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that it faced formidable obstacles in doing so because the originating lender was 
defunct.171 Heritage assured the court that it intended to do so.172 In opposition to 
the defendant's later motion for summary judgment, Heritage offered the Ganter and 
Schuerman declarations and the declaration of an assistant secretary to the 
originating lender's successor-in-interest who stated that the originating lender 
relied on information supplied by a borrower in a loan application. 173  Several 
months later, at the hearing on the motion for attorney's fees, the second bankruptcy 
judge assigned to the proceeding concluded that none of that evidence demonstrated 
the originating lender's actual reliance.174 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel affirmed, stressing that justifiable or reasonable reliance necessarily required 
a predicate showing of actual reliance.175 It is simply impossible to reconcile the 
finding in this proceeding that Heritage had failed to demonstrate actual reliance of 
the originating creditor with contrary implicit or explicit conclusions on the issue of 
reliance previously discussed. 
 
c.    At Trial 
 
Comparing decisions on the issue of reliance in the five trials is more difficult 
because the evidence of reliance in some differed from the evidence of reliance in 
others.  Heritage submitted the Ganter declaration and one of the two Schuerman 
declarations in four of the five trials.176 Mr. Ganter testified in each of the five trials; 
Mr. Schuerman did not appear at any of the five trials.177 Judges in two of the 
proceedings excluded Mr. Schuerman's declaration either because of Heritage's 
failure to timely disclose him as a witness or because he failed to appear at trial for 
cross-examination. 178  Judges in two other proceedings discounted but did not 
technically exclude his declaration.179 Mr. Schuerman's absence from trial probably 
reflected Heritage's decision not to pay travel expenses and expert witness fees.  
More importantly, Heritage's failure to present him for trial reflected both its 
                                                                                                                         
171 Neither an audio recording nor a transcript of the hearing is available from PACER, but the Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's opinion affirming the defendant's later motion for attorney's fees 
mentions that caution. See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).  
172 Id.  
173  See Declaration of Ben Ganter in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, In re 
Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2010), ECF No. 65-1; Declaration of Mark G. Schuerman 
in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-
04008 (Mar. 7, 2010), ECF No. 65-2; Declaration of Diane Taylor, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Mar. 7, 
2010), ECF No. 65-12.  
174 See Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion to Reconsider of [sic] Court's Order Denying Request for 
an Award Filed by Jesus Montano at 42–45, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Jan. 25, 2013), ECF No. 197.  
175 See In re Montano, 501 B.R. at 115.  
176 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurmen [sic] in Support, supra 
note 6. Heritage submitted the declarations in response to pretrial orders requiring that direct testimony be 
given by declaration. See, e.g., Order Setting Trial Date and Establishing Procedures for Conduct of Trial at 
1–2, In re Mabson, No. 10-02445 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011), ECF No. 18.  
177 See, e.g., Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 3.  
178 See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 121, at 4–5.  
179 See, e.g., Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 3 n.3.  
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implicit contention that his declaration in support of motions for default or summary 
judgment had been unnecessary (as in the three motions for default judgment 
granted without his declaration) and at the same time an implicit if unintended 
concession that his declaration in support of motions for default or summary 
judgment was either irrelevant or unpersuasive (as in other proceedings in which 
bankruptcy judges found it insufficient). 
Bankruptcy judges rendered a judgment for the defendant following trial in 
three proceedings.  Two of them found misrepresentations by the defendant in a 
loan application but concluded that the originating lender's reliance on them was not 
reasonable given its failure to heed "red flags" evident either from the loan 
application or from other information obtained by the lender.  Neither bankruptcy 
judge explicitly addressed the predicate issue of actual reliance. 180  In the third 
proceeding, involving defendant Rosa Vasquez, the bankruptcy judge found 
insufficient proof of misrepresentations, insufficient proof of either actual or 
reasonable reliance, and insufficient proof of intent to deceive.181  
WMC Mortgage Corporation, an originating lender identified in many of the 
Heritage adversary proceedings, made the loan to Ms. Vasquez.182  Its loan file 
reveals significant details that confirm the judge's conclusion on the issue of 
reliance.183 Ms. Vasquez's loan application represented that she was self-employed 
as the manager and partner of Nellie's Beauty Salon and earned $8200/month.184 
The loan file included WMC's "Notice of Conditional Approval – Underwriting 
Requirements," which required two sources of satisfactory evidence of a two-year 
history of self-employment as a condition to approval of the loan.185 The loan file 
also contained handwritten notes of an unidentified person on a "Pre-Funding Self-
Employment Audit" form that implied a telephone call to Nellie's Beauty Salon, but 
nothing on the form identified the person called or the information gleaned from the 
telephone conversation.186 The audit form also indicated an online verification of a 
                                                                                                                         
180 See Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 7–9; Transcript of Trial, supra note 2, at 118–20.  
181 See Memorandum, supra note 121, at 8–13.  
182 See Exhibit B to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 2, In re 
Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011), ECF No. 9-2.  
183 Heritage submitted the loan file in advance of trial. See Exhibit Register and Notice Re Disposition of 
Exhibits, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Feb. 23, 2012), ECF No. 41. The judge excluded the loan file from 
evidence for failure to disclose it in a Joint Pretrial Order, Memorandum, supra note 121, at 5, and thus did 
not consider the loan file in reaching her conclusion on the issue of reliance. 
Contemporary news reports also suggested that employees of WMC may have knowingly approved loans 
based on falsified paperwork and documentation. See, e.g., Michael Hudson, Fraud And Folly: The Untold 
Story Of General Electric's Shady Subprime Debacle, DAILY BAIL (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:10 PM), 
http://dailybail.com/home/fraud-and-folly-the-untold-story-of-general-electrics-shady.html; Michael Hudson 
& E. Scott Reckard, GE lending unit said to be target of U.S. probe, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/20/business/la-fi-mortgage-probe-20120120.  
184 See Exhibit Register and Notice Re Disposition of Exhibits, supra note 183, at 3–4.  
185 See id. at Bates Stamp 000151.  
186 See id. at Bates Stamp 000175. The audit form indicated a call to the telephone number that Ms. 
Vasquez had provided on her loan application for Nellie's Beauty Salon. It hardly seems satisfactory 
verification of self-employment to contact the very number given by the applicant for her place of self-
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"Beauty Salon" license,187 but separate documents in the file showed an online 
verification only of Ms. Vasquez's cosmetology license and a copy of the 
cosmetology license. 188  No document in the loan file demonstrated, as WMC's 
underwriting requirements required, that Ms. Vasquez owned Nellie's Beauty Salon 
or that she had a two-year history of self-employment.  
WMC's notice of conditional approval also required that "INCOME MUST BE 
CONSISTENT WITH PROFESSION AND EXPERIENCE." 189  The loan file 
contained a copy of an IRS form 4506-T, authorizing the IRS to supply a tax 
transcript for Ms. Vasquez. 190  Line 5 of the form, authorizing mailing of the 
transcript to a third party, was blank,191 and the loan file contained no tax transcript.  
The loan file thus suggested that WMC did not use the transcript request form to 
verify her income prior to approving the loan.  Nor is there any evidence in the loan 
file to suggest that WMC attempted to verify that her stated income was consistent 
with her experience as a cosmetologist or with her ownership of a beauty salon.192  
                                                                                                                         
employment unless the verification indicates that the caller in fact reached a business named by the loan 
applicant and spoke with someone other than the applicant (e.g. an employee). The audit form did neither.  
187 See id.  
188 See id. at Bates Stamp 000167, 000178.  
189 Id. at Bates Stamp 000151.  
190 Id. at Bates Stamp 000114. 
191 Exhibit Register and Notice Re Disposition of Exhibits, supra note 183, at Bates Stamp 000114.  
192 A notice of conditional loan approval and a pre-funding audit form from yet another WMC loan file, 
submitted by Heritage in an adversary proceeding against defendant Garrett Palines, influenced the decision 
of another bankruptcy judge to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment for failure of Heritage to 
demonstrate reliance by the originating lender. Mr. Palines' loan application had claimed employment as an 
administrator, at $18,869/month, by Primetimers Senior Resources. See Exhibit A to Declaration of James 
Michel in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim of Plaintiff Heritage Pacific 
Financial at 3, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012), ECF No. 27-4. WMC's 
conditional loan approval required that his income be consistent with his profession and experience and also 
that it must be validated. See Exhibit B to Declaration of Diane Taylor for WMC Mortgage Corporation in 
Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, In re Palines, No. 12-
03063 (Oct. 11, 2012), ECF No. 33-2. Handwritten entries in WMC's pre-funding audit form implied a 
telephone contact with Mr. Palines' employer to verify his stated income, Exhibit D to Declaration of Ben 
Ganter in Support of the Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, In re Palines, No. 
12-03063 (Oct. 5, 2012), ECF No. 30-4, but, as the bankruptcy judge noted, those entries neither responded 
to a preprinted question on the form asking whether the information agreed with the information stated in the 
"1003" (the loan application) nor stated Mr. Palines' income. See Oral Argument at 19:25–20:25, In re 
Palines, No. 12-03063 (Oct. 19, 2012), ECF No. 36. Heritage submitted no other evidence from the loan file 
demonstrating either verification of income or that the stated income was consistent with Mr. Palines' 
profession and experience. Heritage did submit the declaration of a person employed by WMC at the time of 
the loan who stated that she was fully familiar with its business operations. See Declaration of Diane Taylor 
for WMC Mortgage Corporation in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Oct. 11, 2012), ECF No. 33. She had reviewed the loan 
application and notice of conditional loan approval and stated that WMC, consistent with standard practices 
in the loan industry at the time and with its own business practices, had relied on the information in the loan 
application. See Declaration of Diane Taylor for WMC Mortgage Corporation in Support of Plaintiff's 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra, at 2. The bankruptcy judge was not 
persuaded, concluding from the other evidence that WMC had not followed its own procedures. See Oral 
Argument, supra, at 11:20–11:40.  
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The evidence from the Vasquez loan file suggesting WMC's failure to adhere to 
the requirements of its own conditional loan approval is reminiscent of comparable 
evidence evaluated in an adversary proceeding filed several years earlier that a 
California bankruptcy court termed "a poster child for some of the practices that 
have led to the current crisis in our housing market."193 The court concluded that the 
borrowers had misrepresented their financial condition to National City Bank, that 
their representations were material, and that they had made the representations with 
knowledge of their falsity and intent to deceive.194 But the court entered judgment 
for the borrowers because of its conclusion that the bank's reliance on the 
misrepresentations was not reasonable, including because the bank deviated from its 
own internal guidelines on loan approval.195  
The guidelines called for a third party vendor to evaluate the reasonableness of 
stated income based on job type, tenure, and geographical location, but the bank 
submitted no evidence that such an evaluation had been undertaken. 196  The 
guidelines also permitted the bank to verify self-employment with a letter from a 
CPA.197 The bank introduced such a letter, on the letterhead of a CPA, but the court 
found it insufficient because the bank presented no evidence verifying the identity 
or credentials of the person signing the letter.198  
Bankruptcy judges rendered a judgment for Heritage following trial in two 
proceedings.  Each of them inferred both actual and reasonable reliance of the 
originating lender.  In one, the court found that defendant Julian Tovar falsely 
represented self-employment as the owner of a landscaping business, falsely 
represented his income, and falsely represented his intention to occupy real property 
being purchased with the loan proceeds, and did so with intent to deceive.199 WMC 
made the loan to Mr. Tovar.200 Heritage had not attempted at trial to demonstrate 
WMC's stated underwriting practices or its compliance with them in processing Mr. 
Tovar's loan application,201 even though Heritage bore the burden of proof on the 
issue of reliance.202  Its only witness was Ben Ganter.203 Neither his declaration 
                                                                                                                         
193 In re Hill, Ch. 7 No. 07-41137 TT, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1668, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 28, 2008).  
194 Id. at *10.  
195 Id. at *13–17.  
196 Id. at *5, 14.  
197 Id. at *5–6.  
198 Id. 
199 See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *35 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Aug. 3, 2012).  
200 Id. at *2.  
201 See Transcript of Trial, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2011), ECF No. 36. 
202 Mr. Tovar's counsel argued at trial that Heritage failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that WMC 
took any steps to verify information provided by Mr. Tovar in connection with his loan application. See 
Transcript of Trial, supra note 201, at 61–62. At trial, Mr. Tovar's counsel did not introduce any evidence of 
WMC's underwriting procedures or any evidence from the loan file that might have proven WMC's failure to 
comply with its underwriting procedures. See Transcript of Trial, supra note 201, at 61–62. There are no 
PACER-accessible records that would reflect whether Mr. Tovar's counsel requested or was provided a copy 
of the loan file in discovery.  
203 Transcript of Trial, supra note 201, at 6–32. 
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(submitted in lieu of direct examination) nor his subsequent in-person testimony 
claimed any personal knowledge of those underwriting practices.204 The bankruptcy 
judge nonetheless inferred WMC's actual and reasonable reliance on Mr. Tovar's 
misrepresentations from four documents that Heritage introduced into evidence at 
trial, or so the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded in affirming the 
judgment on appeal.205  
Heritage had introduced an occupancy statement, indicating Mr. Tovar's 
intention to occupy the real property, a bank statement, a "Latin Services" 
statement, and a landscaping brochure.206 The "Latin Services" statement was a 
letter from an alleged tax preparer describing preparation of Mr. Tovar's tax returns 
and describing Tovar's self-employment for two years in the landscaping business 
under the name Tovar Landscaping Design.207 It did not refer to a CPA, was signed 
by a person whose printed name and signature was illegible, and was unsupported 
by any evidence that the originating lender had verified the nature of "Latin 
Services" or the identity or credentials of the person signing the letter,208 gaps in 
evidence that had led another bankruptcy judge to find a comparable letter 
inadequate proof of reliance. 209  The landscaping brochure advertised Tovar's 
alleged landscaping business.210  To the bankruptcy judge, the mere presence of 
these documents in the loan file must have indicated that the originating lender 
actually looked at and relied on the documents.  This inference stands in marked 
contrast to the contrary view of another bankruptcy judge, noted earlier, who denied 
a Heritage motion for default judgment because, given industry practices at the 
time, she was unwilling to presume that anyone even looked at documents 
submitted in support of loan applications.211  
In affirming the judgment against Mr. Tovar, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
stated that a creditor's actual verification of information is not an explicit 
requirement of reasonable reliance,212 but nonetheless seemed to require a lender's 
compliance with its own underwriting practices when it also noted that "[n]othing in 
the record suggests that WMC did not adhere to normal business practices . . . ."213 
In so commenting, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel appears to have implicitly, and 
incorrectly, shifted the burden of proof on that factual question to Mr. Tovar.  
                                                                                                                         
204 See Declaration of Ben Ganter, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Sept. 7, 2011), ECF No. 22; Transcript of 
Trial, supra note 201, at 6–32.  
205 See In re Tovar, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *32–34.  
206 Id. at *5. 
207 See Plaintiff's [Amended] Exhibit List and Exhibits 1–13 at 47, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 8, 2011), ECF No. 26.  
208 Plaintiff's [Amended] Exhibit List and Exhibits 1–13, supra note 207, at 47.  
209 See supra note 197–98 and accompanying text.  
210 Plaintiff's [Amended] Exhibit List and Exhibits 1–13, supra note 207, at 49. 
211 See supra text accompanying note 140.  
212 In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *33 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 
2012).  
213 Id. at *34.  
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A second bankruptcy judge rendering judgment for Heritage following trial, 
against defendant Duane Mabson, drew an inference of reasonable reliance from 
evidence less compelling than the evidence submitted in the trial involving Mr. 
Tovar.  Heritage again submitted the declaration of Ben Ganter, through which it 
introduced the loan application and promissory note, 214  and made Ben Ganter 
available for cross-examination.215 It submitted no other documents from the loan 
file.  It also submitted the declaration of Mark Schuerman,216 but the court excluded 
his declaration because Heritage did not present him for cross-examination at 
trial.217  Heritage called Mr. Mabson as a witness to admit that he was a straw 
buyer.218 Heritage also submitted an unanswered request for admissions, but, like 
the requests for admissions earlier discussed,219 they did not include a request to 
admit that the originating lender had relied on misrepresentations.220 On the issue of 
reliance, the bankruptcy judge said only that "[t]he creditor's reliance was 
reasonable under the circumstances," and "these representations [of income and 
intended use of the property] were of a type that would be reasonably relied upon 
by a lender in the original transaction . . . ."221 Necessarily the judge also inferred 
actual reliance.  Mr. Mabson did not appeal.  
 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has stated that "[t]o sustain . . . 
an inference [of actual reliance], an inquiry must be made concerning the extent to 
which the creditor considered the misrepresentation a substantial factor in 
influencing its decision (i.e., actual reliance or reliance in fact)."222 It is difficult to 
reconcile that requirement with the inferences of actual reliance drawn by the 
bankruptcy judges in the proceedings against Mr. Tovar and Mr. Mabson.  We 
might nevertheless attribute affirmance of the judgment against Mr. Tovar to the 
standard of appellate review requiring that an appellate court affirm a factual 
finding unless clearly erroneous.223  
  
                                                                                                                         
214 See Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurman [sic] in Support, supra note 
6, at 11–14. 
215 See Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 8–129.  
216 See Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurman [sic] in Support, supra note 
6, at 15–20. 
217 See Transcript of Trial, supra note 121.  
218 Id. at 12–13. 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 163–66.  
220 The Request for Admissions, submitted as a trial exhibit, is not available from PACER. Heritage 
referred to it in its trial brief and stated that the defendant did not respond to the requests. See Plaintiff's Trial 
Brief, Declarations of Ben Ganter and Mark Schurman [sic] in Support, supra note 6, at 9. The trial brief 
thereafter included a document captioned "Facts Admitted Into Evidence." Id. at 21–24. The thirty-two facts 
recited in that document conform to Requests for Admission used in other proceedings that are on file with 
the author. It is unclear whether the bankruptcy judge credited the admissions on the issue of reliance. He 
stated: "The requests for admissions admit . . . virtually all of the salient facts necessary to establish a claim 
of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(B)." Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 15. 
221 Transcript of Trial, supra note 121, at 17.  
222 In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 117 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). 
223 See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Aug. 3, 2012).  
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2.   California's Limitation on Fraud Claims  
 
We have previously seen that the prohibition of deficiency judgments in section 
580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure should have defeated Heritage's 
contract claim in its (non-bankruptcy) federal district court action against Susana 
David and that the preclusion of certain fraud claims in section 726(g) of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure properly defeated its fraud claim against her.224 
Section 726(g) likewise should have defeated every Heritage adversary proceeding 
in which the loan to the defendant was secured by single-family, owner-occupied 
residential real property occupied by the defendant. 
Sections 726(f) and (h) of the California Code of Civil Procedure permit the 
real property secured lender or its successor in interest to assert a fraud claim 
against a borrower notwithstanding any anti-deficiency rule,225 but section 726(g) of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure precludes such fraud claims unless the loan 
exceeds $150,000 as adjusted annually, commencing on January 1, 1987, to the 
U.S. Department of Labor Consumer Price Index.226 As of February 24, 2010, the 
date on which Heritage filed its first adversary proceeding in a California 
bankruptcy court, the inflation-adjusted amount was $287,926.06.227 None of the 
notes on which Heritage sued exceeded that amount.  Because "[t]he validity of a 
creditor's claim is determined by rules of state law,"228 Heritage did not have a 
legitimate fraud claim under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code in any case 
subject to the protection of section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
Yet defendants failed to claim the protection afforded by section 726(g) in all 
but a few of the very large number of adversary proceedings in which it was 
                                                                                                                         
224 See supra text accompanying notes 30–36. 
225 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(f), (h) (2012). 
226 See id. § 726(g). A California court of appeal has held that California's anti-deficiency statutes did not 
preclude actions for fraud. See Guild Mortg. Co. v. Heller, 239 Cal. Rptr. 59, 63–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). In 
1985, the California legislature codified that result in section 7460 of the California Financial Code (with 
respect to state or federally chartered savings and loan associations), in section 779 of the California 
Financial Code (now section 1301 of the California Financial Code) (with respect to state and nationally 
chartered banks), and in section 15102 of the California Financial Code (with respect to credit unions). Id. at 
64–65. Each of those provisions, however, included the same exception, described by the court in Guild 
Mortg.: "Because of evidence that fraud was most prevalent in loans for large, single-family dwellings, 
multiple-unit dwellings and commercial property, the legislation exempted loans secured by single-family 
residential real property, when the property is actually occupied by the borrower and the loan is for 
$150,000 or less." Id. at 64; CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 7460(b), 1301(b), 15102(b) (2012). Sections 726(f) and (g) 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure apply the same rules, including the same exception, to other 
persons and entities authorized by California to make or arrange loans secured by real property who 
originate any loan secured directly or collaterally, in whole or in part, by a mortgage or deed of trust on real 
property. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(f), (g) (2012). The 1987 Guild Mortg. opinion did not mention 
sections 726(f) and (g) because the legislature added those sections that very year. Act of July 22, 1987, 
1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. 117–20 (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726).  
227CPI      Inflation       Calculator,      BUREAU       OF        LABOR        STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (accessed Feb. 18, 2015).  
228 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283 (1991).  
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potentially applicable.  PACER-accessible records displayed loan applications in 
175 of the 218 adversary proceedings.  Loan applications in ninety-four of them 
stated an intention to use loan proceeds to purchase a primary residence,229 loan 
applications in two others stated an intention to use loan proceeds to construct a 
primary residence, 230  a loan application in one concerned the purchase of a 
manufactured home,231 and a loan application in one other stated an intention to use 
loan proceeds for debt consolidation.232 
Defendants failed to claim the protection against fraud claims in all but three of 
this subset of ninety-eight proceedings.  An attorney represented the defendant in 
sixty-two of this subset of proceedings, asserting an anti-deficiency defense in 
thirteen of them.  This defense was technically inapplicable because Heritage was 
claiming fraud, not a deficiency, but at least the defense aimed in the right direction.  
Only three attorneys referred to a bar on fraud claims.233 One of twenty pro se 
defendants in this subset of proceedings asserted an anti-deficiency defense but 
none of them asserted the bar on fraud claims.234 Sixteen defendants in this subset 
of proceedings failed to appear.235 
Defendants also failed to claim the protection against fraud claims in all fifty-
nine proceedings in which the loan application stated an intention to use loan 
proceeds to refinance a primary residence.  An attorney represented the defendant in 
thirty-seven of these proceedings, asserting an anti-deficiency defense in four of 
                                                                                                                         
229 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 10, In re Alcala, No. 10-72258 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan 22, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 
9, In re Garcia, No. 11-41772 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 13, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
230 See Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Needham, No. 11-
02562 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011), ECF No. 1; Exhibit A to Exhibit Index, In re Thomas, No. 10-
02716 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. July 1, 2011), ECF No. 26. 
231 See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 9–13, In re Hernandez, No. 11-
05058 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
 232 See Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Moreno, No. 11-
01113 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
233 In one proceeding, the defendant, pro se through trial, first claimed the protection on appeal after 
retaining counsel. See Appellee's Brief at 28–33, In re Trejo, No. 11-1652 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012), 
ECF No. 20. In a second, the defendant erroneously relied on the comparable protection of section 7460(b) 
of the California Financial Code (applicable to savings and loan associations but not to the loan originator 
involved in the proceeding). See First Amended Answer at 5–6, In re Rodriguez, No. 11-05222 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 17. In a third, the defendant also initially relied on the protection of section 
7460(b) of the California Financial Code, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 12–14, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012), ECF No. 57-1, but 
discussed section 726(g) in oral argument on a motion for summary judgment. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment at 43–49, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Feb. 23, 2013), ECF 
No. 206.  
234 See, e.g., Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Heng, No. 11-
02255 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011), ECF No. 1 (indicating intent to purchase primary residence) and 
Answer, In re Heng, No. 11-02255 (May 19, 2011), ECF No. 3 (asserting anti-deficiency defense).  
235 See, e.g., Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Phillips, No. 
10-62464 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2010), ECF No. 1 (indicating intent to purchase primary residence), 
and Entry of Default and Order Re: Default Judgment Procedures, In re Phillips, No. 10-62464 (Mar. 28, 
2011), ECF No. 11 (indicating failure to appear).  
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them.  Although anti-deficiency legislation arguably did not, at the time, apply to 
loans used to refinance a primary residence and thus may not have protected these 
defendants against a bankruptcy dischargeable contract claim,236 section 726(g) is 
not so limited.  It bars fraud claims without regard to the purpose of the loan as long 
as the loan to the defendant is secured by single-family, owner-occupied residential 
real property occupied by the defendant at the time of loan origination.  None of the 
fourteen pro se defendants in this subset of proceedings asserted the section 726(g) 
protection.  Eight defendants in this subset of proceedings failed to appear. 
In sum, defendants failed to claim the section 726(g) protection against fraud 
claims in 154 of the 157 proceedings in which it was potentially available, not 
counting an additional unknown number of the forty-three proceedings in which 
information about use of the real property used to secure the loan was unavailable 
through PACER.237  
There may have been good reason not to do so in some of the proceedings.  
Recall that in most of its complaints Heritage alleged on information and belief that 
the defendant had misstated employment, income and/or intended use of the 
property as a principal residence.238 The protection against fraud claims would 
have been unavailable to those whose loan applications misrepresented the 
defendant's occupancy of the residence.  Indeed there were at least four such 
defendants. 239  Attorneys representing some defendants may have learned these 
                                                                                                                         
236 Frequently cited dictum from one California appellate court decision states the inapplicability of the 
purchase money anti-deficiency rule to such loans. See Bank of Am. v. Wendland, 126 Cal. Rptr. 549, 553–
54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). That dictum has been subject to scholarly criticism, Charles B. Sheppard, 
California Code of Civil Procedure 580b, Anti-Deficiency Protection Regarding Purchase Money Debts: 
Arguments for the Inclusion of Refinanced Purchase Money Obligations Within the Anti-Deficiency 
Protection of Section 580b, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 245 (1997), and was disapproved in Helvetica 
Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan, 277 P.3d 198, 203–04 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (criticizing what it termed the 
"flawed" reasoning of Wendland). In 2012, California legislation explicitly extended anti-deficiency 
protection to credit transactions involving the refinancing of a purchase money loan that would have been 
protected under section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 2012 Cal. Stat., Ch. 64, § 1 
(originally adding 580b(c)), and then 2013 Cal. Stat, Ch. 65, § 2 (SB 426) (renumbering 580b(c) as 580b(b)), 
now codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b(b) (2012).  
237 Loan applications in fifteen proceedings specified an investment purpose for the loan, loan applications 
in two proceedings did not specify a purpose for the loan, and the loan application erroneously attached to 
the complaint in one proceeding pertained to a person other than the named defendant.  
238 See, e.g., Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 3, In re Alvarez, No. 10-01575 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010), ECF No. 1.  
239 In each of two proceedings in which the loan application represented a defendant's intention to use the 
loan proceeds for purchase of the defendant's primary residence, the defendant admitted to having acted as a 
straw buyer on behalf of a third person. See Stipulation for Mutual Release and Dismissal of All Claims 
Against Defendant Evaristo Aguirre at 2, In re Aguirre, No. 10-05371 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012), ECF 
No. 30; Deposition of Vien Keomeuangson, Exhibit E in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment at 20, 29, 32, In re Keomeuangsong, No. 11-
02525 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012), ECF No. 15.  
In a third proceeding, a defendant declared that he purchased the subject real property for his sister. See 
Declaration of Garrett Palines in Support of Defendant's Motion for a Reasonable Attorney's Fee at 1–2, In 
re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2012), ECF No. 39-1. Mr. Palines' loan application had 
represented his intention to purchase a primary residence. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt, supra note 40, at 8.  
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disqualifying facts from their clients and thus properly decided not to claim the 
protection afforded by section 726(g).  The data does not reveal the number of other 
defendants whose loan applications falsely represented the defendant's intended use 
of the property and we thus cannot know the extent to which the actual adversary 
proceeding outcomes diverged from outcomes that section 726(g) would have 
commanded had it been asserted, pursued, and factually substantiated.  It seems 
reasonable to suppose, however, that the loan applications of at least some, perhaps 
many, defendants, including those represented by an attorney, truthfully represented 
the defendant's intended use of the property as a personal residence.240 In every such 
proceeding, if the property was a single-family residence, the section 726(g) 
protection should have been claimed and, if pursued, should have led to dismissal 
without any payment to Heritage.   
The section 726(g) protection led to dismissal of only one adversary 
proceeding, involving defendant Edgar Montano.  Heritage's complaint included its 
standard information and belief allegation that the defendant's loan application had 
misstated employment, income, or intended use of property as a primary 
residence.241 The bankruptcy court found that Mr. Montano used the property as a 
primary residence242 and granted Mr. Montano summary judgment on the basis of 
section 726(g). 243  The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the 
judgment on appeal in an opinion both describing the relationship between section 
726(g) and California's anti-deficiency legislation and rejecting Heritage's 
                                                                                                                         
In a fourth proceeding, the defendant admitted that the residence was not his primary residence and that 
his brother and brother's family lived in the property. See Joint Pretrial Order at 2, In re Tovar, No. 10-03016 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), ECF No. 18. 
In two other proceedings, Heritage submitted evidence that the defendant had applied for multiple loans 
within a short period of time yet had represented in each loan application an intention to use loan proceeds to 
purchase a primary residence. From that evidence, it drew the reasonable inference that the defendant used 
loan proceeds from at least one of the loans to acquire investment property. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Final Default Judgment by the Court Against Defendant 
Emmanuel Kongnyuy Nsahlai at 6, In re Nsahlai, No. 11-02983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 
11-1; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Final Default Judgment by the Court Against 
Maria Taraz at 5, In re Taraz, No. 10-90456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 21-1.  
In yet another proceeding, Heritage's complaint for recovery on two separate loans attached two loan 
applications, each signed by the defendant on December 5, 2006. One loan application stated a purpose to 
purchase a primary residence located at one address and the other loan application stated a purpose to 
purchase a primary residence located at another address. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt at 9–18, In re Rodriguez, No. 11-05222 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 24, 2011), ECF No. 
1. 
240 For example, one bankruptcy court found the defendant to have truthfully represented his intention to 
use loan proceeds to purchase a primary residence in a proceeding in which Heritage attempted to prove the 
contrary. See, e.g., Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
121, at 4.  
241 See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 2–3, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
242 Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 233, at 106–07.  
243 Id. at 104–08; see Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 
(June 5, 2012), ECF No. 121.  
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arguments that section 726(g) was inapplicable.244  The bankruptcy court's order 
granting summary judgment, entered on June 5, 2012, 245  and the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel's opinion, filed on November 1, 2013, came too late to offer 
ammunition to the many defendants whose adversary proceedings had already been 
resolved.  
For example, we may infer that section 726(g) might have rescued at least one 
pro se defendant from the $61,417 summary judgment entered against her on 
September 20, 2011.  The bankruptcy court's judgment rested on its finding that 
Heritage had established a prima facie case based on misrepresentation of 
income.246 Heritage's moving papers evidenced only misrepresentation of income 
and employment but did not include evidence of a false representation about the 
intended use of the real property securing the loan.247 The absence of any such 
evidence lent credence to the defendant's prose addendum to her pro se answer to 
the complaint, in which she described her agent's advice to her about funding the 
purchase of a home.248 She didn't oppose the motion for summary judgment, likely 
unaware of how to do so or what to argue.  
In contrast, the failure of another pro se defendant to assert the protection 
afforded by section 726(g) proved harmless because a different bankruptcy court 
concluded after trial that Heritage had failed to establish the requisite reliance on 
misrepresentations of income and employment.249 Prior to reaching that conclusion, 
the court sua sponte addressed and dismissed an anti-deficiency defense after 
finding that the defendant had truthfully represented his intention to live in the 
property purchased and had in fact lived in the property for an extended period of 
time.250 It correctly stated that Heritage would have no right to a deficiency under 
section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure absent a claim for fraud.251 It 
was unaware, however, that section 726(g) of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure limited fraud claims and thus incorrectly concluded that Heritage's fraud 
                                                                                                                         
244 See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 106–12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).  
245 See Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (June 5, 
2012), ECF No. 121.  
246 See Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121.  
247 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or 
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 5–6, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 
22, 2011), ECF No. 14. Heritage's memorandum claimed that the defendant admitted a false representation 
concerning her intended use of the property to be acquired with loan proceeds by failing to respond to 
Heritage's request for admissions. See id. Although a matter is deemed admitted if the party to whom a 
request for admissions is directed fails to timely respond to them, FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3), made applicable 
to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7036, Heritage's request for admissions, attached 
as an exhibit to its memorandum, had not asked the defendant to admit that she misrepresented her intended 
use of the property. See Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Requests for Admission to 
Defendant Yazmin Gonzalez, Exhibit A to Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 163.  
248 See Answer to Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt and for Judgment at unnumbered third 
page, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Mar. 10, 2011), ECF No. 7.  
249 Order Following Trial, supra note 121, at 6–8.  
250 Id. at 2, 4. 
251 Id. at 4. 
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claim could survive the defense.252 Recall that the federal district court in the David 
case made the opposite error: it was aware of the limit on fraud claims and 
dismissed Heritage's fraud claim but overlooked the basic protection of section 
580b and granted Heritage a judgment on a contract claim.253  
The dispositions in the remaining proceedings involving pro se defendants who 
might have asserted but did not assert the protection afforded by section 726(g) 
were mixed.254 The defendant was absolved of any payment obligation in ten of 
these proceedings, primarily through a stipulated settlement with Heritage.  In 
sixteen others, however, pro se defendants stipulated to pay various amounts to 
Heritage in settlement of its claims.  Agreed amounts, payable in monthly 
installments, ranged from a low of $2,000 in one proceeding to a high of $25,000 in 
another proceeding and ranged as a percentage of Heritage's claim from a low of 2.6 
percent in one proceeding to a high of 23.4 percent in another proceeding.  In nine 
of these proceedings, however, the defendant also agreed to liability in a greater 
amount upon default in installment payments, ranging in amount from a low of 
$20,000 in one proceeding to a high of $77,677 in another proceeding and ranging 
as a percentage of Heritage's claim from a low of 20.3 percent in one proceeding to 
a high of 51 percent in another proceeding.255  
The mix of dispositions in the proceedings in which an attorney represented a 
defendant256 and in which the protection afforded by section 726(g) might have 
been but was not asserted resembles the mix of dispositions in proceedings 
involving pro se defendants.  The defendant was absolved of any payment 
obligation in twenty-nine such proceedings, primarily through a stipulated 
settlement with Heritage, but in two proceedings by summary judgment257 and in a 
                                                                                                                         
252 Id.  
253 See supra text accompanying notes 30–36.  
254 The number of dispositions reported here and in the ensuing two paragraphs of the text excludes 
dispositions of proceedings for which PACER-accessible documents did not provide information about a 
defendant's represented use of the real property securing the loan.  
255 Bankruptcy courts dismissed two other such proceedings upon Heritage's request based on settlements 
for undisclosed amounts and dismissed two others whose underlying bankruptcy case had been dismissed. 
Heritage obtained a $59,154 default judgment of nondischargeability in another such proceeding against a 
defendant who failed to cooperate or appear after having informally agreed to a settlement in mediation.  
256 These proceedings include eighty-one proceedings in which an attorney represented the defendant 
throughout the proceeding and thirteen others in which an attorney represented the defendant for only a 
portion of the proceeding.  
257 In one of these two proceedings, the defendant submitted as an exhibit a mortgage interest statement 
showing the address of the defendant to be the same as the property identified in his loan application, 
evidence that would have supported a defense based on section 726(g). See Exhibits A and C to Declaration 
of Debtor in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, In re Machuca, No. 10-05301 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 24-3. But neither the defendant's answer nor his motion for summary judgment had 
asserted the defense. See Answer, In re Machuca, No. 10-05031 (Aug. 2, 2011), ECF No. 18; Motion for 
Summary Judgment, In re Machuca, No. 10-05031 (Oct. 27, 2011), ECF No. 24. In ruling on an appeal from 
a later order granting the defendant's motion for attorney's fees, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel noted that 
the bankruptcy court had granted the summary judgment because of insufficient evidence of the originating 
lender's actual or reasonable reliance on alleged misrepresentations in the loan application. See In re 
Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 731–32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
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third proceeding following trial.258 In sixty others, however, the defendants agreed 
to pay various amounts to Heritage in settlement of its claims.  Agreed amounts, 
payable in monthly installments, ranged from a low of $500 in one proceeding to a 
high of $32,000 in another proceeding and ranged as a percentage of Heritage's 
claim from a low of 0.9 percent in one proceeding to a high of 48.3 percent in 
another proceeding.  In forty-eight of these proceedings, however, the defendant 
also agreed to liability in a greater amount upon default in installment payments, 
ranging in amount from a low of $5,000 in one proceeding to a high of $143,693 in 
another proceeding and ranging as a percentage of Heritage's claim from a low of 
7.6 percent in one proceeding to a high of 100 percent in three other proceedings.259  
We see a similar mix of dispositions in twenty-two proceedings in which a 
defendant failed to appear and in which the protection afforded by section 726(g) 
might have been but was not asserted.  Bankruptcy courts entered a default 
judgment in the amount of Heritage's claim in six such proceedings, ranging in 
amount from $51,710 to $147,710.  Heritage dismissed seven other such 
proceedings after the bankruptcy court either denied a motion for default judgment, 
required additional evidence or briefing in support of a motion for default judgment, 
or took no action in response to a motion for default judgment.  Bankruptcy courts 
dismissed eight such proceedings upon Heritage's unexplained request for dismissal 
and one such proceeding when the underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed. 
 
3.   Heritage's Standing to Sue  
 
A defense asserting Heritage's lack of standing to assert a fraud claim would 
have been available to every defendant whose note was acquired through 
agreements that did not also expressly assign a claim for fraud, regardless of the 
purpose for which the defendant used the loan funds.  Although derived from 
California common law long predating the adversary proceedings, this defense did 
                                                                                                                         
In the other proceeding, neither the defendant's answer nor his motion for summary judgment asserted a 
defense based on section 726(g). See Answer to Complaint for Determination of Dischargeability of Debt, In 
re Martinez, No. 11-01131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2011), ECF No. 4; Notice of Motion and Motion for 
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Adjudication of the Facts, In re Martinez, No. 
11-01131 (Jan. 30, 2012), ECF No. 12. In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the 
bankruptcy court acknowledged the defendant's evidence that the defendant had used the subject property as 
his primary residence but did not consider the protection afforded by section 726(g). See Memorandum of 
Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121, at 4.  
258 In this proceeding, neither the defendant's answer nor her trial brief asserted the defense afforded by 
section 726(g). See Answer to Adversary Proceeding, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 
28, 2011), ECF No. 12; Defendant's Trial Brief, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Jan. 5, 2012), ECF No. 26. In 
the party's joint pre-trial order, Heritage indicated an intention to prove the defendant's misrepresentation of 
income but not any misrepresentation of her intent to use loan proceeds to purchase a primary residence. See 
Joint Pretrial Order, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Oct. 7, 2011), ECF No. 22. In granting judgment for the 
defendant following trial, the bankruptcy court found insufficient evidence to support several of the elements 
of a claim under section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, but did not consider the protection afforded by 
section 726(g). See Memorandum, supra note 121, at 7–13.  
259 In one outlier, for reasons not evident from PACER-accessible documents, the defendant stipulated to 
pay Heritage 170% of its claim upon his default in monthly payments.  
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not gain traction publically until the California appellate court's Monroy decision in 
March 2013, discussed previously,260 resolving one of the Heritage lawsuits in state 
court.  
In 1941, the California Supreme Court stated in National Reserve Co. v. 
Metropolitan Trust Co. that the unqualified assignment of a contract with no 
indication of the intent of the parties vests in the assignee the assigned contract "and 
all rights and remedies incidental thereto."261 It continued: 
 
Unless an assignment specifically or impliedly designates them, 
accrued causes of action arising out of an assigned contract, 
whether ex contractu or ex delicto, do not pass under the 
assignment as incidental to the contract if they can be asserted by 
the assignor independently of his continued ownership of the 
contract and are not essential to a continued enforcement of the 
contract.262 
 
In Monroy, Heritage could not demonstrate that assignment of a note to it also 
specifically assigned a fraud claim first held by the originating lender.  That left for 
resolution the question of whether the fraud claim represented a right incidental to 
the note or whether the fraud claim could be asserted independently by the 
originating lender and was not essential to enforcement of the note.  The National 
Reserve opinion did not answer that question because the plaintiff in that case, an 
assignee of contract rights, was not asserting a fraud claim.263 Prior to Monroy, no 
reported California opinion had considered the question in the context of 
assignment of a note.  The closest analogy, perhaps, was either a 1936 opinion 
holding that assignment of a note and chattel mortgage did not assign a right to 
recover for conversion of some of the collateral prior to the assignment264 or a 2005 
opinion holding that a divorce agreement awarding a husband's interest in a 
diamond ring to the wife did not transfer to the wife the husband's claim for fraud 
against a jeweler.265  
Only two bankruptcy judges considered this lack of standing defense.  One took 
the matter under submission following a hearing, but the parties settled soon 
thereafter, making a ruling on the motion unnecessary.266 The other bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                         
260 See supra text accompanying notes 61–75.  
261 Nat'l Reserve Co. of Am. v. Metro. Trust Co. of Cal., 112 P.2d 598, 602 (Cal. 1941).  
262 Id.  
263 Id. at 599–600.  
264 See Millner v. Lankershim Packing Co., 56 P.2d 1295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936). 
265 See Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 237–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).  
266 Defendant Rosa Ortiz had filed a motion to dismiss that raised the standing issue. See Defendant Rosa 
Maria Ortiz's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 9–10, In re Ortiz, No. 11-01018 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 20, 2011), ECF No. 19. The court held a hearing on the motion. See Docket, In re Ortiz, No. 11-
01018 (Jan. 10, 2011). Before the court ruled on the motion, the parties stipulated to a judgment of 
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judge considered the defense in two separate proceedings, both before publication 
of the Monroy decision.  In the first, involving defendant Elia Garcia, the judge 
rejected the defense, ruling that assignment of the note carried with it assignment of 
the fraud claim.267 A year later, in the Montano proceeding previously discussed,268 
the judge lent a more sympathetic ear to the defense in a hearing on a defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, but granted the motion for summary judgment on 
another ground.269 In one proceeding, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
declined to consider the defense because the pro se defendant had not raised it at 
trial.270 In all but one of the other proceedings in which a defendant had explicitly 
articulated the defense, the parties settled before its consideration by the court.271  
Whether one is persuaded by the bankruptcy judge's rejection of the defense or 
by the California appellate court's later vindication of the defense in Monroy, the 
truly remarkable fact is that defendants articulated the defense so rarely by way of 
answer, motion, or otherwise.  They did so in only six of the 137 adversary 
proceedings in which an attorney represented a defendant.  Not surprisingly, only 
one of forty-six pro se defendants raised the defense.272 To be sure, twenty-eight 
other defendants represented by attorneys and two pro se defendants asserted lack 
of standing as an affirmative defense in an answer, but one cannot determine 
whether the boilerplate language used to express the defense in these additional 
proceedings derived from the specific theory described here, from some other 
theory, or simply from a form book or standardized answer.273  
Had it been pressed with the defense in each proceeding, Heritage might not 
have produced documents that assigned a claim for fraud to Heritage.  It failed to do 
                                                                                                                         
nondischargeability and installment payments from Ms. Ortiz to Heritage totaling $6000. See Stipulation for 
Entry of Judgment and Settlement Agreement, In re Ortiz, No. 11-01018 (Jan. 11, 2012), ECF No. 34.  
267 See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration at 2–4, In re Garcia, No. 11-04150 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 10, 2012), ECF No. 47.  
268 See supra text accompanying notes 241–44.  
269 See Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 233, at 85–89, 104–08.  
270 See In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *19–20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Dec. 20, 2012). 
271 See, e.g., Joint Pretrial Order at 2, In re Navarette, No. 11-01167 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012), ECF 
No. 15 (raising defense) and Stipulation for Settlement and Dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding, In re 
Navarette, No. 11-01167 (Sept. 10, 2012) (settlement of $4,500).  
272 See Answer at 4 (6th page of document), In re Heng, No. 11-02255 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 19, 2011), 
ECF No. 7.  
273  Typical of the boilerplate language is the following: "AS A SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, Debtor alleges that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the causes of action 
asserted in the complaint." Answer to Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt at 6, In 
re Garcia, No. 11-04150 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 14, 2011), ECF No. 6. One suspects that the defense, when 
first asserted in that answer, was drawn simply from a standardized answer, because the caption of the 
answer had not been edited to reflect its probably more common use in defending against a claim for fraud in 
the use of a credit card. See id. at 1. Yet the defendant's attorney was one of the few who later relied on the 
specific theory described in the text. See Motion Setting Aside Order Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Entering Order Granting Summary Judgment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 and/or FRBP 9024 
at 3–8, In re Garcia, No. 11-04150 (Nov. 22, 2011), ECF No. 37.  
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so in Monroy even though directed to do so by the trial court judge. 274  Its 
unwillingness to do so in that case might have reflected the existence of a non-
disclosure covenant in a written agreement between it and its immediate 
transferor. 275  Or, more generally, the agreements between Heritage and its 
immediate transferors simply might not have included language expressly assigning 
fraud claims.276 Moreover, in the many cases in which Heritage obtained a note 
from entities other than the originating lender, it may not have even been able to 
locate and retrieve documents reflecting transfer of the notes from the originating 
lender to an initial transferee or between intermediate transferees.  Unless and until 
Heritage produced documents reflecting transfers of both the notes and associated 
fraud claims, every defendant should have asserted and pursued the defense.  
Yet even if one assumes that Heritage's right to enforce a note implicitly carried 
with it a right to assert an associated fraud claim, Heritage would still have lacked 
standing to assert its fraud claim if it could not prove a "right to enforce" the note 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the California Commercial Code.277 Heritage had 
a right to enforce a note if it was either a holder of the note or, under a shelter 
principle, if it was a non-holder in possession of the note who had the rights of a 
holder.278 It might have had difficulty doing so in the many proceedings involving 
notes that passed from an originating lender to Heritage through intermediate 
parties. 
In many proceedings, Heritage submitted copies of a note or an allonge 
suggesting that it did not qualify as a holder of the note in its own right.  Consider 
the following example.  In a proceeding against defendants Numan and Lynda 
Ilayan, Heritage attached to its complaint a copy of a note issued by the Ilayans to 
First Magnus Financial Corporation (the originating lender) and a copy of an 
allonge showing an indorsement of the note from Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. 
("Cadlerock") to Heritage.279 Nothing on either the note or the allonge showed an 
                                                                                                                         
274 See Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 34–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), petition for 
review denied, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6631 (Cal. July 31, 2013).  
275 Copies of each of three agreements pursuant to which Heritage purchased loan obligations, on file with 
the author, contain identical provisions prohibiting the parties from disclosing terms of the transaction (other 
than the identity of the seller and general nature of the transaction) without the written consent of the other 
except to the extent, among other things, that disclosure is required under applicable court order.  
276 See supra text accompanying notes 69–74.  
277 A few defendants obligated themselves through contracts, such as a home equity line of credit, that did 
not constitute negotiable instruments. In such cases, Heritage would still have had to demonstrate its right to 
enforce the contract by virtue of one or more transfers of rights under the contract. See Cockerell v. Title Ins. 
& Trust Co., 267 P.2d 16, 20–21 (Cal. 1954). Such a transfer could be made by indorsement even though the 
contract was not a negotiable instrument. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1459 (2012).  
278 See CAL. COM. CODE § 3301 (2012) (defining a person who is entitled to enforce an instrument). A 
promissory note is an instrument. Id. § 3104(a), (b), (e). The Commercial Code also gives certain persons 
without possession of an instrument a right to enforce it, id. § 3301, but Heritage seems to have had 
possession of the relevant notes.  
279 See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 13–16, In re Ilayan, No. 11-04079 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
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indorsement by the originating lender. 280  Absent such an indorsement, neither 
Cadlerock nor Heritage became a holder of the note.281  
Heritage held possession of the note, however, and would still have been 
entitled to enforce the note were it able to demonstrate that it held the rights of a 
holder deriving from a transfer from the originating lender to Cadlerock.  Unlike 
negotiation, "transfer" does not require indorsement but does require delivery of the 
note for the purpose of giving the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the 
note.282 Transfer even without negotiation vests in the transferee any right of the 
transferor to enforce the instrument.283 Suppose for example that the originating 
lender, a holder of the note and therefore someone with a right to enforce it, had 
without indorsement delivered the note directly to Heritage for the purpose of 
giving Heritage the right to enforce the note.  Ben Ganter's declaration or testimony 
about Heritage's acquisition of the note would have sufficed to establish those facts 
because he was personally familiar with Heritage's business practices involving the 
purchase of notes.284 Heritage would thus have taken the rights of the originating 
lender to enforce the note.  But assuming that Mr. Ganter lacked personal 
knowledge of how or from whom Cadlerock acquired the note, his testimony could 
not establish that Cadlerock took the rights of the originating lender through 
transfer.  Heritage might have been unable to locate a witness with the relevant 
personal knowledge or unable to obtain documentary evidence demonstrating 
transfer from the originating lender to Cadlerock.  Missing that link, as to which it 
had the burden of proof,285 it could not have established that Cadlerock and in turn 
Heritage took the rights of the originating lender to enforce the note.  Without the 
right to enforce the note, either as a holder in its own right or as transferee from 
someone entitled to enforce the note, Heritage could not have demonstrated that it 
was the real party in interest and thus would have lacked prudential standing to 
assert its claim.286  
                                                                                                                         
280 See id.  
281 The originating lender was a holder of the note because the note was issued to it. CAL. COM. CODE § 
3201; U.C.C. cmt. 1 (2012). A person acquiring the note from the originating lender could only itself 
become a holder through negotiation of the note by a holder. CAL. COM. CODE § 3201(a) (2012). Unless 
payable to bearer, negotiation requires indorsement by the holder. Id. § 3201(b). None of the notes held by 
Heritage were payable to bearer. Accordingly, Cadlerock was not a holder, and Heritage was not a holder 
because Cadlerock's indorsement was not an indorsement by a holder.  
282 CAL. COM. CODE § 3203(a).  
283 Id. § 3203(b).  
284 See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *27–28 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Aug. 3, 2012).  
285 CAL. COM. CODE § 3308; U.C.C. cmt. 2.  
286 See In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). Heritage likely derived ownership rights in the 
notes it purchased, but ownership rights alone would not have given it rights to enforce the notes against the 
defendants. For an explanation of that distinction and for discussion of the relevant provisions of Articles 3 
and 9 of the Commercial Code, see James M. Davis, Paper Weight: Problems in the Documentation and 
Enforcement of Transferred Mortgage Loans, and a Proposal for an Electronic Solution, 87 AM. BANKR. L. 
J. 305, 322–30 (2013).  
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Not a single defendant articulated this version of the lack of standing defense in 
any of the adversary proceedings in which it would have been appropriate, 
although, as noted earlier, a relatively small number of defendants asserted what 
likely was a boilerplate lack of standing defense.287 The oversight was harmless in 
the forty-nine proceedings in which Heritage and the defendant settled for no 
payment to Heritage. 288  Mr. and Mrs. Ilayan, however, agreed to a $30,000 
judgment of nondischargeability, as to which Heritage would refrain from execution 
if the Ilayans timely paid $4000 through eight monthly installment payments.289 At 
least fourteen other defendants who could have asserted this lack of standing 
defense nonetheless entered settlement agreements with Heritage, in amounts 
ranging from $5,000, satisfied by timely installment payments totaling $500,290 to 
$30,000, satisfied by timely installment payments totaling $10,000. 291  One 
additional defendant who could have asserted the defense suffered a default 
judgment of $77,037.62,292 but a defense asserting lack of prudential standing is 
waived if not asserted.293 Conceivably, the defense may also have been available to 
multiple other defendants who agreed to judgments of nondischargeability, but 
PACER-accessible documents do not provide information sufficient to reach that 
conclusion.294  
                                                                                                                         
287 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.  
288 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 16–19, In re Mena, No. 11-
05239 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2011), ECF No. 1 (incomplete chain of indorsements), Answer to 
Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Mena, No. 11-05239 (Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 4 (no 
standing defense plead), and Stipulation for Dismissal of all Claims Against Defendants Joaquin Mena and 
Rafaela Mena, In re Mena, No. 11-05329 (Apr. 9, 2012), ECF No. 17 (mutual releases). 
289 See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation at 1–2, In re Ilayan, No. 11-04079 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 
27, 2011), ECF No. 13.  
290 See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation at 1, 3, In re Gomez, No. 10-03197 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 
12, 2011), ECF No. 17. Ms. Gomez had signed a note payable to Oak Hill Mortgage, Inc.; an allonge 
showed an indorsement to Heritage from Argent Mortgage Co., L.L.C., but neither the note nor the allonge 
showed an indorsement by Oak Hill Mortgage, Inc. or anyone else to Argent. See Plaintiff's Exhibit List at 
9–11, In re Gomez, No. 10-03197 (Sept. 6, 2011), ECF No. 14.  
291 See Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Settlement Agreement at 3, In re Han, No. 11-02042 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. July 14, 2011), ECF No. 18. Mr. Han and his spouse had signed a note payable to Ownit Mortgage 
Solutions, Inc.; an allonge showed an indorsement to Heritage from Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P., but 
neither the note nor the allonge showed an indorsement by Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Inc. or anyone else to 
Cadlerock. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at un-paginated Exhibit B, In re 
Han, No. 11-02042 (Jan. 20, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
292 See Order for Judgment Against Defendant Manuel Orozco, In re Orozco, No. 11-02166 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 15. Mr. Orozco had signed a note payable to Mortgage Lenders Network 
USA, Inc.; an allonge showed an indorsement to Heritage from Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P., but neither 
the note nor the allonge showed an indorsement by Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. or by anyone else 
to Cadlerock. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 11–13, In re Orozco, No. 
11-02166 (May 5, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
293 See Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).  
294 To be conservative in counting the number of proceedings in which this standing defense could have 
been successfully asserted, this Article did not count those proceedings in which the note included no 
indorsement whatsoever, either in its body or in an allonge. In those proceedings, the defense would have 
been unavailable if the originating lender had delivered the note directly to Heritage and this Article assumes 
that it did so. This Article also excludes from the count those proceedings in which an allonge may not have 
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III.     PLAYING WITH A STACKED DECK 
 
A.    Heritage's Hand 
 
Heritage acquired debt for a song and then litigated with a deck stacked in its 
favor.  A paradigm "repeat player,"295 it litigated with superior information and 
litigated efficiently by mass-producing documents for filing.  Given its apparent 
acquisition and litigation costs, it offered attractive settlements to defendants faced 
with the prospect of significant attorney's fees and ruinous liability.  
Two attorneys in one law firm (assisted by an unknown number of special 
appearance attorneys and office staff) represented Heritage in virtually all of the 
adversary proceedings.  Another attorney represented Heritage throughout five of 
the adversary proceedings and represented Heritage only initially in fifteen other 
adversary proceedings.  In contrast, one hundred twenty-six different attorneys 
represented defendants in the roughly sixty-three percent of proceedings in which 
the defendant was represented by counsel (either throughout the proceeding or in 
part of the proceeding).296  The consolidation of representation on one side and 
dispersal of representation on the other afforded Heritage the advantage of superior 
information as the filings unfolded over time.  With each additional filing, Heritage 
could learn from and adapt to defense positions and arguments advanced or judicial 
reactions expressed, whereas almost every attorney representing a defendant 
appeared in only one adversary proceeding and thus confronted issues posed by the 
litigation only once.297  
Many attorneys may have been unaware of Heritage's comparable proceedings 
against others either in bankruptcy court, federal district court, or state court. Sound 
representation might have counseled a PACER name search for Heritage in one or 
more California federal district or bankruptcy courts, but an attorney's time 
gathering, sorting, reviewing, assimilating, and evaluating information and ideas 
available from PACER-accessible records filed in other Heritage adversary 
proceedings would have been prohibitively expensive to most defendants.  Even if 
somehow affordable, the attorney could not assure the client in advance that the 
attorney's fees to be incurred for that work would be a good investment because the 
                                                                                                                         
been effective to show a complete chain of indorsements. An allonge is effective only if affixed to the note. 
CAL. COM. CODE § 3204(a) (2012). In one Heritage proceeding, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel expressed some skepticism about whether the allonge was affixed to the note. See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 
No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *17–20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012).  
295 Professor Marc Galanter coined this term in Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).  
296 When a law firm of two or more attorneys represented a defendant, this figure counts only one attorney 
even if more than one attorney associated with the firm appeared in the proceeding.  
297 Only eleven attorneys represented a defendant in two of the adversary proceedings and two other 
attorneys represented a defendant in three of the proceedings. The nature and range of results in those 
twenty-eight adversary proceedings resemble the nature and range of results in the adversary proceedings 
generally.  
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attorney could not know in advance what a PACER search might reveal.  Moreover, 
an attorney could not have learned of Heritage's state court actions through PACER.  
Learning about them would have been serendipitous and learning from them would 
have been extraordinarily time consuming and expensive.  
This information asymmetry might have been mitigated somewhat in an 
unknown number of cases in which, through professional associations, ad hoc 
informal networks, or other communication, a defendant's attorney obtained 
information and ideas from attorneys representing other defendants. 298  But that 
benefit to any one defendant would have been random and almost certainly would 
have been unavailable to pro se defendants.  Many if not most pro se defendants 
would have been unaware of the PACER resource, unable to afford the cost of 
downloading records (typically $.10/page),299 or unable to recognize, sift through, 
understand, or effectively utilize relevant PACER documents filed by Heritage in 
other adversary proceedings.  In proceedings in which defendants appeared pro se, 
therefore, Heritage benefitted from vastly superior information.   
One example of the information asymmetry is particularly noteworthy.  Recall 
that in one of Heritage's federal district court actions the court ruled on October 17, 
2011 that Heritage's fraud claim was barred by California's limitation on fraud 
claims.300 Heritage did not mention that unpublished (but PACER-accessible) ruling 
in any document filed in the three adversary proceedings it initiated after October 
17, 2011 or in the many adversary proceedings still open on that date, but the failure 
of its attorneys to do so did not violate California's rules of professional 
responsibility.301 Likely no defendant's attorney was aware of the ruling because 
none mentioned it in any document filed in any adversary proceeding.  The absence 
of a professional obligation of Heritage's lawyers to disclose that ruling exacerbated 
the information asymmetry.  
Consider another subtler example, derived from four Heritage adversary 
proceedings pending before the same judge.  In two of them, the bankruptcy judge 
either denied a Heritage motion for default judgment or required Heritage to 
                                                                                                                         
298 The author, for example, supervised law students representing three such defendants and in the process 
soon learned of the mass filings and gained useful insights from two acquaintances, one a local bankruptcy 
attorney and the other a local consumer law attorney. 
299  See PACER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, https://www.pacer.gov/documents/pacer_policy.pdf (last 
updated Aug. 18, 2014).  
300 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  
301 California's rules of professional conduct prohibit only citation of a decision that has been overruled, 
knowing its invalidity. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-200(D) (1992). American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from knowingly failing "to disclose to the tribunal 
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . ." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002). 
Putting aside the question of whether an unpublished federal district court ruling was legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction, California lawyers may consider but are not bound by the A.B.A. Model Rules. See 
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (1992). Moreover, the limitation on fraud claims may not 
have been available in some of those proceedings, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 238–40.  
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provide further briefing in support of its motion.302 In each, Heritage thereafter 
requested dismissal of the proceeding.303 In the other two, defendants represented 
by attorneys stipulated to judgments of nondischargeability and payments to 
Heritage, in one of them agreeing to pay $18,000 in installments (9 percent of the 
claim) or $36,000 (18 percent of the claim) upon default in installment payments.304 
One wonders whether the attorneys representing the two defendants who settled 
were aware of the settlement leverage to be derived from the judge's skepticism in 
response to the two motions for default judgment.   
Consider a final example of the information asymmetry.  In his deposition in a 
state court action, Ben Ganter testified that in acquiring portfolios of loans he 
(perhaps he meant Heritage) did not inquire of the originating lenders what they 
relied upon in making loans.305 From this obscure testimony, known to Heritage and 
the deposing attorney, but likely by few others, it might be reasonably (if not 
conclusively) inferred that Heritage had no evidence of reliance by originating 
lenders when it filed its adversary proceedings.  If Heritage were thereafter unable 
to acquire and present such evidence and the adversary proceeding were to be 
dismissed for that reason, Heritage might be liable for the defendant's attorney's fees 
because it lacked substantial justification for initiating the proceeding. 306 
Knowledge of that evidence would therefore have provided additional powerful 
settlement leverage to defendants.  
In addition to its informational advantage, Heritage's mass production of 
pleadings, motions, legal memoranda, and declarations afforded Heritage 
economies of scale unavailable to defendants.  Its mass production is evident from 
comparison of documents it filed in any one proceeding with corresponding 
documents that it filed in other proceedings, 307  from obvious errors in some 
                                                                                                                         
302 See Minute Order, In re Garibay, No. 10-90480 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012), ECF No. 28; Memo 
re Order: Request for further documentation or further action, supra note 91.  
303 See Request for Dismissal of Adversary Proceeding Against Defendant Antonio Anguiano Garibay, In 
re Garibay, No. 10-90480 (Mar. 15, 2012), ECF No. 29; Request for Dismissal of Adversary Proceeding 
Against Defendant Darrell E. Cox, supra note 91.  
304  See Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, In re Calderon, No. 11-90402 
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. June 5, 2012), ECF No. 18; Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, 
In re Dekoekkoek, No. 11-90491 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012), ECF No. 16.  
305 See Oral Deposition of Benjamin A. Ganter, supra note 6, at 47.  
306 See infra notes 326–29 and accompanying text.  
307 As we have seen, Heritage mass produced complaints. See supra note 112. With minor adjustments to 
each, Heritage also filed other documents multiple times, including memoranda in support of motions for 
default or summary judgment, pre-trial conference statements, trial briefs, settlement agreements, and 
judgments. Compare Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment by the Court, In re Garibay, No. 10-90480 
(Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 17, with Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment by the Court, In re Cox, No. 11-
90357 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2012), ECF No. 17; compare Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, In re 
Lemus, No. 10-01092 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010), ECF No. 13, with Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary 
Judgment, In re Hellawell, No. 10-03100 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011), ECF No. 11-1; compare 
Plaintiff's Trial Brief; Declarations of Brad A. Mokri, Ben Ganter and Mark Schuerman in Support Thereof, 
In re Villatoro, No. 11-01315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), ECF No. 8, with Plaintiff's Trial Brief, In re 
Mercado, No. 10-02770 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011), ECF No 21. 
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documents that might naturally have resulted from mass production,308 and by the 
sheer volume of documents, numbering in the thousands, filed by the three lawyers 
representing Heritage over a twenty-six month period.  The mass production 
prompted one bankruptcy judge to express his concern, at an initial status 
conference, about "boilerplate language" in form complaints and to allude to similar 
concerns shared by his colleagues.309 The mass production probably also extended 
to written discovery propounded by Heritage, as is suggested by its apparent use of 
a standardized request for admissions as a device to prove its allegations.310 As 
                                                                                                                         
308 Examples of errors abound. Most troubling are the multiple instances in which Heritage named a 
husband and wife even though only one of the parties had applied for the loan and signed the loan 
application and promissory note. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt at 1, 
19, 22, 25, In re Driscoll, No. 11-02333 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 10, 2011), ECF No. 1 (signatures on loan 
application and note by Robert Driscoll but not by co-defendant Darlene Driscoll). That error was 
compounded in the multiple instances in which both such co-defendants stipulated to entry of a judgment 
against both, even if represented by an attorney. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of 
Judgment, In re Driscoll, No. 11-02333 (Dec. 8, 2011), ECF No. 10. This error might or might not be 
harmful, depending upon whether the person applying for the loan and signing the loan documents did so 
prior to his or her marriage to the co-defendant and whether the spouse who did not apply for the loan or 
sign the loan documents had separate property. In California, the community estate of the spouses is liable 
for the debts of either spouse incurred prior to or during marriage, CAL. FAM. CODE § 910 (2012), but the 
earnings of a married person are not liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse prior to marriage, id. § 
911(a), and the separate property of a spouse is not liable for a debt incurred by the other spouse either prior 
to or during the marriage. Id. § 913(b)(1).  
One complaint alleged defendant Eduardo Guerrero's misrepresentations in an attached loan application 
but attached a loan application signed by Eduardo Ramirez. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt at 2–3, 10–13, In re Guerrero, No. 11-01223 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2011), ECF 
No. 1.  
In another complaint, Heritage alleged the defendant's misstatement of income on an attached loan 
application that included no statement of income. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of 
Debt at 3, 10, In re Chacon, No. 11-05133 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
In three other complaints, Heritage alleged that the defendant misrepresented an intention to purchase 
property as a primary residence (a standard allegation) even though the attached loan application clearly 
stated only an intention to refinance investment property. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt at 4, 9, In re Louie, No. 11-01128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011), ECF No. 1.  
In another proceeding, Heritage supported its motion for summary judgment against defendant Miguel 
Arredondo with an alleged unanswered request for admissions served on him in which Request for 
Admission No. 17 asked the defendant to admit execution of a promissory note by a person named Yolanda 
Lemus. See Exhibit A, Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of Request [sic] for Admissions to 
Defendant Miguel Arredondo at 4, In re Arredondo, No. 10-09065 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011), ECF No. 
20.  
Heritage also mass-produced proposed orders submitted to the court for signature on the basis of a 
stipulated judgment. One entered judgment "for the principal amount of fifteen-thousand dollars ($52,000)." 
Order (Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment) at 1, In re Diaz, No. 11-02682 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2011), ECF No. 6. Yet the settlement agreement called for a judgment of $25,000, less 
payments made by the defendant pursuant to the stipulation, but provided that Heritage would not enforce 
the judgment if the defendant timely paid installments totaling $4320. See Stipulation and Settlement at 1–2, 
In re Diaz, No 11-02682 (Oct. 24, 2011), ECF No. 5.  
309 See Case Management Conference at 2:45–3:06, In re Makmuri, No. 11-04111 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 
6, 2011), ECF No. 12.  
310 PACER typically does not capture discovery documents because the parties file neither discovery 
requests nor discovery responses unless in support of or in opposition to a motion or as trial exhibits. 
Heritage filed them in several such instances. See, e.g., Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's First Set of 
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noted earlier, Heritage also submitted multiple boilerplate declarations of an expert 
opining about lending practices relating to stated income loans.311 
 
B.    The Defendants' Hand 
 
Attorneys representing defendants were not without benefit of some boilerplate 
of their own.  Answers filed by many included affirmative defenses, bereft of 
factual detail, ranging from the plausible (statute of limitations, laches) to the 
expected (waiver, estoppel, unclean hands) to the irrelevant (accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, contributory negligence, license, statute of 
frauds). 312  At the extreme, one attorney filed an answer listing thirty-four 
affirmative defenses, the last preserving unknown latent defenses. 313  This 
standardized, over inclusive (and thus protective) response to a complaint is 
understandable given the short time period within which a defendant must file an 
answer to a complaint.  Even when a plaintiff stipulates to an extension of time (a 
typical professional courtesy), the defendant's attorney has insufficient time and 
information to thoroughly consider the nature of appropriate defenses to be pleaded.  
After issuance of summons, a thirty-day clock starts ticking.314 Once served, the 
defendant may need time to decide whether to retain an attorney and time to find a 
suitable attorney willing to schedule an appointment. The attorney may not be able 
to schedule an immediate initial appointment and the defendant may need time after 
the appointment to digest information (including information about attorney's fees) 
and choose among options.  Once retained, the attorney may be adding the matter to 
an already crowded professional calendar, limiting the amount of time that can 
initially be devoted to the matter.  Discovery that might reveal the most appropriate 
defenses cannot begin until after the parties have conferred and developed a 
proposed discovery plan.315  
But front-end time constraints and lack of information do not explain, or at least 
do not justify, an attorney's failure to aggressively dispute the originating lender's 
reliance or to discover and pursue defenses based on California's limitation on fraud 
claims or Heritage's lack of standing.  We must look elsewhere for explanation.  
                                                                                                                         
Requests for Admission to Defendant Yazmin Gonzalez, Exhibit A to Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, 
supra note 163.  
311 See supra text accompanying notes 130–37.  
312 See Answer at 5, In re Ballesteros, No. 11-04045 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011), ECF No. 7.  
313 See Answer at 2–9, In re Chepetsky, No. 10-90443 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2011), ECF No. 14. This 
answer included the following potpourri of clearly irrelevant defenses: plaintiff's consent to the defendant's 
actions; plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages; res judicata; lack of consideration for contractual claims; lack 
of definite terms in a contract between plaintiff and defendant; assumption of the risk; set off; plaintiff's 
previous rejection of defendant's tender of performance; the defendant's conduct was privileged or justified; 
contracts between plaintiff and defendant have been rescinded. Id. at 2–8.  
314 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a).  
315 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1), (f), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7026.  
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Least flattering would be that some attorneys may lack the degree of knowledge or 
skill necessary to discover, formulate, or effectively communicate relatively 
obscure and complex legal arguments.  This probably would not explain an 
attorney's failure to aggressively dispute the originating lender's reliance but might 
explain the failure to discover and pursue the two defenses.  The law governing the 
reliance requirement in dischargeability actions under section 523(a)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code is relatively uncomplicated,316 and discovery of the underwriting 
practices applied by an originating lender to a specific defendant's loan application 
would require only a request for production of the relevant loan file and perhaps a 
deposition of the originating lender's person most knowledgeable.  
California's limit on fraud claims, however, is buried, incongruously, at the end 
of a lengthy section in a chapter of the California Code of Civil Procedure devoted 
to actions for the foreclosure of mortgages,317 and a clear understanding of its scope 
and ramifications requires an understanding of what the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate panel described as a "maze of elaborate and interrelated foreclosure and 
antideficiency statutes in California relating to the enforcement of obligations 
secured by interests in real property."318 One lack of standing defense required a 
carefully crafted argument based on obscure California common law,319 the other 
required understanding and application of interrelated provisions of Article 3 of the 
Commercial Code,320 and both required an understanding of federal procedural law 
governing prudential standing.321 We can readily imagine that a legal team drawn 
from a blue chip law firm representing a Heritage defendant pro bono would have 
discovered and advanced these defenses.  We can reasonably question whether 
every attorney could do so.  
The cost of legal representation offers a second, hopefully more common, 
explanation.  Given financial constraints on a defendant's ability to fund litigation, it 
would not have been surprising for a defendant's attorney to have allocated most of 
a limited amount of billable time to settlement negotiations and little to detailed 
legal research, analysis, or briefing.  At least some of the defendants in the 
adversary proceedings likely would have been unable to fund extensive litigation; a 
significant number of debtors continue to experience financial distress following 
bankruptcy 322  and the potential attorney's fees could have been substantial. 323 
                                                                                                                         
316 We have seen, however, that the relevant analysis requires an understanding of the right of an assignee 
to assert the reliance of the originating lender, see supra note 17, an understanding that the nature of the 
required reliance (reasonable or justifiable) depends upon the nature of the misrepresentation claimed, see 
supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text, and an understanding of the applicable burden of proof, see 
supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
317 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (2012) (in Part 2, Title 10, Chapter 1).  
318 In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 107 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).  
319 See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text.  
320 See supra notes 277–85 and accompanying text.  
321 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.  
322 See Porter & Thorne, supra note 98, at 88–93.  
323 One defendant's attorney reported charging his client $1750 for seven hours of work on a discovery 
motion ($250/hr.). See Notice of Motion and Motion to Compell [sic] Answers to Discovery and for 
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Confronted with the possibility of liability on a five or six-figure claim and 
substantial attorney's fees fighting the claim, burdened with the emotional weight of 
the litigation, and seeking finality, represented defendants more often than not 
settled with Heritage well before trial for a small percentage of its claim.324 Heritage 
surely recognized the leverage this afforded.  
Pro se defendants, in contrast, needn't have worried about attorney's fees.  
Perhaps for that reason, or others, pro se defendants among all districts obtained no-
payment settlements at a slightly higher rate (thirty-six percent) than defendants 
among all districts represented by attorneys (thirty-one percent).325 Heritage may 
                                                                                                                         
Attorney's Fees at 3, In re Gutierrez, No. 10-03250 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2011), ECF No. 26. Another 
defendant's attorney reported charging his client $1375, at a rate of $250/hr., for preparing a motion for 
sanctions under Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See Defendant's Notice of Motion 
and Motion for Sanctions under FRBP 9011 at 11, In re Louie, No. 11-01128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 
2011), ECF No. 9. He also reported a total of $9,737.95 in attorney's fees and costs incurred from the 
inception of the case. See id.  
 A third defendant's attorney explained that his standard practice in representing defendants sued in 
adversary proceedings is to charge a $2500 retainer to be charged at an hourly rate of $300/hr., which he 
described as $75–$100 below the going market rate in the Central District of California. See Telephone 
Interview (June 25, 2014) (attorney's name withheld to protect anonymity). He commented that this retainer 
would typically cover work for sixty to ninety days. Id. Thereafter, he attempts to keep his receivables below 
$2000/client, including by offering small discounts for prompt payment. Id. About four to six months before 
an anticipated trial, pursuant to his retainer agreement, he requires clients to pay an additional retainer for 
trial. If the clients can't or won't pay, he substitutes out or, if necessary, files a motion to withdraw. Id.  
324 The attorney for one defendant reported: "[T]hough I was looking forward to trial against Heritage for 
my Bankruptcy clients, they recently decide [sic] to settle their claim at $8000 no interest, payable at 
$167.00 per month. Given the total claim was about $127,000, I guess the settlement was reasonable." E-
mail from attorney Peter Manning to attorney William Kennedy (Feb. 2, 2012) (on file with author). 
Conversations with three defendants revealed the same story. One defendant who vehemently denied 
misrepresenting his income and who had sent Heritage relevant tax transcripts as proof, nonetheless settled a 
$140,662 claim for $20,016 payable over five years, because his attorney had advised that attorney's fees 
could well exceed the amount of the settlement offer and had advised that Heritage had a small chance of 
prevailing in the proceeding. See Telephone Interview with Defendant (Aug. 29, 2014) (name withheld to 
preserve anonymity). A second defendant retained an attorney for a $1000 initial retainer. Heritage, 
believing the defendant to be unrepresented, telephoned the defendant to offer a twelve percent settlement on 
a $65,895 claim. In a five minute conversation, the parties settled the claim for $6000, payable over forty-
two months. The defendant believed the proceeding to lack merit, but settled because he believed he would 
have to pay at least the settlement amount in attorney's fees and that he could conceivably lose in the 
litigation. See Telephone Interview with Defendant (Oct. 7, 2014) (name withheld to preserve anonymity). A 
third defendant settled a $124,555 claim for $30,000 payable over ninety months for the same reasons. See 
Telephone Interview with Defendant (Aug. 22, 2014) (name withheld to preserve anonymity).  
325 Likewise, two researchers studying litigation before the United States Tax Court found "lack of any 
statistically significant effect of counsel on the IRS's recovery ratio in settled cases," a finding suggesting 
that counsel do not obtain better settlements than pro se taxpayers. Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, 
Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Effects on Tax Court Litigation 
Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1264 (2006). More recently, however, two Harvard researchers 
concluded that observational studies of case files, of which the tax court study and this study are examples, 
cannot validly measure the effects of legal representation on outcome because of inherent methodological 
limitations, including the failure to account for selection effects. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and 
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2176–96 (2012) (reviewing literature on dozens of observational 
studies of case files in a wide range of civil contexts, including bankruptcy). This Article therefore makes no 
general claim about the effect of representation on outcome. Nonetheless, it may be of interest to note the 
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have recognized some pro se defendants to be both judgment proof and incapable of 
making installment payments (they couldn't even afford an attorney) and may 
therefore have agreed to no-payment settlements with them to avoid wasted 
additional expense.  Conceivably, then, retaining an attorney diminished a 
defendant's chances of a no-payment settlement by signaling to Heritage the 
possibility that a defendant could afford installment payments in settlement of its 
claim.  
Heritage's potential liability for a defendant's attorney's fees conceivably could 
have offset Heritage's litigation advantages to some extent.  Section 523(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code directs a bankruptcy court to award the debtor a reasonable 
attorney's fee incurred in an adversary proceeding in which a creditor requests a 
determination of the dischargeability of a consumer debt under section 523(a)(2), 
the debt is discharged, and the court finds that the creditor's position was not 
substantially justified, unless the court finds that special circumstances would make 
such an award unjust.326 The creditor bears the burden of proving that its claim was 
substantially justified,327 and to sustain its burden the creditor must establish that its 
claim had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact, a standard derived from the 
showing required for attorney's fees under the federal Equal Access to Justice 
Act.328 Substantial justification must persist through trial.329  
Fear of incurring liability for a defendant's attorney's fees might have deterred 
Heritage from filing adversary proceedings against some potential defendants when 
it considered even colorable claims of misrepresentation or reliance to have been 
weak.  Likewise, fear of incurring such liability might have contributed to 
Heritage's decision to dismiss forty-four of the adversary proceedings in which an 
attorney represented a defendant through a stipulation calling for a mutual release of 
all claims.330 We cannot learn whether either is true absent knowledge of Heritage's 
internal deliberations or its privileged communications with its attorneys.  
                                                                                                                         
further finding of this study that represented defendants in the Heritage adversary proceedings who agreed to 
installment payments to Heritage in settlement of its claim fared no better, on average, than pro se 
defendants who agreed to installment payments to Heritage in settlement of its claim. On average, 
represented defendants agreed to installment payments totaling 11.9% of Heritage's claim, with the median 
total of installment payments equal to 9.9% of its claim, whereas on average pro se defendants agreed to 
installment payments totaling 9.38% of Heritage's claim, with the median total installment payments equal to 
7.6% of its claim. In contrast, in those settlements in which the defendant agreed to a larger liability upon 
default in installment payments, represented defendants agreed, on average, to liability equal to 39.3% of 
Heritage's claim, with the median liability equal to 30.3% of its claim, whereas pro se defendants, on 
average, agreed to liability equal to 47.4% of Heritage's claim, with the median liability equal to 49.9% of its 
claim.  
326 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012).  
327 See, e.g., In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 114 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).  
328 See First Card v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 238 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2001).  
329 See In re Harvey, 172 B.R. 314, 318–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).  
330 See, e.g., Stipulation and Settlement, In re Flores, No. 10-05400 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011), ECF 
No. 19; Stipulation and Settlement, In re Barocio, No. 11-05009 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2011), ECF No. 
19.  
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Absent conversations with defendants represented by an attorney, we also 
cannot learn their fee arrangements with their attorneys or why, after securing 
representation, those who settled for a mutual release of all claims thereby 
abandoned a claim for attorney's fees.  We can speculate with some confidence on 
both questions, however.  A few attorneys might have been willing to represent a 
defendant pro bono (either before or after the fact).  A few attorneys might have 
been willing to condition the defendant's obligation to pay attorney's fees on an 
attorney's fees award, but that would have been a blind and therefore precarious and 
rare gamble.  Heritage could escape liability for attorney's fees by demonstrating 
that even its losing position was substantially justified or that special circumstances 
made an attorney's fee award unjust.  An attorney could not possibly have predicted 
at the outset whether the debt would be dischargeable or whether, even if 
dischargeable, Heritage could escape liability for attorney's fees.  The "substantial 
justification" and "special circumstances" components of section 523(d), therefore, 
compound an attorney's uncertainty and undermine the incentive to undertake 
contingent representation.  Accordingly, most attorneys likely charged their clients 
an initial retainer and thereafter billed for time.331 It thus would be no surprise that a 
defendant would be amply motivated to stipulate to mutual releases when offered 
the opportunity to avoid a very large adverse judgment and the outlay of additional 
attorney's fees, even if, at the time of a Heritage settlement offer, the defendant's 
attorney had a better sense of the prospect for recovering attorney's fees.  Heritage 
was certainly wise enough to understand and capitalize on that motivation.332 It was 
also interested in protecting its own purse; it did not stipulate to pay a defendant's 
attorney's fees in any of the adversary proceedings.  
Only five defendants represented by an attorney, each appearing before a 
different bankruptcy judge, sought to recover attorney's fees.333 Each had obtained a 
judgment of dischargeability (one predicate for an award of attorney's fees), four 
through summary judgment334 and one following trial.335 Three of the five prevailed 
                                                                                                                         
331 Had a defendant sought representation from an attorney who had represented the defendant in the 
underlying chapter 7 proceeding, the attorney's fees charged for that earlier representation would not 
typically have covered representation in a subsequent adversary proceeding. See, e.g., Guidelines for Legal 
Services to be Provided by Debtors' Attorney in Chapter 7 Cases, U.S. BANKR. COURT, N. DIST. OF CAL., 
http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/procedure/guidelines-legal-services-be-provided-debtors-attorney-chapter-7-
cases (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).  
332 It should be noted, however, that Heritage denied in one adversary proceeding that it was filing the 
proceeding in the hope of extracting a settlement from an honest debtor hoping to save attorney's fees. See 
Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees at 7, In re 
Palines, No. 12-03063 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012), ECF No. 41.  
333 One other defendant, Rosa Vasquez, prevailed at trial, without making an appearance at trial, shortly 
after the judge granted her attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel. Memorandum, supra note 121, at 4, 13. 
Her attorney's declaration in support of his motion to withdraw cited Ms. Vasquez's failure to pay attorney's 
fees, failure to keep an appointment, and failure to otherwise cooperate. See Notice of Motion for Withdrawl 
[sic] of Counsel at 7, In re Vasquez, No. 10-01663 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 28. Neither 
she nor her former attorney thereafter sought an award of attorney's fees. Docket, In re Vasquez, No. 10-
01663 (Nov. 8, 2010). 
334 See Summary Judgment Determining Dischargeability of Debt, In re Machuca, No. 10-05301 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011), ECF No. 37; Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant, In re Martinez, No. 11-
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on the motion, obtaining attorney fee judgments of $8,975.00,336 $69,782.19,337 and 
$40,000,338 respectively.  
One bankruptcy judge denied the motion of a fourth defendant on multiple 
grounds.339 Another bankruptcy judge denied the motion of a fifth defendant on 
grounds stated on the record but not in the judge's order.340 The defendant's attorney 
in that proceeding later explained that the judge found substantial justification for 
the adversary proceeding because the defendant had failed to list his ownership of a 
restaurant on his bankruptcy schedules and Heritage could therefore reasonably 
argue that the loan application's reference to ownership of a restaurant was a 
misrepresentation.341 If that explanation is correct, the judge's finding of substantial 
justification is puzzling.  
The judge earlier had found that the defendant had not in fact misrepresented 
his ownership of a restaurant;342 the originating lender therefore could not possibly 
have erroneously relied on that truthful representation.  The judge also found that 
the lender had not conducted even a minimal amount of due diligence before 
approving the defendant's loan and had also not demonstrated that the defendant's 
failure to include an additional source of income on his loan application could have 
adversely affected the lender.343 It is thus difficult to see how Heritage could have 
been substantially justified in believing that it could demonstrate reliance by the 
originating lender.  A similar failure to demonstrate reliance by the originating 
lender led other bankruptcy judges to make two of the three attorney's fee awards 
mentioned above.344 Here too, then, we see disparate outcomes, but the disparity is 
                                                                                                                         
01131 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012), ECF No. 37; Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
In re Montano, 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012), ECF No. 121; Order Granting Defendant Garrett 
Palines' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim of Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial, In re Palines, No. 
12-03063 (Oct. 30, 2012), ECF No. 38.  
335 See Judgment After Trial, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012), ECF No. 49.  
336 Order Awarding Attorneys Fees at 2, In re Machuca, No. 10-05301 (Jan. 28, 2012), ECF No. 43.  
337 Order on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs at 3, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Jan. 25, 
2013), ECF No. 198.  
338 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs at 1, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Mar. 28, 2013), ECF 
No. 62.  
339 See Order Denying Motion for Attorneys' Fees, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Dec. 3, 2012), ECF No. 
51; Oral Argument at 13:20–16:30, In re Palines, No. 12-03063 (Dec. 4, 2012), ECF No. 48 (capturing 
judge's conclusion that the debt, incurred to purchase a home for the defendant's sister, was not a consumer 
debt, that the creditor may have been substantially justified in pursuing the proceeding, and that, in any 
event, special circumstances justified denial of attorney's fees because of the defendant's unclean hands).  
340 See Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees, In re Martinez, No. 11-01131 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 29, 2013), ECF No. 47.  
341 See Telephone Interview with Donna Dishbak, Attorney for Defendant Rolando Martinez (June 14, 
2014).  
342 See Memorandum of Decision Re Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 121, at 7.  
343 See id. at 10.  
344 See Transcript of Defendant's 523(a) Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees at 4–8, In re Machuca, No. 
10-05301 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 52; Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion to 
Reconsider of [sic] Court's Order Denying Request for an Award Filed by Jesus Montano, supra note 174, at 
30–49.  
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easier to justify than disparity in findings about actual reliance because of the 
subjective and flexible nature of the "substantial justification" standard.   
Heritage appealed each of the three adverse attorney fee judgments to the Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.  Heritage neither moved to stay the judgments 
pending appeal 345 nor stayed their enforcement by supersedeas bond.346 The Panel 
affirmed two of the judgments.  In December 2012, it affirmed the $8,975 judgment 
rendered in and unpaid since January 2012.347 In November 2013, it affirmed the 
$69,782.19 judgment rendered in and unpaid since January 2013.348 Heritage paid 
neither judgment after losing the appeals. 349  In January 2014, the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel suspended hearing of the third appeal, from the $40,000 judgment 
rendered in and unpaid since March 2013,350 upon Heritage's January 2014 filing of 
a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  It later dismissed the appeal for failure of Heritage 
or its chapter 7 trustee to file required status reports.351  
Heritage's filing of a chapter 7 petition following its extended failure to pay the 
three judgments highlights the potential impotency of section 523(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 352  Prior to Heritage's chapter 7 filing, only one of the three 
defendants attempted to enforce his judgment. The long and continuing saga of his 
attorney's extraordinary but mostly unsuccessful attempts to collect both his 
$69,782.19 attorney's fees judgment and a subsequent attorney's fees award of 
$59,555.63 for attempting to enforce that initial judgment merit a separate article.353 
                                                                                                                         
345 A party may by motion seek a stay of a bankruptcy court judgment pending appeal. See FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 8007.  
346 A party may by supersedeas bond stay enforcement of a judgment pending appeal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
62(d), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7062.  
347 See In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 728–29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012). 
348 See In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 114–19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013).  
349 See Interview with Stanley Zlotoff, Attorney for Defendant Raul Machuca, Jr., in San Jose, Cal. (Feb. 
11, 2014); Telephone Interview with Tessa Santiago, Attorney for Defendant Jesus Montano (Jan. 12, 2015).  
350 See Order Suspending Prosecution of Appeal, In re Adrian, No. 13-1175 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 21, 
2014), ECF No. 22.  
351 See Order Dismissing Appeal, In re Adrian, No. 13-1175 (Apr. 30, 2015), ECF No. 28.  
352 The same problem also attends mandatory fee shifting statutes (i.e. those in which a court must award 
attorney's fees to a prevailing consumer irrespective of the plaintiff's justification for the action). For 
example, a California appellate court affirmed an attorney's fee judgment of $87,525 against Heritage under 
the mandatory fee shifting provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) 
(2012)). See, e.g., Heritage Pac. Fin., L.L.C. v. Monroy, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 49–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013), 
petition for review denied, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6631 (Cal. July 31, 2013). In its subsequent bankruptcy filing, 
Heritage listed the judgment creditor, Maribel Monroy, as holding a $190,000 non-priority unsecured claim. 
See Petition of Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C., supra note 3, at 37 (Schedule F).  
353 Since at least February 12, 2013, when the defendant filed a motion for leave to file post-judgment 
interrogatories designed to elicit information about the location, nature, and extent of Heritage's ability to 
pay the judgment, the defendant has attempted to enforce its judgment for attorney's fees against Heritage, 
against alleged assignees of Heritage, and against persons and entities alleged to be alter egos of or 
otherwise closely aligned with Heritage. See Defendant's Rule 26(b) Motion for Additional Interrogatories, 
In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013), ECF No. 202. The bulk of the next 203 
docket entries in the proceeding, dating through June 10, 2015, concern the defendant's ongoing efforts to 
enforce its original and subsequent attorney's fee awards. See, e.g., Order Fixing Fees Incurred in Enforcing 
the January 25, 2013 Order Awarding Fees, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (May 19, 2014), ECF No. 388 
(awarding $55,362.10 in attorney's fees and costs incurred in enforcing the original judgment); Defendant's 
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The failure of any of the three defendants to collect the judgments (except to the 
extent Heritage's chapter 7 trustee may pay a dividend to unsecured creditors) also 
highlights either the altruistic or the speculative efforts of the attorneys representing 
the defendants, each of whom appears either to have undertaken the representation 
on contingency or written off the fees.354  
 
C.    Wild Cards 
 
The foregoing portrait of Heritage's stacked deck captures much of what 
Professor Marc Galanter described in his influential theoretical essay on the general 
features of an American-like legal system.355 Professor Galanter's essay included a 
detailed portrait of litigation between what he termed "repeat players," those 
engaging in similar litigation over time, and "one-shotters," those drawn only 
occasionally into court.356 He described the "ideal type" of repeat player as "a unit 
which has had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the 
outcome of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long-run 
interests." 357  The repeat player's multiple strategic advantages therefore include 
advance intelligence, developed expertise, ready access to specialists, economies of 
scale, low startup costs for any case, the likelihood that the one-shotter will adopt a 
strategy that will minimize the probability of maximum loss, and the ability of the 
repeat player to forego tangible gain in one case, such as by settling a case where it 
expects an unfavorable outcome, while spending resources in another regarded as 
more likely to produce a favorable generally applicable rule.358 Galanter speculated 
that legal services amplify these strategic advantages. The repeat player, he 
suggested, may obtain better legal services than many a one-shotter in part because 
of the repeat player's ability to pay higher rates for a large quantity of continuing 
work and because its attorneys benefit from accumulated information and 
                                                                                                                         
December 23, 2014 Status Report–Collections on Judgment, In re Montano, No. 11-04008 (Dec. 23, 2014), 
ECF No. 400. Ironically, the defendant recovered $59,555.63 of the attorney's fee award through 
enforcement proceedings only to surrender that amount to Heritage's chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee in 
settlement of the trustee's subsequent action to set aside that recovery as a preferential transfer. See id. at 2. 
354 At the hearing on the attorney's fee application of defendant Leidy Adrian, Mr. Adrian's attorney 
commented to the court that her client had paid her only $500 to help pay for a transcript. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument on Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs at 40, In re Adrian, No. 10-01334 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
July 18, 2013), ECF No. 74. In the author's telephone conversations with attorneys for two other defendants, 
the confidentiality of communications between attorney and client prevented the attorney's disclosure of the 
amount of attorney's fees, if any, actually paid by each defendant. Speculation that those defendants have not 
paid attorney's fees derives both from the amount of attorney's fees involved in each proceeding and from 
reading between the lines of what each attorney was able to disclose.  
355 See Galanter, supra note 295.  
356 Id. at 97. 
357 Id. at 98.  
358 Id. at 98–101.  
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experience.359 Cases often "take the form of stereotyped mass processing with little 
of the individuated attention of full-dress adjudication."360  
Wild cards muddy this portrait.  The exercise of discretion by trial court judges 
is one wildcard.  As we have seen, some judges took a more inquisitive or active 
role in the litigation, or a more skeptical view of Heritage's position, than others.  
On functionally identical facts and issues, some denied and others granted motions 
for default judgment.  Although default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, a court 
may, in the exercise of its discretion, enter a default judgment after considering one 
or more of several factors: the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; the merits of 
the plaintiff's substantive claim; the sufficiency of the complaint; the sum of money 
at stake in the action; the possibility of dispute concerning material facts; whether 
the default was due to excusable neglect; the strong policy favoring decisions on the 
merits.361 The differences in outcome in resolution of motions for default judgment 
are to some extent enshrined by procedural rules: denial of a motion for default 
judgment is generally not a final, appealable order, 362  and entry of a default 
judgment may only be undone if a defendant appears and successfully moves to set 
aside the judgment, such as for inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.363  
On functionally identical facts and issues, some judges granted a defendant's 
motion for summary judgment or denied a Heritage motion for summary judgment 
but one granted a Heritage motion for summary judgment.  Although appellate 
review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment is de novo,364 neither side on 
the losing end of a summary judgment appealed.  For Heritage, appeal may not have 
been worth the expense.  The pro se defendant suffering a summary judgment may 
have lacked the resources or sophistication to appeal.  Decisions in the few trials 
diverged, but here too inconsistency will often be sanctioned because a trial court's 
factual findings are reversible only if clearly erroneous.365  
Heritage faced additional isolated instances of unpredictable judicial activism, 
skepticism, or lack of tolerance.  After a defendant had filed an answer to Heritage's 
complaint, one judge sua sponte dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for 
failure to plead fraud claims with particularity, ordered Heritage to file and serve 
proof of its status as real party in interest, and stayed until further court order all 
                                                                                                                         
359 Id. at 114.  
360 Id. at 108–09.  
361 See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986).  
362 See In re Lee, 186 B.R. 695, 697 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).  
363 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c), 60(b)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7055.  
364 See SNTL Corp. v. Ctr. Ins. Co. (In re SNTL Corp.), 571 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 2009).  
365  The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel articulated that same standard of review in both 
upholding a trial court judgment of nondischargeability in favor of Heritage against defendant Javier Tovar 
and in upholding a trial court judgment of dischargeability in favor of defendant Oscar Trejo against 
Heritage. See In re Tovar, Ch. 7 No. CC-11-1696-MkDKi, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3633, at *12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Aug. 3, 2012); In re Trejo, Ch. 7 No. NC-11-1652-HPaMk, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5881, at *6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Dec. 20, 2012).  
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discovery other than that relating to Heritage's status as real party in interest.366 In 
one of the twenty-three proceedings in which Heritage and a pro se defendant filed 
a settlement stipulation calling for the defendant to pay money to Heritage, the 
judge, prior to entering judgment, ordered a hearing, to be attended by the 
defendant, to consider the circumstances leading to the stipulation and to assess 
whether the defendant understood the consequences of entry of a judgment based on 
the stipulation. 367  In one of seventy-nine proceedings in which Heritage and a 
represented defendant filed such a settlement stipulation, the judge ordered a 
hearing on the settlement agreement and requested production of the full loan 
file.368  At a status conference following the clerk's entry of another defendant's 
default, one judge required that Heritage notice a hearing on a motion for default 
judgment on one of three specified days and ordered Heritage to notify the court of 
the date chosen within seven days of the status conference.369 In doing so, the court 
apparently voiced concerns about the credibility of the claim.370 Heritage's specially 
appearing attorney failed to timely communicate the message to Heritage's regular 
counsel.371 The judge dismissed the adversary proceeding when Heritage failed to 
notify the court of a date chosen for the hearing.372 Heritage's subsequent motion to 
vacate the dismissal for mistake and excusable neglect, noticed for a date "[t]o be 
determined,"373 went unheard.374  
The contrasting nature of settlements between Heritage and many of the 
defendants suggests additional wildcards at work. Heritage and a defendant filed a 
written settlement stipulation in 152 of the 218 adversary proceedings.  Attorneys 
represented defendants in 116 of these proceedings; 375  defendants represented 
                                                                                                                         
366 See Civil Minute Order, In re Torell, No 11-01080 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 11, 2011), ECF No. 14. After 
Heritage filed its amended complaint, which included as an exhibit a copy of a note from the defendant to an 
originating lender and the lender's indorsement of the note to Heritage, the judge, seemingly unsatisfied that 
the indorsed note sufficed, ordered Heritage to file and serve a copy of documents showing that plaintiff was 
the real party in interest. See id.  
367 See Notice of Hearing on Pro Se Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, In re Ramirez, No. 11-01545 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 12.  
368 See Order Setting Hearing on Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Settlement Agreement, In re Salas, 
No. 10-01574 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011), ECF No. 21; Declaration of Ben Ganter Re: Production of 
Full Bank File, In re Salas, No. 10-01574 (Feb. 22, 2012), ECF No. 28-4.  
369 See Docket, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010).  
370 See Amended Declaration of Brad A. Mokri in Support of Plaintiff Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s 
Motion for an Order to Set Aside Court's Order of October 1, 2010, Dismissing the Adversary Proceeding at 
3, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Nov. 18, 2010), ECF No. 15.  
371 See id. at 2.  
372 See Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Oct. 4, 2010), ECF No. 9.  
373 Heritage Pacific Financial, L.L.C.'s Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order to Set Aside Court's 
Order of October 1, 2010, Dismissing the Adversary Proceeding, at 1, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (Nov. 18, 
2010), ECF No. 12.  
374 See Docket, In re Rodas, No. 10-04182 (July 22, 2010).  
375 This number includes nineteen proceedings in which an attorney substituted in for a previously pro se 
defendant. In one of these nineteen proceedings, the defendant's attorney signed the settlement stipulation 
but had not appeared in the proceeding. 
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themselves in the remaining thirty-six proceedings.376 Data presented in Table 2 
indicates that, when represented by an attorney, defendants sued in the Northern 
District who thereafter settled with Heritage obtained dismissals of the proceedings 
with no payment to Heritage ("no-payment settlements") much more frequently 
than represented defendants sued in the other three districts.  Applying the Chi-
Square test of independence to that data reveals that this disparity among districts 
for represented defendants is statistically significant.377 The disparity is therefore 
almost certainly attributable to some underlying cause or causes.   
 
TABLE 2: Stipulated Settlements with Represented Defendants 
(Where "O" = observed frequency of settlements 
and "E" = expected frequency of settlements)378 
 
 Northern 
District 
Eastern 
District 
Central 
District 
Southern 
District 
Total 
$0 to 
Heritage 
O = 20 
E = 8.0690 
O = 7 
E = 6.8276 
O = 9 
E = 18.3103 
O = 0 
E = 
2.7931 
O = 36 
>$0 to 
Heritage 
O = 6 
E = 17.9310 
O = 15 
E = 15.1724 
O = 50 
E = 40.6897 
O = 9 
E = 
6.2069 
O = 80 
Total O = 26 O = 22 O = 59 O = 9 O = 116 
 
This disparity among districts in no-payment settlements for represented 
defendants might be the result, in part, of what others have called local legal 
culture:  
 
[S]ystematic and persistent variation in local legal practices as a 
consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared 
by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and 
differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and 
expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a 
                                                                                                                         
376 This number includes two proceedings in which a defendant initially represented by an attorney was 
acting pro se at the time of the settlement.  
377 The chances that the disparity is the result of random distribution are less than one in a hundred. In 
technical terms, x2 (3) = 36.50, p < .01, where x2 = Ʃ (O – E)2/E. One reaches the same conclusion even when 
excluding the small Southern District sample (where the expected frequency < 5).  
The sample size for settlements with pro se defendants is too small to justify either a similar or contrary 
conclusion about the distribution of no-payment settlements among districts. But the data in that small 
sample at least suggests that there may be no statistically significant disparity among districts for pro se 
defendants, and there is no intuitive reason to think otherwise. 
378 Expected frequencies of settlements are derived by multiplying the total of a row by the total of a 
column and dividing that product by the total population (e.g., 36 x 26/116).  
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similar formal legal regime.379  
 
For example, judicial pressure to use mediation, or the amenability of attorneys 
to mediation,380 a potential feature of local legal culture, might explain some of the 
disparity.  Represented defendants mediated most frequently in the two districts, 
Central and Southern, with the highest percentage of settlements requiring payment 
to Heritage.  Nineteen represented defendants in the Central District and six 
represented defendants in the Southern District settled the litigation through 
mediation.  Twenty-one of the twenty-five who did so settled for some payment to 
Heritage.  In contrast, only one represented defendant in the Northern District 
mediated the dispute.  Heritage dismissed that proceeding without filing a written 
settlement agreement but a status conference statement filed shortly before 
dismissal refers to a tentative settlement agreement for an unstated amount.381 Yet 
differences among districts in the frequency of mediation by represented defendants 
do not explain all of the disparity and might not explain any of it.  Only two 
represented defendants in the Eastern District settled the litigation through 
mediation.  Both agreed to some payment to Heritage, but so did a majority of those 
who settled without mediation.  Likewise, many represented defendants in the 
Central District agreed to some payment to Heritage without having mediated the 
dispute.  
Absent additional data, we can only speculate about other potential reasons for 
the generally more advantageous settlement outcomes accruing to represented 
defendants in the Northern District.  Without exhausting the possibilities, perhaps 
attorneys who represented defendants in the Northern District adversary 
proceedings more frequently perceived that the assigned bankruptcy judge would be 
especially exacting in considering Heritage's fraud claims—another potential 
feature of local legal culture.  Communicating that perception to Heritage's out-of-
the-area attorneys might have provided the defendants with more effective 
settlement leverage. 382  Perhaps more attorneys who represented defendants in 
                                                                                                                         
379  Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal 
Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 
804 (1994). Professor Jean Braucher earlier described local legal culture somewhat more narrowly as the 
context created by local administrative practices of judges and trustees and prevailing professional attitudes. 
See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
501, 503 (1993).  
380 Mediation of adversary proceedings is available in all four districts. See, e.g., Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 
9040-1 to 9050-1. 
381 See Joint Status Report at 2, In re Hernandez, No. 11-04007 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2011), ECF No. 
13. 
382 The progress of two adversary proceedings before the same judge in the Central District illustrates how 
Heritage might have been influenced to settle or abandon an adversary proceeding because of its perception 
of a judge's proclivity. The progress of those two adversary proceedings also supports this Article's claim 
that Heritage's adversary 218 proceedings were functionally identical. 
In a proceeding involving non-appearing defendant Maria Becerra, Heritage filed a motion for default 
judgment in April 2011. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Final Default Judgment by the Court Against Maria R. Becerra, In re Becerra, No. 10-01517 (Bankr. 
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Northern District adversary proceedings, in contrast to their counterparts in other 
districts, had created or joined an effective network of communication with one 
another (by happenstance or otherwise) and utilized that network in the Heritage 
adversary proceedings for the exchange of information, ideas, work product, or 
simply moral support. 383  Perhaps, fortuitously, more attorneys who represented 
defendants in Northern District adversary proceedings, in contrast to their 
counterparts in other districts, provided representation pro bono or at reduced rates. 
Communicating that information to Heritage would diminish Heritage's settlement 
leverage because Heritage would know that the defendant's continuation of 
litigation would be less expensive to the defendant than Heritage might otherwise 
anticipate.  Whether for these or other reasons, most represented defendants in the 
Northern District who settled with Heritage were more fortunate than represented 
defendants in other districts. 
 
IV.    RESHUFFLING THE STACKED DECK 
 
The Heritage adversary proceedings in California bankruptcy courts were not 
unique.  It also filed fifty adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy courts of Florida, 
Nevada, and Arizona in 2011 and 2012.384 Waugh Real Estate Holdings, another 
                                                                                                                         
C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011), ECF No. 12. Following a hearing on the motion in June 2011, the court requested 
supplemental briefing on the issue of reliance. Court's Request for Supplemental Brief on Justifiable 
Reliance in Motion for Default Judgment, supra note 140. After Heritage submitted supplemental briefing, 
the court denied the motion. Denial of Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra, supra note 144. After 
Heritage submitted additional supplemental briefing, the court again denied the motion. Order Denying 
Entry of Judgment Against Defendant Maria Becerra, supra note 146. In a second proceeding before the 
same judge involving non-appearing defendant Jose Villegas, Heritage filed a motion for default judgment in 
May 2011, three weeks after filing the same motion in the Becerra adversary proceeding, but sought a 
judgment without hearing. See Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Default Judgment by the Court, In re 
Villegas, supra note 147. The court took no action on the motion, but Heritage, presumably awaiting the 
court's decision on its earlier filed motion in Becerra, also took no further action on the motion (other than 
seeking a protective order). See Docket, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010). In 
March 2013, the court issued an order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. See Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute, supra note 147. Shortly 
thereafter Heritage requested dismissal of the proceeding. Request for Dismissal of Defendant Jose 
Asuncion Villegas, supra note 147. The court then dismissed the action. See Order on Dismissal of 
Defendant Jose Asuncion Villegas, In re Villegas, No. 10-01526 (Mar. 27, 2013), ECF No. 22.  
383 The geographically more compact dimensions of the Northern District might facilitate the formation 
and effectiveness of such a network because of the increased likelihood of personal interaction at 
professional gatherings or in court. Although the Northern District stretches along the California coast from 
Monterey County in the south to Del Norte County in the north, a distance of approximately 400 miles, 
Heritage filed adversary proceedings exclusively in the San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose divisions of 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. The dimensions of the San Francisco Bay area 
are considerably smaller than those of the Central District, where filings occurred in divisions as distant from 
one another as Santa Barbara and Riverside Counties, and also considerably smaller than those of the 
Eastern District, where filings occurred in divisions as distant from one another as Fresno and Sacramento 
Counties.  
384 PACER searches revealing these filings are on file with author. Review of the documents filed in these 
fifty proceedings was beyond the scope of this study. Complaints in three of them, one chosen at random 
from the filings in each of the three states, mimic the complaints Heritage filed in California bankruptcy 
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debt buyer, filed nine adversary proceedings in Nevada bankruptcy courts in 2011, 
2012, and 2013, each comparable in factual allegations and theory to those filed by 
Heritage. 385  Nor are such adversary proceedings likely to be exceptional given 
continuing securitization of some revenue streams that may derive from dubious 
lending practices, borrower fraud, or both.386 There is thus good reason to consider 
reshuffling the stacked deck in anticipation of future opportunities for repeat filing 
debt buyers or other plaintiffs who are not the originating creditor ("covered 
entity").387 Easier and less expensive access to information, procedures for transfer 
and consolidation of related adversary proceedings, and amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code's attorney fee shifting statute would mitigate the advantages of 
covered entities, increase the consistency of trial court decisions, and reduce 
unnecessary duplication of both attorney and judicial effort.  
  
A.    Reducing Information Asymmetry 
 
Local bankruptcy rules in each of California's four federal districts require that 
a plaintiff initiating an adversary proceeding file an Adversary Proceeding Cover 
Sheet ("Cover Sheet") with the complaint.388 Among other things, the Cover Sheet, 
an official bankruptcy form, requires the plaintiff to provide information about any 
related adversary proceeding.389 Heritage filed a Cover Sheet in all but three of the 
                                                                                                                         
courts. See Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Rey, No. 11-01764 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2011), ECF No. 1; Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt, In re Spartacus, No. 
11-01145 (Bankr. D. Nev. June 6, 2011), ECF No. 1; Plaintiff's Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of 
Debt, In re Williams, No. 11-01159 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 28, 2011), ECF No. 1. 
385 Copies of each complaint are on file with author. In one of these adversary proceedings, the defendant 
prevailed at trial upon the court's finding that Heritage had failed to sustain its burden of proving both 
defendant's knowing or intentional misrepresentations and reliance by the originating lender. See In re 
Daecharkhom, 481 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2012), rev'd in part, In re Daecharkhom, 505 B.R. 898 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2014) (reversing limitation on award of defendant's attorney's fees).  
386 For example, potentially dubious lending practices in generating securitized subprime auto loans have 
prompted Justice Department coordination of a nationwide investigation of whether loans were based on 
falsified income or employment information. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Investment 
Riches Built on Auto Loans to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2015, at A1; see also Al Yoon & Katy Burne, 
Investors Clamor for Risky Debt Offerings, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2014, at C1 (strong demand for high yield 
investments has led to loosening of some underwriting standards).  
387 A debt buyer could be defined, as it is in California, as "a person or entity that is regularly engaged in 
the business of purchasing charged-off consumer debt for collection purposes, whether it collects the debt 
itself, hires a third party for collection, or hires an attorney-at-law for collection litigation." CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1788.50(a)(1) (2012). Heritage disputed its characterization as a debt buyer, claiming instead an intricate 
relationship with the owner of the claims that it was asserting. See supra note 2. Accordingly, to prevent 
evasion of the procedures, covered entities could be defined more broadly, as suggested in the text. 
388 See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 7003-1; Bankr. E.D. Cal. R. 7003-1; Bankr. C.D. Cal. R.  7003-1; Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. R.  7003-1. 
389  Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet at 2 (revised Aug. 2007), ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/adversary-proceeding-cover-sheet (last visited Feb. 2, 
2016). This form of the Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet (Form 104) was replaced effective December 1, 
2015 by a revised form (Form 1040) that revised only its number. Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet 
(revised Dec. 2015), ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-
forms/adversary-proceeding-cover-sheet-0 (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
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adversary proceedings (presumably inadvertently failing to do so in those three).  In 
the portion of the Cover Sheet calling for information about a related adversary 
proceeding, Heritage provided no information about comparable adversary 
proceedings it had filed.  Instead, it consistently identified the very adversary 
proceeding that it was filing as "related to" the debtor's underlying bankruptcy 
case. 390  That surely is not the meaning of "related adversary proceeding." An 
adversary proceeding ipso facto arises in and is related to the underlying bankruptcy 
case, and the Cover Sheet also requires the plaintiff to separately provide 
information about the underlying bankruptcy case.391 To re-identify the adversary 
proceeding being filed as related to the underlying bankruptcy case thus provides no 
additional information.  Bankruptcy local rules for the Northern District of 
California make this clear, defining a "related adversary proceeding" as those in 
which both adversary proceedings concern some of the same parties and are based 
on the same or similar claims or when both "appear likely to involve duplication of 
labor or might create conflicts and unnecessary expenses if heard by different 
judges."392 
Heritage may have overlooked that definition, considered it inapplicable, or 
deliberately ignored it.  But no one seems to have noticed.  PACER documents 
reveal no instance in which any defendant raised this issue; they also reveal no 
instance in which any bankruptcy judge criticized or sanctioned Heritage for 
improper completion of the Cover Sheet even though at least some of the judges 
were aware that Heritage had filed comparable actions in the same division, the 
same district, or other districts.393 The Cover Sheet may simply be so pro forma that 
attorneys and judges pay insufficient attention to its proper completion.  Moreover, 
given the format of the Cover Sheet, it is not surprising and probably not 
blameworthy for Heritage to have completed the form as it did, unless it 
deliberately refrained from identifying the other adversary proceedings that it had 
filed.  The Cover Sheet provides space for information about only one related 
adversary proceeding (without inviting an attachment to list additional related 
adversary proceedings), calls for that information in the same outlined box in which 
the plaintiff is required to identify the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, and offers 
no guidance on the subject in its instructions.394 It certainly does not seem to have 
been designed to alert defendants or the court to a covered entity's mass filing of 
comparable adversary proceedings.  
                                                                                                                         
390 See, e.g., Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet at 2, In re Gonzalez, No. 11-02088 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 
7, 2011), ECF No. 2.  
391 See id.  
392 See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 7042-1(a). Bankruptcy local rules for the Eastern District of California offer a 
nearly identical definition of related cases. See Bankr. E.D. Cal. R. 123(a). Bankruptcy local rules for the 
Southern District of California offer a somewhat less expansive definition. See Bankr. S.D. Cal. R.  7003-2. 
Bankruptcy local rules for the Central District of California do not define a related adversary proceeding. See 
Bankr. C.D. Cal. R.  7003-1–7069-2.  
393 See supra text accompanying note 156.  
394 Adversary Proceeding Cover Sheet, supra note 390, at 1–2.  
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Revised instructions on and formatting changes to the Cover Sheet (or an 
alternative form of Cover Sheet for covered entities) could insure increased 
disclosure of related adversary proceedings if proper completion of such a revised 
Cover Sheet were to be enforceable by sanctions.  Alternatively, or in addition, 
federal procedural rules could be amended to require that a covered entity furnish 
information about related adversary proceedings in the mandatory initial disclosures 
already required without a discovery request. 395  The covered entity would be 
required to supplement these disclosures as it filed additional related adversary 
proceedings.396 
Better still, a covered entity could be required to establish, maintain, and 
regularly update a website, searchable by district and time of filing, listing all of its 
related adversary proceedings.  To save defendants and their attorneys the 
significant cost of searching PACER for potentially helpful information from each 
proceeding so listed, the covered entity could also be required to upload to the 
website, and link to, each dispositive court order rendered in response to identified 
types of motions (e.g. a motion for default judgment, a motion to dismiss, or a 
motion for summary judgment) or rendered following trial.397 The covered entity 
would also be required to identify and provide the URL for the website in its Cover 
Sheet.  Free open source software is available to create the website and the expense 
of hosting the website would be trivial. 398  An employee's time in creating the 
website and uploading dispositive court orders would add to the expense, but 
probably in an amount only marginally increasing the covered entity's cost of doing 
business.  
  
B.    A Better Mechanism for Transfer and Consolidation 
 
Beyond simple disclosure of information about "related" proceedings, the likely 
purpose of the Cover Sheet is to alert defendants or judges to the possibility of 
either consolidation of adversary proceedings pending before the same judge or 
transfer of an adversary proceeding to another judge before whom a related 
adversary proceeding is then pending.  Federal rules authorize consolidation of 
                                                                                                                         
395 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 7026. A party failing to provide mandatory initial disclosures is subject to a wide variety of sanctions, 
including dismissal of the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary 
proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7037.  
396  A party must supplement its initial disclosures in a timely manner if its initial disclosures are 
incomplete in some material respect. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1), made applicable to bankruptcy adversary 
proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026. 
397 Similar websites have been utilized in connection with management of a class action. See, e.g., Vibram 
FiveFingers Class Action, HEFFLER CLAIMS GROUP, https://www.fivefingerssettlement.com/ (last visited 
June 4, 2015).  
398  Free open source software to create the website is available at WORDPRESS.COM, 
https://wordpress.com/ (last visited June 4, 2015). Low cost hosting of a website is available at BLUEHOST, 
http://www.bluehost.com/ (last visited June 4, 2015).  
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actions involving a common question of law or fact399 for the purpose, among 
others, of conserving the resources of the court and the parties and to avoid 
inconsistent or conflicting results. 400  But consolidation simply brings together 
proceedings then pending before a single judge.401 Local bankruptcy rules in the 
Northern District of California go further, authorizing transfer of an adversary 
proceeding to another judge in the district for the same reasons.402 Local bankruptcy 
rules in the Central and Southern Districts are either less expansive or less explicit 
on the subject but nonetheless seem to comprehend the same general theme: two or 
more adversary cases presenting issues that can more consistently and efficiently be 
resolved by one judge should be resolved by one judge.403 Local bankruptcy rules 
for the Eastern District do not provide for such a transfer, but the Eastern District 
requirement to file a Cover Sheet that lists a related adversary proceeding implies 
that a judge in that district is empowered to order such a transfer. 
No defendant or judge sought transfer of any Heritage adversary proceeding to 
another judge hearing another Heritage adversary proceeding.  The intra-district 
transfer procedure alone is in any event ill-suited to bringing together before a 
single judge a multitude of related adversary proceedings filed by a covered entity 
over time in multiple districts and multiple divisions within each district.  Heritage 
filed the adversary proceedings over a roughly two-year period.  No one (perhaps 
not even Heritage) could have predicted at the outset how many proceedings it 
would file in each division or each district.  Spotting the pattern of virtually 
identical proceedings would take time.  By the time someone spotted the pattern, 
some of the proceedings earlier initiated would have been closed.  Even putting 
these practical obstacles aside, it would not have been feasible to transfer a large 
number of the Heritage adversary proceedings to one judge without an overarching 
mechanism for adjusting distribution of caseloads and dealing with a variety of 
procedural issues.404  
Concepts and procedures identified in the Federal Judicial Center's Manual for 
Complex Litigation ("Manual") 405  and in the federal multi-district litigation 
                                                                                                                         
399 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42, made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings by FED. R. BANKR. P. 
7042.  
400 See 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 42.10[4] (3d ed. 2015).  
401 Id. § 42.11[1].  
402 See Bankr. N.D. Cal. R. 7042-1(d). Because local bankruptcy rules of the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of California govern each of its four divisions (San Jose, Oakland, San Francisco, and 
Santa Rosa), this rule presumably authorizes transfer of a proceeding not simply within a division but also to 
another division in the same district. 
403 See Bankr. S.D. Cal. R. 7042-1(a) 7003-2, 7042-1; Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 1073-1. 
404 Although it might have been feasible to transfer the six Heritage adversary proceedings filed in the San 
Francisco Division of the Northern District to one judge sitting in that division or the seven Heritage 
adversary proceedings filed in the Santa Ana Division of the Central District to one judge sitting in that 
division, it would not have been feasible to transfer the forty-seven Heritage adversary proceedings filed in 
the Los Angeles Division of the Central District to one judge in that division, or the 125 Heritage adversary 
proceedings filed in the Central District to one judge sitting in that district.  
405 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).  
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statute406 suggest a mechanism that could make such transfers feasible, either across 
divisions or across districts.  Both contemplate consolidation of actions before a 
single judge (or in some cases more than one judge) to foster consistent outcomes 
and conserve judicial resources,407 but neither applied to the Heritage adversary 
proceedings.  The Manual applies to complex litigation; the Heritage adversary 
proceedings, viewed individually, were not complex.  The federal statute applies 
only if civil actions in multiple districts involve one or more common questions of 
fact.408 The Heritage adversary proceeding raised separate questions of fact: Did the 
defendant misrepresent salient facts to a specific lender?  Were the 
misrepresentations intentional?  Were they material?  Did the lender actually and 
either reasonably or justifiably rely on those misrepresentations? 
Selected features from both, however, could be adapted to the context of related 
adversary proceedings initiated by a covered entity.  Without exhausting or refining 
the possibilities here, we may imagine several potential features of this new 
mechanism:  
 
1. A revised Cover Sheet defining a related adversary proceeding, requiring 
a covered entity to so identify itself, inviting attachments in which the 
covered entity identifies related adversary proceedings, including those 
already dismissed or terminated, and including a statement, if applicable, 
that the covered entity contemplates the filing of additional related 
adversary proceedings within the ensuing year.409 In lieu of attachments, the 
Cover Sheet could require a covered entity to identify the address of a 
website established by the covered entity that provides information about 
related adversary proceedings, as suggested above.410 
2. A procedure for determining whether to transfer multiple qualifying 
adversary proceedings to a single judge and for identifying the judge, 
triggered, perhaps, by the filing of at least a minimum number of related 
adversary proceedings each of whose claims exceed a minimum amount 
(e.g. five related adversary proceedings each with claims exceeding 
$10,000).411 
                                                                                                                         
406 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).  
407 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 405, §§ 10.1, 20.13, 20.131; JAMES WM. MOORE 
ET AL., supra note 400, §§ 112.02[1][a], 112.04[1][a].  
408 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., supra note 400, § 112.04[1][b].  
409 For an example of a rule requiring disclosure of related federal district court actions, including those 
"about to be filed" and those that may have already been dismissed or otherwise terminated, see D. Alaska 
Civ. R. 40.2, http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/reference/rules/lr/civil.pdf (last visited June 2, 2015).  
410 See supra text accompanying notes 397–98.  
411  The Northern District of California offers a procedural model for transfer of related adversary 
proceedings within a district. See supra note 402. The federal multidistrict litigation statute offers a 
procedural model (use of a judicial panel on multidistrict litigation) applicable to multidistrict litigation 
involving common questions of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). Federal law authorizes the appointment of 
retired district or circuit court judges who might serve, id. §§ 294–96, and that authority could be expanded 
to include retired bankruptcy judges. If transfer is to be made to a sitting bankruptcy judge, each district 
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3. When a large number of adversary proceedings warrant (as in the 
Heritage example), a procedure for transferring the proceedings to a three-
judge panel.412 
4. Authority of the transferee judge(s) to decide common questions of law 
such as, in the Heritage cases, the applicability of California's limitation on 
fraud claims or Heritage's standing to pursue fraud claims.  
5. Deferral of any default judgment until common questions of law are 
resolved in contested proceedings.  
 
Use of such a mechanism would both increase the consistency of dispositive 
rulings and conserve judicial and party resources in related bankruptcy adversary 
proceedings initiated by covered entities.  There was much consistency to be gained 
and many resources to conserve in the 218 Heritage adversary proceedings, which, 
in pursuit of $21,267,016, occupied the time of forty-seven bankruptcy judges, four 
bankruptcy appellate panels, and 126 attorneys for defendants. 
This proposed mechanism would not address the much more extensive 
inconsistencies and inefficiencies likely generated by a covered entity's litigation of 
functionally identical claims in both federal and state judicial forums.  Recall that 
Heritage filed three lawsuits joining multiple non-bankruptcy defendants in federal 
district court and hundreds of lawsuits against non-bankruptcy defendants in 
California's state courts.  The lawsuits in federal district court pursued claims 
functionally identical to those asserted in the Heritage adversary proceedings and 
the lawsuits in California's state courts likely did so as well.  Discussion of potential 
mechanisms for consolidation of actions filed in both federal and state judicial 
forums or coordination of discovery, settlement, pre-trial and other proceedings in 
such actions is beyond the scope of this Article, but others have considered such 
mechanisms.413 
 
C.   Amendment of the Attorney Fee Shifting Provision 
 
Three amendments to section 523(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, made applicable 
to covered entities, would sharpen its teeth.  First, covered entities claiming 
nondischargeability for fraud could be required to post a bond to secure payment of 
an attorney's fee judgment.  Heritage did not pay attorney's fees judgments entered 
against it, even after losing appeals of those judgments and well before it filed 
                                                                                                                         
could determine for itself how caseloads should be adjusted, as suggested for complex civil litigation. See 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 405, § 10.12.  
412 The federal multidistrict litigation statute contemplates the possibility of transferring litigation to more 
than one judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2012). To avoid inconsistent rulings, the majority of a three-judge 
panel could adopt a ruling applicable to all proceedings.  
413 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
ANALYSIS (1994); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER AND NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION, A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2013); William W. 
Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss, & Alan. Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in 
State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992).  
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bankruptcy.414 Together with amendments suggested below, the bond's assurance of 
payment of an attorney's fee judgment might encourage more contingent fee 
representation of defendants sued by covered entities.  
Second, upon suffering a judgment that a debt is discharged, such creditors 
could be made liable for a defendant's attorney's fees whether or not the creditor's 
claim was substantially justified, reverting to a standard applicable before a 1984 
amendment to section 523(d).  When originally enacted in 1978, substantial 
justification for a creditor's claim did not protect the creditor from an award of 
attorney's fees to the debtor.  If a consumer debt were discharged in an adversary 
proceeding, the section directed the bankruptcy court to award attorney's fees to the 
debtor unless "clearly inequitable."415 The current version of the section, enacted by 
as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,416 
aimed to strike "the appropriate balance between protecting the debtor from 
unreasonable challenges to dischargeability of debts and not deterring creditors 
from making challenges when it is reasonable to do so."417 Findings of this study 
suggest that, at least in the case of covered entities, the 1984 amendment may have 
tipped the balance too far in the creditor's direction.418  
Finally, covered entities could also be made liable for a defendant's additional 
attorney's fees incurred in response to a covered entity's unsuccessful appeal from a 
judgment that a debt subject to section 523(d) has been discharged or from a 
judgment awarding attorney's fees to the defendant under section 523(d).  In the 
Ninth Circuit at least, section 523(d) does not authorize attorney's fees to a 
                                                                                                                         
414 See supra notes 345–54 and accompanying text.  
415 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2592 (current version at 
11 U.S.C. § 523(d) (2012)).  
416 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 307(b), 98 Stat. 
333.  
417 S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 9–10 (1983) (accompanying the Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 
1983, S. 445, 98th Cong. § 209(b) (1983), the predecessor bill to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984).  
418 In a May 30, 1997 memorandum to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Judge Samuel 
Bufford, Professor Margaret Howard, Professor Jeffrey Morris, and Judge Eugene Wedoff recommended 
even more drastic amendment of section 523(d), for similar reasons: 
 
Costs and fees may be awarded only if 'the position of the creditor was not substantially 
justified' and may not be awarded if 'special circumstances would make the award 
unjust.' These conditions have resulted in a reluctance by many courts to award fees 
and costs to prevailing debtors, with the result that debtors cannot be assured of 
recovering their costs of litigation when they prevail. This, in turn, provides a 
substantial incentive to debtors to agree to settlements even of nondischargeability 
claims that are not well founded. To encourage adequate representation of consumer 
debtors, we strongly recommend that, as to debtors with primarily consumer debts, the 
award of costs and attorneys' fees be mandatory. 
 
NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY 
REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, app. G-1.c at 27 (Oct. 20, 1997).  
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defendant in these circumstances.419 Only an appellate court may award such fees 
and only for a frivolous appeal. 420  This limitation imposes upon defendants a 
potentially significant, perhaps insurmountable, economic burden of defending 
against a non-frivolous appeal by a covered entity, with no prospect of 
reimbursement for attorney's fees if successful. 
 
V.     CONCLUSION 
 
In economic, political, or philosophical debates, Heritage might well be praised, 
defended, or vilified for its lawsuits.  It might be praised for seeking to redress 
prevarication that contributed to an economic crisis.  It might be defended for 
contributing to the availability of credit at lower prices by purchasing and thereby 
reducing losses from stale debt.421 It might be vilified for scavenging among the 
financial ruins of individuals duped and exploited by greedy and mendacious 
brokers or enabled by devil-may-care lenders.   
Those debates aside, the Heritage adversary proceedings described here offer a 
rare laboratory for testing the extent to which our entry-level justice system 
measures up to our aspirations for "Equal Justice Under Law." We are unlikely to 
find many conditions better suited to empirical exploration of that question: (1) civil 
litigation filed during a relatively brief time span by one plaintiff against 266 
defendants (including co-defendant spouses); (2) some defendants defaulting, some 
defendants appearing pro se, and some represented by an attorney; (3) dispersal of 
the litigation among forty-seven different bankruptcy court judges, all sitting in one 
state (and thus, where applicable, required to apply the relevant substantive law of a 
single state); and (4) legal claims and factual allegations by the plaintiff so nearly 
identical that each dispute is resolvable on the basis of one obvious and 
straightforward factual question (reliance by an originating lender on a borrower's 
misrepresentations) or on the basis of three less obvious and more complex legal 
rules (a California statutory limitation on fraud claims and two alternative varieties 
of a standing defense).  The results in the Heritage adversary proceedings evidence 
an unacceptable level of randomly distributed justice at the trial court level, 
generated as much by the idiosyncratic behaviors of judges, lawyers, and parties as 
by even handed application of law.   
Appellate decision making is well documented, in both reported and unreported 
opinions that are easily accessible.  It therefore garners ongoing attention and reams 
of published analysis.  Trial court justice, exponentially more frequent and less well 
documented is largely hidden from view.  
                                                                                                                         
419 See Vasseli v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Vasseli), 5 F.3d 351, 353–54 (9th Cir. 1993); contra In re 
Wiencek, 58 B.R. 485, 489 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).  
420 See FED. R. APP. P. 38. An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious or the appellant's arguments 
are wholly without merit. E.g., Bell v. City of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991). 
421 The Federal Trade Commission cited several empirical studies in support of this proposition in a 2013 
report of its study of the debt buying industry. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 11 n.48.  
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PACER helps us peel back some of the layers of federal trial court justice but it 
is an imperfect research tool.  Unless supplemented by digital recording of hearings 
and trials (as in the Northern District of California422), it does not capture what 
sometimes may be important exchanges between attorneys and judges or 
explanations for a judge's written orders.  It obviously does not purport to capture 
critical communications between the attorneys and their clients or communications 
between attorneys for each party.423 This study's extensive reliance on PACER-
derived data thus necessarily paints an incomplete, perhaps occasionally flawed, 
picture of the adversary proceedings it has described and analyzed.  
The data from this study nonetheless offer a revealing and sobering view of the 
nature, quality, and value of legal representation in civil litigation and the contours 
of justice dispensed by trial court judges.  It suggests and warns that the justice 
delivered by our litigation system falls well short of our aspirations, not simply in 
the relatively narrow context of bankruptcy adversary proceedings or actions by 
debt buyers, but, by implication, more broadly, in all trial level contexts. 
422 See supra note 10. 
423 Interviews with defendants would have enriched this study but attempts to contact a large number of 
the defendants were unsuccessful. Using addresses listed on the docket of the relevant adversary proceeding, 
the author wrote to defendants in 136 of the adversary proceedings requesting an interview, enclosing a 
consent form mandated by a Human Subjects Committee and a stamped envelope addressed to the author. 
The postal service returned twenty-six interview requests as undeliverable. Of the remainder, only three 
responded (2.2% of those mailed and 2.7% of those presumed delivered), each consenting to an interview on 
the consent form. Conversations with those three defendants are described supra note 324. Given the meager 
response rate, requests for an interview of defendants in the remaining eighty-two proceedings were not 
mailed. In a recent study of bankruptcy stigma, the researcher reported essentially identical results when 
soliciting interviews of 2,822 bankruptcy debtors who were to indicate consent to an interview by returning a 
pre-paid addressed postcard listing contact information. See Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-
Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L. J. 435, 462 (2013) (2.1% of those mailed and 2.5% of those presumed 
deliverable).  
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